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Squaring Faith and Sexuality:
Religious Institutions and the Unique
Challenge of Sports
Robin Fretwell Wilsont
In 2014, the Minnesota Vikings released punter Chris Kluwe
from the team for, in his words, his "activism for same-sex
marriage rights."1 Imagine instead that Kluwe was kicked off the
team while playing college football at one of the more than 1000
t. Roger and Stephany Joslin Professor of Law; Director, Family Law and
Policy Program; Co-Director, Epstein Program in Health Law and Policy,
University of Illinois College of Law. A version of this Article was presented at
Playing with Pride: LGBT Inclusion in Sports at the University of Minnesota
School of Law, at a faculty workshop at the Seattle University School of Law, the
2016 Conference of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, the Fairness to All Forum at
Messiah College, and at the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Religion or
Belief and Sexuality in Geneva, Switzerland. I thank Ajay T. Abraham, Stuart
Adams, Bryan Adamson, Kif Augustine-Adams, Heidi Brady, Peg Brinig, Carl
Esbeck, Marie Failinger, Rick Garnett, Fred Gedicks, Kent Greenawalt, Bridget
Hiedemann, Greg Lipper, Michael Leroy, Paul Stancil, Jim Stoner, and the editors
and staff of Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practicefor their helpful
comments. I am grateful for the excellent research assistance of Anna Gotfryd and,
especially, Robert Morse, without whom I could not have completed this Article.
The universities and colleges discussed in this Article have been sued, have been
the subject of media attention, or have been profiled in a Human Rights Campaign
(HRC) report, SARAH WARBELOW & REMINGTON GREGG, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,
TITLE Ix RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS PUTTING LGBT STUDENTS AT RISK (2015),
http://hrc-assets. s3-website-us-east1.amazonaws.com//files/assets/resources/Title IX Exemptions-Report.pdf.
The
University of Notre Dame is included as an example of a school that is inclusive of
LGBT students and faculty. See infra Part II.C; Part II.A.
1. Chris Kluwe, I Was an NFL Player Until I Was Fired by Two Cowards and
a Bigot, DEADSPIN (Jan. 2, 2014), http://deadspin.com/i-was-an-nfl-player-until-iwas-fired-by-two-cowards-an-1493208214. For a full accounts of events leading up
to the Vikings' decision to cut Kluwe from the team, see Memorandum from Donald
S. Prophete to Zygmunt Wilf, Chairman and Owner, and Mark Wilf, President and
Owner, Minn. Vikings (July 18, 2014), http://prod.preview.vikings.clubs.nfl.com
/assets/docs/20 14/july/full-kluwe-report.pdf.
This Article does not discuss speech interests separate from religious freedom
claims, although free speech claims may exist for both LGBT students and religious
institutions. In recent years, whether to protect corporate speech or corporate
religious freedom with the same fervor as individual speech or free exercise has
become controversial. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010);
Ronald Dworkin, The Decision That Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May
13,
2010),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2010/05/13/decision-threatensdemocracy/; see also THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Micah
Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, & Zo6 Robinson, eds., 2016).
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religious universities and colleges in the United States. 2 And
imagine that the religious university expelled Kluwe not because
he supported same-sex marriage, but because he came out as gay
while playing for the school-much like Michael Sam, the first
openly gay player drafted into the National Football League, came
out while at the University of Missouri. 3 Imagine further that
Kluwe and another male teammate became an item and coaches
asked intrusive questions like "do you guys push your beds
together in the dorm room? Do you guys sleep together?" 4 And
imagine that Kluwe answered truthfully, "Yes, we do."
Some would see all of these scenarios as nothing more than
5
rank discrimination against a player for living out his sexuality.
Others would say a commercial enterprise like the Minnesota
Vikings 6 has a much greater interest in controlling the public
image and conduct of the athletes it employs than a religious
university has in its student-athletes, 7 and would make no

2. Daniel Frost, Sexually Conservative Religious Universities and Tax
Exemption, J. CHURCH & STATE (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 4),
http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/20 16/07/07/jcs.csw49.full.pdf+html?sid=
e83aeebd-dc9d-4b74-aaaO-9a971377c25f (estimating that there are 1,014 religious
universities in the United States).
3. Bill Beacon, Michael Sam, NFL's 1st Openly Gay Draft Pick, Signs with
CFL, CTV NEWS (May 22, 2015, 2:48 PM), http://www.ctvnews.ca/sports/michaelsam-nfl-s- lst-openly-gay-draft-pick-signs-with-cfl- 1.2385993.
4. This hypothetical is adapted from allegations in the lawsuit filed against
Pepperdine University.
See Nathan Fenno, Former Basketball Players Sue
Pepperdine, Coach for Discrimination, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014, 5:10 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-pepperdine-coach-sued-fordiscrimination-20141217-story.html. This case is discussed further infra Part I.A.
5. Cyd Zeigler, Southern Christian College Bullies Another Gay Athlete Into
Silence,
OUTSPORTS
(Apr.
22,
2015,
9:07
AM),
http://www.outsports.com/2015/4/22/8459617/christian-college-gay-athlete-lgbtsilence. OutSports argues: "Itis time to give these schools a choice: Discontinue
your practice of forcing employees and students to sign any anti-LGBT lifestyle
contract or have your membership in the NCAA or [National Association of
Intercollegiate Athletics] revoked." Id.; see also Morgan Mitchell, How Christian
Universities Are Becoming a Battleground for LGBT Rights, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 3,
2016, 12:00
PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/how-christian-universities-arebecoming-battleground-lgbt-rights-422354 (quoting the Human Rights Campaign
as contending that there should be no exemptions to duties not to discriminate on
the basis of gender identity or sexual orientation).
6. Individual National Football League (NFL) teams operate for a profit.
After significant controversy, in 2015 the NFL voluntarily gave up its tax-exempt
status. See Andy Kroll, The NFL Is About To Pay Taxes for the First Time in More
than
70
Years, MOTHER
JONES
(Apr.
28,
2015,
5:54
PM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/04/nfl-roger-goodell-tax-exempt-change.
7. Sanctions of professional sportsmen for heinous acts underline the interest
that the NFL and its teams have in controlling players' behaviors, both on and off
the field. See, e.g., Danielle Paquette, Johnny Manziel Is the NFL's FirstDomestic
Violence Case in 2016. He Won't Be the Last., WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2016),
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distinctions.8 However, many Americans would see religious
institutions as being wholly different because these institutions
play a role in shaping the lives of students who follow a particular
faith tradition. 9 Some would say religious institutions legitimately
can "cultivate a community oriented around one particular
worldview," and they can ask students to live a life consistent with
10
that faith tradition.
The intuition that religious organizations should often be
given the freedom to operate within the tenets of their faiths has
been reflected throughout the law. Every state that has banned
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in hiring makes
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/20 16/02/09/johnny-manziel-is-thenfls-first-domestic-violence-case-in-2016-he-wont-be-the-last/;
NFL Arrests and
Charges, POINTAFTER, http://nfl-arrests.pointafter.com/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2016)
(listing violent crimes committed by NFL players); Shocking Video Shows

Baltimore Ravens Star Ray Rice 'DraggingHis Unconscious Girlfriend Out of an
Atlantic City Casino Elevator,' DAILY MAIL (Feb. 19, 2014, 9:49 PM),
http://www. dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2563240/Shocking-video-footage-showsBaltimore Ravens-running-Ray-Rice drag-girlfriend-Atlantic-City-casino -elevatorlegs.html.
8. Some oppose protections for LGBT individuals in any context, whether
religious or not. See Ryan T. Anderson, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
(SOGI) Laws
Threaten Freedom, HERITAGE
FOUND.
(Nov.
30,
2015),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/1 I/sexual-orientation-and-genderidentity-sogi-laws-threaten-freedom ("SOGI laws are bad public policy."). Some
who oppose protections believe homosexuality violates natural law and, as a
consequence, they believe that governments should not protect what they
understand as "choices" or "behavior," rather than orientation or identity. See John
Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049
(1994); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 642 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[W]here criminal sanctions are not involved, homosexual 'orientation' is an
acceptable stand-in for homosexual conduct.").
Certainly, opposition to marriage equality has receded significantly over the last
decade and will likely drop off as older individuals opposed to same-sex marriage
pass away. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Marriageof Necessity: Same-Sex Marriage
and Religious Liberty Protections, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161 (2014).
In
addition, within some major religious denominations, there are signs of increasing
acceptance of LGBT families. In a recent exhortation, Pope Francis recognized the
need to embrace all families, whether traditional "real" families or "irregular"
cohabitating and same-sex families. See Pope Francis, Amoris Laetitia [On Love in
the
Family],
VATICAN
PRESS
225-45
(Feb.
12,
2015),
https://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/pdf/apost-exhortations/documents/pap
a-francesco esortazione-ap_20160319_amoris-laetitia-en.pdf.
9. See KAYE COOK & CYNTHIA NEAL KIMBALL, IS A CHRISTIAN COLLEGE
EDUCATION 'WORTH IT'? WORLDVIEW DEVELOPMENT AMONG CHRISTIAN COLLEGE
STUDENTS
AS
A
MODEL
FOR
THE
LARGER
ACADEMY
(2011),
http://www.gordon.edu/download/pages/Is /20a /2OChristian /2OCollege /2OEduca
tion%20Worth%20it.pdf.

10. Ruth Graham, The ProfessorSuspended for Saying Muslims and Christians
Worship
One
God,
ATLANTIC
(Dec.
17,
2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/christian-college-suspendprofessor/421029/.
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some accommodation for religious employers.1 1 Indeed, religious
liberty protections appear in over two thousand federal and state
laws, 12 including federal laws that prohibit discrimination in
hiring, housing, and education.1 3 While some of those federal laws
date back decades and might be taken to reflect a now-discarded
respect for religion, the Obama Administration's significant
concessions for faith organizations opposed to the contraceptive
coverage mandate under the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act attests to a continuing space for faith organizations to
14
follow their religious convictions while abiding by the law.
This special solicitude for religion, however, has come under
increasing scrutiny and pushback, particularly in higher

11. Douglas Laycock, The Campaign Against Religious Liberty, in THE RISE OF
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 231, 251 n.91 (citing JEROME
HUNT, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A STATE-BY-STATE EXAMINATION OF NONDISCRIMINATION
LAWS
AND
POLICIES
3-4
(2012),
https://www.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/20 12/06/pdf/state non-discrimination.pdf).
12. James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
IconoclasticAssessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445 (1992).
13. See Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2014); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2014); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (2014);
Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1
(2010) (listing hundreds of laws with accommodations for religious believers). A
legislature may accommodate religion without running afoul of the First
Amendment's prohibition on establishment of religion. See, e.g., Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) ("[The Court] has never
indicated that statutes that give special consideration to religious groups are per se
invalid. That would run contrary to the teaching of our cases that there is ample
room for accommodation of religion under the Establishment Clause."). However,
naked preferences for religion without consideration of the interests of others can
violate the Establishment Clause. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S.
703 (1985).
14. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, When Governments Insulate Dissenters from
Social Change: What Hobby Lobby and Abortion Conscience Clauses Teach About
Specific Exemptions, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 703, 726 (2014) [hereinafter Wilson,
When Governments Insulate Dissenters from Social Change]; see also Douglas
Laycock, Neither Side Got What It Wanted: What Obama's Non-Discrimination
Executive Order Means Going Forward, FIRST THINGS (July 31, 2014),
http://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2014/07/neither-side-got-what-it-wanted
[hereinafter Laycock, Neither Side] (describing the Obama Administration's record
on protecting religious freedom as mixed, and noting that the Obama
"Administration has often chosen to protect religious liberty by quietly doing
nothing"). The Supreme Court's remand in Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557
(2016), to the circuit courts of appeals with instructions to "arrive at an approach
going forward that accommodates petitioners' religious exercise while at the same
time ensuring that women covered by petitioners' health plans 'receive full and
equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage,"' demonstrates that
compromise over religious accommodations remains within reach even as to the
most divisive obligations. Id. at 1560.
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education. 15 Moreover, all claims for religious protection face more
skepticism now than in the past. 16 The public overwhelmingly
17
sees distinctions based on sexual orientation as illegitimate.
Moreover, with the rise of the "nones"-individuals with no
religious affiliation-18 -many
now find the desire of religious
institutions to inscribe a faith-driven ethos on the institution to
be a source of "bafflement and mockery." 19
Exacerbating matters, universities are deeply intertwined
with government because of the financial support they and their
students receive from state and federal sources. 20 An increasing

15. Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, Office
for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Ron Wyden, U.S. Senator (Jan. 20, 2016),
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=49301FF8-076D-4F95-A13823C7247DAF2B&download= 1.
16. As one example, after Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014), "[b]attle lines ... form[ed] around whether" the federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2014), which was at the
heart of Hobby Lobby, "should be amended or even repealed." Times Editorial
Board, Hobby Lobby Ruling: Bad for Women's Rights, Bad for the Religious
Freedom
Restoration
Act,
L.A.
TIMES
(July
1,
2014),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-hobby-lobby-contraceptioncoverage-supreme-c-20140701-story.html ("[T]he decision threatens to fracture
what has been a bipartisan support for reasonable accommodation of religious
beliefs."). A bill circulating in Congress, but not yet introduced, would sweepingly
make RFRA unavailable for discrimination claims, labor and employment claims,
child-protection claims, health care claims, claims to benefits under any
government program, and in all suits when the government is not a party. See Do
No Harm Act, H.R. 5272, 114th Cong. (2015). When Congress enacted RFRA in
1993, it did so with overwhelming bipartisan support, passing unanimously in the
House and in the Senate with a vote of ninety-seven to three before being signed
into law by President Bill Clinton. See Katie Sanders, Did Barack Obama Vote for
Religious Freedom Restoration Act With 'Very Same' Wording as Indiana's?,
POLITIFACT
(Mar.
29,
2015,
6:57
PM),
www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/statements/2015/mar/29/mike-pence/did-barack-obama-vote-religiousfreedom-restoratio.
17. See ANDREW R. FLORES, WILLIAMS INST., NATIONAL TRENDS IN PUBLIC
OPINION

ON

LGBT

RIGHTS

IN

THE

UNITED

STATES

9-10

(2014),

http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/census-gbt-demographicsstudies/natl-trends-nov-2014/.
Seventy-five percent of Americans think it is
already illegal to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, which may
contribute to high levels of support for non-discrimination bans. Id.
For a
discussion of bipartisan support for non-discrimination laws, see infra note 120 and
accompanying text.
18. See Michael Lipka, A Closer Look at America's Rapidly Growing Religious
"Nones,' PEW RES. CTR. (May 13, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/05/13/a-closer-look-at-americas-rapidly-growing-religious-nones/.
"Nones" make up 2 3 % of our population, up from 16% in 2007. Id. Being a "none"
does not mean being an atheist-a significant fraction of "nones" are spiritual, even
though they do not identify with a formal religion. Id.
19. Graham, supra note 10.
20. PEW
EDUCATION:

CHARITABLE CTR., FEDERAL AND STATE FUNDING OF
A
CHANGING
LANDSCAPE
9,
11-12

HIGHER
(2015),
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number of municipal and state governments ban discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, and religious
organizations are accommodated to varying extents within that
patchwork of laws.21 Together, the significant financial tethers
and the large number of regulations imposed upon religious
universities give governments incredible power to influence
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2015/06/federal-state-funding-higher-ed
ucation final.pdf; Thomas G. Mortenson, State Funding: A Race to the Bottom, AM.
COUNCIL
ON
EDUC.,
http://www.acenet.edu/the-presidency/columns-andfeatures/Pages/state-funding-a-race-to-the-bottom. aspx (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
Consider student aid under Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
2000d (2012), which bars "discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion or
national origin" by "public elementary and secondary schools and public
institutions of higher learning." See
Types of Educational Opportunities
Discrimination, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/typeseducational-opportunities-discrimination (last visited June 19, 2016) [hereinafter
Types of Educational Opportunities Discrimination]. One can conceive of the Pell
Grant program under Title IV as a kind of voucher that students may use at any
university that qualifies under Title IV. U.S. DEP'T EDUC., Federal Pell Grants Are
Usually Awarded Only to Undergraduate Students.https://studentaid.ed.gov/
sa/types/grants-scholarships/pell (last visited July 15, 2016). Students elect where
they go to school and, therefore, where they will spend their Pell Grants. Id. This
'private choice" complicates the notion that facilities receive government support
when accepting Pell grants. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652
(2002) (holding that school vouchers paid with public funds did not violate the
Establishment Clause even when used disproportionately to pay for private
religious schools because where to spend the voucher was the student's private
choice).
Title IX applies in the primary and secondary education context as well, where
parents' interests in raising children in particular faith traditions are also
implicated. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (discussing religious
interests of parents in the primary and secondary education context). The unique
considerations animating religious schooling for children are beyond the scope of
this Article. However, the treatment of transgender and gay students in religious
primary and secondary schools has sparked considerable controversy. See, e.g.,
Eder Campuzzano, Lutheran School Tried To Discourage Gay, Transgender
Students from Enrolling: Report, OREGONIAN (May 20, 2016, 7:30PM),
http://www.oregonlive.com/today/index.ssf/2016/05/lutheran-school-discourages-lg
bt enrollment.html#incart email. Like Pell Grants for students, "free" lunches for
qualifying students also trigger Title IX duties, even though the lunch program
directly benefits students rather than the school itself. See Russo v. Diocese of
Greensburg, No. 09-1169 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2010) (memorandum and order
granting in part and denying in part defendants' motion to dismiss) (finding that
Title IX applied to a private Catholic high school when another school in the same
diocese accepted federal lunch program assistance); Beth Scott, Title IX Applies to
Private
Schools,
AM.
ASS'N
U.
WOMEN
(Oct.
12,
2010),
http://www.aauw.org/2010/10/12/private-schools/.
Of course, schools may receive
more federal aid than just participating in the National School Lunch Program.
See Letter from Craig Breitkreutz, Principal, St. John's Lutheran Sch., to Parents
(Feb.
29,
2016),
http://www.wiscnews.com/pdf_6f8f4c2d-53d3-538e-bf62b4126bb5807f.html?utm medium=social&utm source=email&utm campaign=user
-share (noting that the Lutheran school received "public funding through the lunch
program, busing, and through NCLB (No Child Left Behind)").
21. See infra Part I.

2016]

Squaring Faith and Sexuality

religiously affiliated schools, possibly even by punishing them for
adhering to disfavored views on marriage and sexuality.
Private accrediting and certification bodies also exert
significant influence because their approval is often the difference
between economic viability and closure. 22 Compounding all of this,
institutions are now open to unprecedented scrutiny as a result of
efforts to shed light on practices that, in the past, remained
outside the public eye. 23 Some predict that negative media
coverage itself could prove "disastrous for religious colleges
24
already struggling with tight budgets and uncertain futures."
Two recent developments highlight these risks. First, on
December 18, 2015, the Human Rights Campaign (HRC)
published a report on Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 (Title IX) entitled Hidden Discrimination:Title IX Religious
Exemptions Putting LGBT Students at Risk. The report profiles
fifty-six colleges and universities across twenty-six states that
have sought waivers to act in accord with "specific tenets of the[ir]
religion[s]." 25 More than 73,000 students attend schools that have
received waivers, some specifically related to LGBT students,
although enrolled students may not realize this. 26 The report
ultimately called on the agency charged with enforcing Title IX,
28
27
the Department of Education (ED), "to take action."
22. See
Things
to
Consider: Accreditation, FED.
STUDENT AID,
https://studentaid.ed. gov/sa/prepare-for-college/choosingschools/consider#accreditation (last visited June 19, 2016).
23. See David R. Wheeler, Gay Marriage and the Future of Evangical Colleges,
ATLANTIC
(July
14,
2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/
education/archive/20 15/07/evangelical-colleges-struggle-gay-marriageruling/398306/.; infra Part II.A (describing publicity around Title IX waivers).
24. Wheeler, supra note 23.
25. SARAH WARBELOW & REMINGTON GREGG, HIDDEN DISCRIMINATION: TITLE
IX RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS PUTTING LGBT STUDENTS AT RISK 5 (2015), http://hrcassets.s3-website-us-east-

1.amazonaws.com//files/assets/resources/Title IX ExemptionsReport.pdf; see HRC
Calls on Department of Education To Take Action Following Anti-LGBT Religious
Exemption

Requests,

HUM.

RTS.

CAMPAIGN

(Dec.

18,

2015),

http://www.hrc.org/blog/hrc-calls-on-department-of-education-to-take-actionfollowing-anti-lgbt [hereinafter HRC Calls on Department of Education].
26. WARBELOW & GREGG, supra note 25, at 3.
27. Title IX and Sex Discrimination, OFF.

CIV.

RTS.

(Apr.

29,

2015),

http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix-dis.html [hereinafter Title IX and
Sex Discrimination].
28. HRC Calls on Department of Education, supra note 25. HRC urged ED to
require schools that have requested exemptions to inform their prospective
students and communities and to release a report to the public every year listing
all the schools that received exemptions. Id. Copies of letters requesting waivers
are posted online. See Andy Birkey, Dozens of Christian Schools Win Title IX
Waivers
to
Ban
LGBT
Students,
COLUMN
(Dec.
1,
2015),
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Second, private accreditors are applying pressure.
The
collegiate sports conference that encompasses North Carolina, has
said it will not host future collegiate sporting events in North
Carolina if the state's legislature does not repeal its controversial
"transgender bathroom" law. 29 Similarly, the National Conference
of Collegiate Athletics (NCAA) now requires cities bidding for
NCAA championship events to show "how they will provide an
environment that is safe, healthy, and free of discrimination, plus
safeguards the dignity of everyone involved in the event," which
include policies protective of sexual orientation and gender
identity.30

Religious universities unquestionably have an interest in
transmitting certain moral values, fostering a common ethos, and
modeling behaviors consistent with their faith teachings.
However, because most faiths speak extensively on sexuality and
marriage, steps taken to cultivate a faith-infused community risk
operating as a backdoor way of excluding LGBT students, faculty,
and staff. A university with no LGBT members loses an important
source of diversity, undercutting its role as an educator to all
students, gay and straight. Thus, the challenge becomes how to
inscribe central faith commitments without excluding LGBT
persons.
Nowhere is this challenge more difficult than with studentathletes.3 1 Since student-athletes are part of the public face of a
http://thecolu.mn/21270/dozens-christian-schools-win-title-ix-waivers-ban-Igbtstudents.
29. Andrew Carter, HB2 Could Affect Whether NC Gets Future ACC
Championships, Commissioner Swofford Says, NEWS & OBSERVER (May 12, 2016,
3:38
PM),
http://www.newsobserver.com/sports/college/acc/unc/uncnow/article77237677.html (quoting Atlantic Coast Conference Commissioner John
Swofford). North Carolina's House Bill 2 bars a municipality from (a) setting a
minimum wage, (b) enacting non-discrimination protections based on sexual
orientation or gender identity, and (c) restricts a person's use of restrooms to the
facility matching the person's gender at birth. Public Facilities Privacy & Security
Act, H.B. 2, Gen. Assemb., 2d Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016). For a review of North
Carolina's controversial measure, see Phil Ciciora, Why Laws Restricting Bathroom
Access to Transgender People Won't Work, ILL. NEWS BUREAU (May 26, 2016, 11:30
AM), https://news.illinois.edublog/view/6367/366409; David A. Graham, North
Carolina Overturns LGBT-Discrimination Bans, ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/north-carolina-gbtdiscrimination-transgender-bathrooms/475125/.
30. Brian Hendrickson, Board of Governors Approves Anti-Discrimination
Process for Championships Bids, NCAA (Apr. 27, 2016, 9:40 PM),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/board-governors-approvesanti-discrimination-process-championships-bids.
31. Some argue that a university has no interest in student-athletes' conduct
because it chooses to have sports programs, which bolster revenue and the
university's profile, and therefore its ability to attract students. See Frank D. Lo
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university, student-athlete conduct raises questions that simply do
not arise with ordinary students. 32 For example, a religious
university may be concerned that, because it arranges
accommodations for student-athletes when they travel for
competitions and it provides locker rooms and other facilities that
bring players into close physical proximity, it may facilitate or
appear to condone a relationship that violates its faith tenets.
This Article does two things. First, it examines the latitude
religious universities have under existing law to infuse faith into
their operations. 33 Different bodies of law apply depending on how
and where a university chooses to promote its faith-whether it
seeks to exclude students who do not share its faith convictions, to
hire and retain only those who publicly affirm its faith tenets, or to
require all members in its community, students and faculty alike,
to adhere to a conduct code mirroring its faith tenets. This Article
asks whether universities can legally enforce such policies.
Second, this Article explores how religious universities can craft
communities of faith which affirm their religious tenets through
conduct codes and other devices without being exclusionary. This
Article maintains that a faith institution's interest in fostering a
community of like-minded believers changes depending on when
and how it seeks to express its religious beliefs while fulfilling its
educational mission.
Universities should never say "no gay
students or faculty need apply." Even if such a policy is legal in
parts of the country, it is impossible to defend such a prerogative
while accepting significant government funding.
Moreover,
asserting religion as an acceptable grounds for excluding LGBT
students, faculty, and staff can only weaken our country's
commitment to respecting religion over time. Instead, universities
should build communities of like-minded believers by distilling
faith commitments into rules of conduct that all students-gay or
Monte, Fouling the First Amendment: Why Colleges Can't, and Shouldn't, Control
Student Athletes' Speech on Social Media, 9 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 4 (2014). Under
this view, student-athletes should be treated no differently than other students. As
Part III, infra, explains, even if one does not believe that student-athletes publicly
represent their universities, some universities may see their role in putting
student-athletes in certain situations, such as in arranging travel accommodations,
as making them complicit in underlying conduct.
32. Other students may also be seen as representing their universities, such as
members of club sports teams, marching bands, debate teams, or other official
university
activities.
See, e.g.,
Marching Band, UNIV. BUFFALO,
http://marchingband.buffalo.edu/ (last visited July 15, 2016)
Many wear
university insignia when performing or competing. See id.
33. Whether and to what extent private organizations like the NCAA can
impose standards beyond what Title IX, Title VII, or state law requires of religious
organizations merits attention but is beyond the scope of this Article.
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straight-must follow. Universities can treat LGBT studentathletes with dignity through common sense approaches that
"reasonably accommodate" all student-athletes-borrowing the
standard from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
which requires employers to make "reasonable accommodation" for
34
an employee's religious belief or practice.
Part I of this Article sketches the very important-if
incomplete-safeguards that insulate LGBT students and faculty
from discrimination in higher education. This Part canvasses four
legal sources of such protection: (1) Title IX's ban on sex
discrimination by federally funded institutions, (2) recent ED
guidance extending that ban to sexual orientation and gender
identity discrimination, (3) Title VII's ban on sex discrimination
and recent guidance extending those protections to LGBT
individuals by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), and (4) parallel state laws. Part I also
briefly describes the solicitude with which the federal law treats
faith institutions, highlighting the ability under Title IX to follow
the organization's "religious tenets" 35 and under Title VII, to
"employ only persons whose beliefs and conduct are consistent
36
with the employer's religious precepts."
Parts II and III seek to demonstrate the unique challenges
posed by LGBT athletes playing for religious universities by
taking a "walk" across a typical campus-examining the chapel,
the front gate (i.e., school admissions policies), the residence halls,
the student commons, the staff lounge, and culminating at the
athletic facilities, including the locker rooms. These Parts show
how a faith institution's interests change in varying contexts.
Part II argues that universities have almost unlimited
autonomy over quintessentially religious questions, such as who
can marry in their chapels and who counts as "married" for

34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). Others commentators have discussed the parity
between Title VII's accommodation for an employee's religious belief or practice
and the need to treat same-sex couples with dignity. See Alan Brownstein, Gays,
Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case for Reciprocal
Accommodation of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry,
45 U. S.F. L. REV. 389, 411-12, 425 (2010).
35. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2012).

36. Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added); see
Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 138-42
(3d Cir. 2006); Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 622-24 (6th
Cir. 2000); Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 200 (11th Cir. 1997); Carl
Esbeck, Federal Contractors, Title VII, and LGBT Employment Discrimination:
Can Religious Organizations Continue To Staff on a Religious Basis?, 2015 OXFORD
J.L. & REL. 368, 389.
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purposes of married student housing.
A number of states
explicitly protect religious entities from punishment for refusing to
solemnize or host marriages when doing so would violate their
faiths' beliefs or for choosing to limit married student housing to
couples that the entity sees as married. Part 11 also demonstrates
that universities currently have considerable autonomy over
admissions-autonomy that, over time, may be called into
question given the significant tax benefits enjoyed by religious
universities.
It further addresses how exclusion defeats the
university's own educational mission, harming both those
excluded and the university community as a whole. Part II then
explores the student commons and faculty lounge. This Part
contends that universities can foster a common ethos through
conduct codes for students and faculty. Universities can and
should rely on "equal opportunity" proscriptions that all students,
gay or straight, must follow-such as a commitment to remain
chaste until married.
However, Part II discusses how even "facially neutral"
proscriptions can operate to exclude LGBT students and faculty.
If universities are allowed to define "marriage" according to their
faith traditions (i.e., recognizing heterosexual marriages only),
married same-sex couples who could never meet that religious
37
tenet may be barred from working at or attending the university.
Here, EEOC policy and some court decisions conclude that Title
VII's ban on sex discrimination extends to sexual orientation and
gender identity. Religious employers have latitude to make
employment decisions guided by faith. But to avoid liability under
Title VII, a conduct code must be applied equally to employees and
student employees and not independently discriminate on the
protected basis. 38
By contrast, Title IX, both textually and
through an exemption process, affords religious universities a
categorical prerogative to follow faith tenets. 39 Some universities
have sweeping conduct codes that restrict many types of conduct,
from drinking alcohol to engaging in extramarital sex, fornication,
and homosexuality.

37. Certain faith traditions also would not recognize interfaith marriages or
second marriages (even those that are civilly recognized), and no major Western
faith tradition would recognize polygamous marriages.
See generally Robin
Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception,Abortion, SameSex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L. REV.

1417, 1440 (2012).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
39. See Birkey, supra note 28.
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Still, universities misstep if they use conduct codes as a
backdoor means to ban gay faculty and staff. One overarching
goal of higher education is to challenge our own preconceptions
about those who are not like us. 40 Diversity advances rather than
defeats a first-rate education. More fundamentally, the driving
impetus for conduct codes-to build communities of like-minded
believers witnessing to a faith belief-can be achieved by requiring
all community members to live by the same standards before
marriage. If a gay student or employee marries, the university's
beliefs that the couple is not in fact married can be given voice by
prohibiting those couples from living in university married
student housing or engaging in same-sex intimacy on grounds.
With this framing in mind, Part IV takes up the particularly
thorny question of student-athletes at religious universities.
Recognizing that student-athletes represent the university
publicly and that universities facilitate their conduct in important
ways, this Part contends that religious universities' unique
interests in the conduct of their student-athletes do not
necessitate their banning LGBT students from their athletics
programs.
If religious universities wish to control studentathletes' conduct, they can adopt policies that discipline all
students who engage in premarital or extramarital sex, including
unmarried students who engage in same-sex intimacy. Should an
LGBT student-athlete marry, the university can respectfully
distance itself from that choice.
Part IV turns to the question of close physical proximity and
argues that it has been blown out of proportion in recent debates
over the North Carolina "transgender bathroom" law and the
Houston HERO ordinance, 41 and that such quandaries can be
solved with duties to "reasonably accommodate" all students in a
respectful way. Part V concludes that faith and sexuality need not
be in tension when carefully crafted laws account for the interests
of all.
I.

Non-discrimination Protections for LGBT Individuals

40. See Patricia Gurin et al., Diversity and Higher Education: Theory and
Impact on Educational Outcomes, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 330, 337 (2002); see also

Richard P. Larrick et al., The Social Psychology of the Wisdom of Crowds, in
SOCIAL JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 227 (Joachim I. Krueger ed., 2012)
(discussing the benefits of diversity in decisionmaking groups).
41. See Manny Fernandez & Mitch Smith, Houston Voters Reject Broad AntiDiscrimination
Ordinance,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
3,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/04/us/houston-voters-repeal-anti-biasmeasure.html?_r=0.
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in Higher Education
In this Volume, Professor Erin Buzuvis and others amply
describe the protections enjoyed by LGBT students in higher
education. 42 This Part briefly recaps select federal and state-level
protections because they form the background from which certain
43
actions of religious educational institutions are carved out.
A. Title IX's protection for LGBT Students
This Section explores whether Title IX's ban on sex
discrimination in education covers sexual orientation or gender
identity, and it shows how policy positions from ED's Office for
Civil Rights (OCR) construe Title IX's ban to include transgender
and gay students. Part II's walk across the campus explores in
detail the latitude given to religious educational organizations
under Title IX to nonetheless follow their faith convictions.
Title IX bans discrimination based only on "sex ...under any
education program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance." 44 A school receives "federal financial assistance" when
42. Erin E. Buzuvis, 'As Who They Really Are" Expanding Opportunities for
Transgender Athletes to Participate in Youth and Scholastic Sports, 34 LAW &
INEQ. 341 (2016).
43. In addition to Title IV, see supra note 20, Title VII, Title IX, and Title VI
prevent recipients of federal funds from discriminating on the basis of race or
national origin, but do not prohibit sex discrimination. See Types of Educational
Opportunities Discrimination,supra note 20. Similarly, Title II, which covers
public accommodations, does not protect against discrimination on the basis of sex.
Id.
Municipal bans on discrimination provide an important source of redress for LGBT
individuals, but vary in their coverage in a given state. See HUMAN RIGHTS
CAMPAIGN, MUNICIPAL EQUALITY INDEX: A NATIONWIDE EVALUATION OF MUNICIPAL
LAW (2013), http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/MEI_2013-report.pdf.
For
example, in Arizona, non-discrimination bans cover only Phoenix and Tucson, see
id. at 41; in Nevada, they cover all major cities, see id. at 47. Some states do not
ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity but provide
special protection in state hate crime laws. See, e.g., Act of June 19, 1993, ch. 987,
1993 Tex. Gen. Laws § 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the Texas
Penal Code and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure); Act of May 11, 2001, ch. 85,
2001 Tex. Gen. Laws § 85 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the Texas
Penal Code and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO.
ANN. art 42.014 (West 2015).
Part II will more fully explore how different background laws affect specific
questions that arise when faith and sexuality intersect.
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2014) ("No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance ....
").Title IX governs all
institutions that receive federal financial assistance from [ED], including
state and local educational agencies.... [These include] 16,500 local
school districts, 7,000 postsecondary institutions ... charter schools, for-
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employee salaries are federally funded 45 or when students use
federal loan dollars to pay for tuition and expenses. 46 Title IX

protects

students,

student-employees,

and

applicants

for

admission and student-employment. 47 If any part of a covered
entity receives any federal funds for any purpose, then all of the
institution's operations are covered by Title IX.4 8
The ban
implicates a number of areas, including "recruitment, admissions,
and counseling;
financial
assistance;
athletics;
sex-based
harassment; 49 treatment of pregnant and parenting students;
50
discipline; single-sex education; and employment."

While Title IX bans discrimination based on sex, it does not
expressly encompass sexual orientation or gender identity

profit schools, libraries, and museums. Also included are vocational
rehabilitation agencies and education agencies of [all] states, the District
of Columbia, and territories and possessions of the United States.
Title IX and Sex Discrimination,supra note 27. Thus, Title IX spans everything
from elementary schools to universities and vocational programs. See Title IX
Legal Manual, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix
[hereinafter Title IX Legal Manual]. A recipient may not retaliate against any
person who opposes an unlawful educational practice or policy or who makes
charges, testifies, or participates in any complaint action under Title IX. Id. As an
additional responsibility, Title IX recipients must "designate at least one employee
to
coordinate
its
efforts
to
comply
with
and
carry
out
its
responsibilities ... including any investigation of any complaint communicated to
such recipient alleging its noncompliance with this part or alleging any actions
which would be prohibited by this part." 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a) (2015).
45. Title IX Legal Manual, supra note 44.
46. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 564 (1984); Title IX Legal
Manual, supra note 44; supra note 20.
47. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., TITLE IX RESOURCE
GUIDE
1
(2015),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-title-ixcoordinators-guide-201504.pdf. Non-student "[e]mployees are also protected from
discrimination on the basis of sex, including sexual harassment, by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ..
Id. at 26 n. 10.
48. Id.
49. In 2011, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) released a "Dear Colleague" letter
specifying needed steps to prevent sex-based harassment, violence, and assault.
Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights,
U.S.
Dep't
of
Educ.,
to
colleague
(Apr.
4,
2011),
http://www2 .ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf. Although not
binding, such letters have considerable force with administrators. See Top of the
Mind with Julie Rose: Religion and Horror, Title IX and Education, BYU RADIO
(May
20,
2016),
http://www.byuradio.org/episode/6fab7809-eab2-4fb5-a67afea0077aa3db/top-of-mind-with-julie-rose-religion-and-horror-title-ix-andeducation?playhead=3124&autoplay=true.
50. Title IX and Sex Discrimination, supra note 27.
Title IX allows for
separate, comparable changing and restroom facilities for each gender. See 44
C.F.R. § 106.33 (2012) ("A recipient may provide separate toilet, locker room, and
shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities provided for students of one
sex shall be comparable to such facilities provided for students of the other sex.").
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discrimination. 51 However, in April 2014, OCR interpreted Title
IX's ban on sex discrimination as "extend[ing] to claims of
discrimination based on gender identity or failure to conform to
stereotypical notions of masculinity or femininity ... ."52 OCR
policy guidance issued in May 2016 reemphasized that Title IX
"encompasses discrimination based on a student's gender
identity," and went further, stating that Title IX protects "a
student's transgender status."53
According to OCR, Title IX
"requires schools to provide transgender students equal access to
educational programs and activities even in circumstances in
which other students, parents, or community members raise
objections or concerns." 54
OCR's guidance regarding separate
changing and restroom facilities was unequivocal: "A school may
provide separate facilities on the basis of sex, but must allow
transgender students access to such facilities consistent with their
55
gender identity."
Courts
give
considerable
deference
to
OCR's
interpretations. 56 For example, in 2015, a federal district court
judge for the Central District of California denied summary
judgment to Pepperdine University in a Title IX case filed by two
former members of the women's basketball team alleging sexual

51. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2014); see WARBELOW & GREGG, supra note 25, at 3.
ON

52. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS,
TITLE
IX
AND

U.S.

DEP'T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
5
(2014),

http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf;
see T. Rees
Shapiro, For Transgender Teens and Teachers, Acceptance Could Be Two Words
Away,
WASH.
POST
(May
6,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/fairfax-county-weighs-protectionsfor-transgender-students-and-teachers/2015/05/06/7 1b3cb76-f3cd- 11e4-84a66d7c67c50db0_story.html; Ian S. Thompson, Victory! Title IX Protects Transgender
Students, ACLU (May 1, 2014, 11:43 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/victory-title-ixprotects-transgender-students.
53. Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, Office
for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., & Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to colleague 1 (May 13, 2016),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ixtransgender.pdf.
54. Id. at 2.
55. Id. at 3. The guidance does, however, allow for schools to "make individualuser options available to all students who voluntarily seek additional privacy." Id.
56. Dionne L. Koller, Not Just One of the Boys: A Post-FeministCritique of Title
IX's Vision for Gender Equity in Sports, 43 CONN. L. REV. 401, 411 (2010) ("Every
court to consider the issue has held that [ED] regulations and Policy Interpretation
are entitled to deference. Courts have stated that '[t]he degree of deference is
particularly high in Title IX cases because Congress explicitly delegated to the
agency the task of prescribing standards for athletic programs under Title IX."
(citing McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275,
288 (2d Cir. 2004)).
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orientation discrimination.5 7
The women asserted that
Pepperdine and its employees discriminated against them because
of their "dating relationship."5 8
The coaches allegedly asked
intrusive questions about their sleeping arrangements "to
determine [their] sexual orientation 59 and "demanded that [they]
60
provide unlimited access to [their] gynecology medical records."
For one player, the discrimination was so severe that it caused her
to "attempt suicide ... [,j to leave Pepperdine, and to give up [her]
61
basketball scholarship."
The court, after reviewing how Title IX's ban on sex
discrimination has been previously interpreted, concluded that the
plaintiffs raised a material question of fact. 62 Historically, under
federal law, only discrimination based on noncompliance with
sexual stereotypes was actionable. 63
Courts reasoned that
"[h]arassment that relies 'upon stereotypical notions about how
men and women should appear and behave'.. . reasonably
suggests that it can be attributed to sex." 64 This sex-stereotyping
theory made it easier for transgender plaintiffs to recover, but
discrimination based on sexual orientation was still generally not
actionable. 65 Judge Pregerson, however, observed that:

57. Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 100 F. Supp. 3d 927, 936 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
58. Id. at 929-30.

59. Id. at 930.
60. Id. at 933.
61. Id. at 934.
62. Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., No. 15-00298, 2015 WL 8916764, at *8 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 15, 2015).
63. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) ("Congress
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women
resulting from sex stereotypes." (citation omitted)); Hoffman v. Saginaw Pub. Sch.,
No. 12-10354, 2012 WL 2450805, at *8 (E.D. Mich. June 27, 2012); infra Part I.E.
64. Howell v. N. Cent. Coll., 320 F. Supp. 2d 717, 722 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
65. Hoffman, 2012 WL 2450805, at *8.
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[T]he line between discrimination based on gender
stereotyping and discrimination based on sexual orientation is
blurry, at best, and thus a claim that Plaintiffs were
discriminated against on the basis of their relationship and
their
sexual orientation may fall within the bounds of Title
66
IX.

This appears to be the first time a federal judge had ruled
that sexual orientation discrimination may be encompassed by
Title IX.67 More recently, in Grimm v. Gloucester City School
Board,68 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
ruled that a trial court should reconsider its decision to reject a
transgender boy's request for a preliminary injunction under Title
IX against Gloucester High School in Virginia, which would
compel the school to allow him to use the boys, rather than girls,
restroom. In reversing the lower court's dismissal of the claim, the
Fourth Circuit emphasized that OCR's January 2015 guidance
permitting transgender students to use the restroom conforming
to their gender identification controlled. 69 If the Fourth Circuit
had interpreted Title IX to exclude gender identity claims,
70
Grimm's suit would not have gone forward.
Notwithstanding the OCR policy interpretations and court
decisions, the question of whether Title IX in fact bans gender
identity and sexual orientation discrimination has not been
definitively decided. While a school that is found to have violated
Title IX risks losing its federal funds, no school has actually lost
federal funding to date, in part because of the considerable

66. Videckis, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 937.
67. See Chris Geidner, Federal Judge Rules That Sexual Orientation
Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination, BuZZFEED (Dec. 20, 2015, 6:01 PM),
http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/federal-judge-rules-that-sexual-orientationdiscrimination-i?utm term=.vqZxJRNPy#.qn887r6BJ; cf. Velma Cheri Gay, "50
Years Later... Still Interpreting the Meaning of 'Because of Sex' Within Title VII
and Whether It Prohibits Sexual Orientation Discrimination,"73 A.F. L. REV. 61
(2015) (discussing how courts have interpreted "because of sex" in Title VII in
regard to sexual orientation discrimination claims); Samuel A. Marcosson,
Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination
Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1 (1992) (same).
68. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 15-2056, 2016 WL
1567467, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 19, 2016).
69. Id. at *8 ("[T]he Department's interpretation of its own regulation, § 106.33,
as it relates to restroom access by transgender individuals ... is to be accorded
controlling weight in this case.").
70. The Fourth Circuit rejected the school's petition for a rehearing en banc,
G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 15-2056, slip op. at 2 (4th Cir.
May 31, 2016), despite a strident dissent by Judge Paul Niemeyer, id. at 3-5
(Neimeyer, J., dissenting).
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latitude Title IX grants religious educational organizations. 71
Congress specified in the text of Title IX that it does "not apply to
an educational institution which is controlled by a religious
organization if [its] application ...

would not be consistent with

72
the religious tenets of such organization."
OCR requires schools to seek and receive express "waivers"
for those specific activities that will be guided by their faith
tenets. 73
As one example, Oklahoma Wesleyan University
(OKWU), a 900-student evangelical Christian university,
requested a waiver from Title IX regulations in, among other
areas, admissions, recruitment, educational programs or activities,
housing, comparable facilities, financial assistance, athletics, and

employment. 74

University officials explained that "compliance

71. Katie Thomas, Law Fights for Sports Equity, Even with a Law, N.Y. TIMES
(July 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/sports/review-shows-title-ix-isnot-significantly-enforced.html (showing that OCR has never stripped a religious
university of Title IX funding); Kif Augustine-Adams, Religious Exemptions to Title
IX
(forthcoming
2016)
(manuscript
at
5-6),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2735173. Of course, there is a
structural impediment to Title IX's enforcement even when a waiver is not
implicated. Students do not want to jeopardize their scholarships by bringing facts
to light that may result in investigations and subsequent loss of federal funds by
the schools giving them scholarships. Kate Fagan, Why The Iowa Field Hockey
Title
IX
Complaint Is
a
Huge Deal,
ESPN
(Feb.
5,
2015),
http://espn.go.com/espnw/news-commentary/article/12283119/why-iowa-fieldhockey-title-ix-complaint-huge-deal ("Rarely will active student-athletes file a
claim against the school still paying for their education for fear of jeopardizing
their scholarship status.").
72. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (2014); see infra Part II.B.
73. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.12 (b) (2015) ("An educational institution which wishes
to claim the exemption set forth in paragraph (a) of this section, shall do so by
submitting in writing to the Assistant Secretary a statement by the highest
ranking official of the institution, identifying the provisions of this part which
conflict with a specific tenet of the religious organization.").
ED's choice to
operationalize the exemption through a waiver process receives Chevron deference.
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
("[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute."). Sometimes a regulation is ambiguous, in which case
an agency's interpretation of its own regulation will also receive Auer deference.
See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339-40 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In practice, Auer deference is Chevron
deference applied to regulations rather than statutes ....
The agency's
interpretation will be accepted if, though not the fairest reading of the regulation,
it is a plausible reading-within the scope of the ambiguity that the regulation
contains." (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997))).
74. Letter from Everett Piper, President, Okla. Wesleyan Univ., to Catherine E.
Lhamon, Assistant Sec'y, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ. 3 (Nov. 14,
2014)
[hereinafter
Letter
from
Everett
Piper],
http://thecolu.mn/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/OklahomaWesleyanUniversity.pdf; see John Riley, OWU
President "Proud"To Ask for Religious Exemption to Title IX, METROWEEKLY (Jan.
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with Title IX, as interpreted by ...

OCR to reach transgender

'discrimination' would be inconsistent with the tenets of OKWU
and The Wesleyan Church." 75 Although Title IX categorically
authorizes religious universities to follow religious strictures,
other laws like Title VII co-govern some questions, such as
employment and conduct codes for student and non-student
employees, which can cut back significantly on Title IX's blanket
authorization. 76
B. Federal Title VII ProtectionsAgainst Discriminationfor
University Employees
No federal law expressly protects LGBT individuals from
discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orientation or
gender identity. However, Title VII's ban on sex discrimination
may provide some protection. Title VII makes it unlawful for
employers to discriminate against their employees because of their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but it does not
explicitly
ban
sexual
orientation
or
gender
identity
discrimination. 77 Since 2012, EEOC, the body responsible for
enforcing federal employment discrimination laws banning
discrimination on these grounds as well as pregnancy, age (40 or
older), disability or genetic information,7 8 has taken the position
that discrimination based on sexual orientation and on gender
identity constitute sex discrimination, 79 which would permit LGBT
plaintiffs to recover for employment discrimination under Title
VII.
According to EEOC, "'[s]exual orientation' [and 'gender
8,

2016),

http://www. metroweekly.com/2016/01/owu-president-proud-to-ask-for-

religious-exemption-waiver/.
75. Letter from Everett Piper, supra note 74, at 2.

76. See infra Part II.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).

78. Overview, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 13,
2016). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) promulgates
rules and policies that regulate discrimination in employment, including under
Title
VII.
EEOC
Regulations,
EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
79. See Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (Apr. 20, 2012) (gender
identity). In 2015, the EEOC decided that consistent with case law from the
Supreme Court and other courts, "allegations of discrimination on the basis of
...sexual orientation state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex within the
meaning of Title VII." Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080 (July 15,
2015), https://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120133080.pdf.
Transgender employees
have been able to claim protection since the "2012 EEOC ruling that incorporated
gender identity-based discrimination." See Nicandro lannacci, Federal Agency Says
Sexual OrientationDiscriminationat Work Is Illegal, CONST. DAILY (July 20, 2015),
http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2015/07/federal-agency-says-sexual-orientationdiscrimination-at-work-is-illegal/.
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identity'] as a concept cannot be defined or understood without
reference to sex."80 EEOC is litigating a raft of cases involving
transgender and gay employees as a kind of sex discrimination.8 1
While EEOC has enforcement power, Title VII does not
explicitly give EEOC formal rulemaking authority.8 2 Nonetheless,
EEOC's positions typically receive some deference, but not as
much as they would under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.8 3 Thus, EEOC's interpretation of
the scope of sex discrimination under Title VII is considered
persuasive, but not binding, authority on courts.8 4
EEOC's
interpretations of anti-discrimination laws often fare poorly in
courts.

85

As with Title IX, courts have grappled with whether the ban
on "sex" discrimination encompasses sexual orientation or gender
identity.
Although to date the "federal courts of appeals have
uniformly held that Title VII does not [directly] forbid
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,' 8 6 some courts
80. Kevin McGowan, EEOC Suits Allege Title VII Covers Sex Orientation Bias,
BLOOMBERG
BNA
(Mar.
1,
2016), http://www.bna.com/eeoc-suits-allege-

n57982068201/.
81. Fact Sheet: Recent EEOC Litigation Regarding Title VII and LGBT-Related
Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Mar 1, 2016),
https://wwwl.eeoc.gov//eeoc/litigation/selected/lgbt-facts.cfm?renderforprint=1; see
McGowan, supra note 80.
82. Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC,
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937, 1944-45 (2006).
83. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
"[C]ourts have a duty to defer to reasonable agency interpretations not only when
Congress expressly delegates interpretative authority to an agency, but also when
Congress is silent or leaves ambiguity in a statute that an agency is charged with
administering." Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833, 833 (2001). When an agency is not charged with administering a
statute, courts analyze the agency's policies using a multipart test under Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), which includes "the thoroughness evident in
the agency's interpretation, the validity of its reasoning, the interpretation's
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, 'and all those factors which
give it power to persuade."'
Bradley George Hubbard, Deference to Agency
Statutory InterpretationsFirst Advanced in Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and
the Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 454-55 (2013) (internal citations
omitted); see Hart, supra note 82, at 1944-45.
84. Dale Carpenter, Anti-Gay DiscriminationIs Sex Discrimination,Says the
EEOC, WASH. POST (July 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/07/16/anti-gay-discrimination-is-sex-discrimination-says-theeeoc/.
85. See Hart, supra note 82, at 1941-49, 1945 ("Most cases considering EEOC
interpretations have applied the Skidmore standard, and the agency's views have,
perhaps not surprisingly, often fared poorly in these cases.").
86. Esbeck, supra note 36, at 389 n.80; see Larson v. United Air Lines, 482 F.
App'x. 344 (10th Cir. 2012); Gilbert v. Country Music Ass'n, Inc., 432 F. App'x 516
(6th Cir. 2011); Pagan v. Gonzales 430 Fed. App'x 170 (3d Cir. 2011); Dawson v.
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have permitted claims of discrimination based on sex
stereotypes-that is, how much an "individual conforms to
traditional notions of what is appropriate for one's gender"8 7- to
be pursued under Title VII. Claims brought on the basis of sex
stereotypes are actionable under Title VII because, as the U.S.
Supreme Court explained in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, "gender
must be irrelevant to employment decisions."88
Relying on Price Waterhouse, several lower federal courts
have allowed transgender plaintiffs to show sex discrimination
using sex stereotyping theories.8 9 At least one federal district court
has held that a gay man sufficiently pled sex discrimination by
showing that his employer did not agree with his gender role. 90
Further, in Smith v. City of Salem, the Sixth Circuit found a male
employee made out a prima facie case for "sex stereotyping"
gender discrimination because he "was qualified for the position in
question" and "would not have been treated differently, on account
of his non-masculine behavior and GID [gender identity disorder],
had he been a woman instead of a man."91 Although older cases
understood Title VII as "barring discrimination based only on 'sex'
(referring to an individual's anatomical and biological
characteristics), but not on 'gender' (referring to sociallyconstructed norms associated with a person's sex)," that approach
has been "eviscerated by Price Waterhouse": "the Supreme Court
established that Title VII's reference to 'sex' encompasses both the
biological differences between men and women, and gender
discrimination, that is, discrimination based on a failure to
conform to stereotypical gender norms. '92 Significantly, at least
93
one plaintiff has recovered under this theory.
Bumble & Bumble 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005); Osborne v. Gordon &
Schwenkmeyer, 10 Fed. App'x 554 (9th Cir. 2001).
87. Gilbert, 432 F. App'x at 519.
88. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989).
89. Five federal courts of appeals have allowed claims to go forward based at
least in part on a sexual orientation or gender identity theory of sex stereotyping.
See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio,
378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257,
262-63 (3rd Cir. 2001); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir.
2001); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999).
The Seventh Circuit construed sex discrimination to encompass gender identity in
a decision later vacated on other grounds and has not revisited the question. See
McGowan, supra note 80.
90. Terveer v. Billington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100 (D.D.C. 2014).
91. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 567 (6th Cir. 2004).
92. Id. at 569-70.
93. In Glenn v. Brumby, a transgender woman recovered against her employer,
the Georgia General Assembly's Office of Legislative Counsel, which had fired her
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A handful of courts have rejected an expansive reading,
reasoning that neither gender identity nor sexual orientation is
"among the list of prohibited bases for employment action, that
Congress did not intend to eliminate anti-gay discrimination when
it enacted Title VII, and that Congress has repeatedly refused to
add 'sexual orientation' or gender identity to employment
protections." 94 Indeed, in late 2013, the U.S. Senate passed the
federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which
would have banned employment discrimination on the basis of
gender identity and sexual orientation, 95 after ENDA had
languished in committees for nearly two decades. 96 The U.S.
House of Representatives ultimately blocked ENDA, after
prominent gay rights groups pulled their support for the bill,
based in part on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
97
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.
for gender nonconformity. 663 F.3d 1312, 1313 (11th Cir. 2011). On cross-motions
for summary judgment, she recovered her costs and got permanent injunctive relief
against her employer. Id.; Christian Boone, Transgender Employee Rehired But
Won't Be Working, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Aug. 6, 2010, 10:06 PM),
http://www. ajc.com/news/news/local/transgender-employee-rehired-but-wont-beworking/nQjC9/.
94. Carpenter, supra note 84.
95. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 4
(as passed by Senate, Nov. 7, 2013).
96. The Senate passed the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) on
November 7, 2013, due in part to its specific exemption for religious employers,
which was broader in scope than the current religious exemptions under Title VII.
See S. 815, § 6; Lauren Fox, Senate Passes ENDA in Bipartisan Vote, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD
REP.
(Nov.
7,
2013),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/11/07/senate-passes-enda-in-bipartisanvote. The enlarged latitude for religious employers helped ENDA to garner eight
Republican votes and pass the Senate.
U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 113th
Congress- 1st
Session:
S.
815,
U.S.
SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call lists/roll call vote cfm.cfm?&congre
ss=113&session=1&vote=00232#position (last visited Feb. 18, 2016) (reporting a
final vote count for the 2013 ENDA of 64-32, with four senators not taking part in
the vote).
After the exemption's scope drew fire, a small group of legislators attempted to
narrow the suddenly controversial exemption, but failed. See S. 815, § 6; Fox,
supra. John Boehner, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, however,
would not allow the amended bill to reach the House floor for a vote, even though it
likely had majority support. ERIC S. DREIBAND & BRETT SWEARINGEN, THE
EVOLUTION OF TITLE VII-SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER IDENTITY, AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS
ACT
OF
1964,
at
12
(2015),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/07f7db13-4b8c-44c3-a89b-6dcfe4a9e2al/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/74a 1l6bc-2cfe-42d2-92a5787b40ee0567/dreiband-lgbt.authcheckdam.pdf. This is the closest that Congress
has come to passing federal legislation that would ban LGBT employment
discrimination.
97. See Lauren Fox, House Won't Take Up ENDA, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 4, 2013,
12:45 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/11/04/house-wont-take-up-
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If courts adopt the EEOC's interpretation, employees may
pursue sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination
under Title VII. Religious employers, however, will continue to
receive the same protections they have always been granted under
Title VII, described in Part IIE(1) below. 98 Universities that

igbt-protections; Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Gay & Lesbian
Advocates & Defs., Lambda Legal, Nat'l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights & Transgender
Law Ctr., Joint Statement on Withdrawal of Support for ENDA and Call for Equal
Workplace
Protections
for
LGBT
People
(July
8,
2014),
http://www.nclrights.org/press-room/press-release/joint-statement-on-withdrawalof-support-for-enda-and-call-for-equal-workplace-protections-for-gbt-people/
[hereinafter Joint Statement]. Since 1974, federal legislators have consistently
proposed bills to ban employment discrimination against LGBT workers, beginning
with the Equality Act of 1974, H.R. 14752, 93d Cong. (1974), which would have
banned

sexual

orientation

discrimination

in

hiring,

housing,

and

public

accommodations. Jerome Hunt, A History of the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act,
CTR.
AM.
PROGRESS
(July
19,
2011),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2011/07/19/10006/a-history-ofthe-employment-non-discrimination-act/. After twenty years of political failure,
proponents abandoned the Equality Act and drafted ENDA as the vehicle for
change. Id. Stand-alone legislation modeled on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964), ENDA would have added sexual orientation and
gender identity as prohibited bases for employment discrimination. Hunt, supra.
In an ironic turn of events, in 2015, legislators turned once again to the Equality
Act as the vehicle for banning LGBT discrimination in hiring-as well as in a host
of other specified realms, including public accommodations, housing, jury duty, and
credit. Equality Act, H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. § 9(a)(4) (2015). In January 2016,
Republican Congressman Robert Dold joined the House version of the Equality Act
as a co-sponsor.
Cosponsors: H.R.3185-114th Congress (2015-2016),
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill 114th-congress/housebill/3185/cosponsors (last visited June 19, 2016). Republican Senator Mark Kirk
joined the Senate version. Cosponsors: S.1858-114th Congress (2015-2016),
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill 114th-congress/senatebill/1858/cosponsors (last visited June 19, 2016). Congressman Dold explained that
"[w]hile this bill is not perfect in its current form, it marks an important first step
in the process of crafting a bipartisan bill that ensures equal rights for all
Americans while also fully protecting the religious freedoms our Constitution
guarantees." Steve Lee, Rep. Bob Dold Becomes First Republican To Co-Sponsor
the
Equality
Act,
LGBT
WKLY.
(Jan.
15,
2016),
http://lgbtweekly.com/2016/0 1/15/rep-bob-dold-becomes-first-republican-to-cosponsor-the-equality-act/. However, with Republicans in control of both chambers
of Congress, there is little chance the far-ranging and controversial measure will
pass without additional protections for faith organizations. Juliet Eilperin, Obama
Supports Altering Civil Rights Act To Ban LGBT Discrimination, WASH. POST
(Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-supports-alteringcivil-rights-act-to-include-gender-discrimination/2015/11/10/3a05107e-87c8-1le59a07-453018f9a0ec-story.html.
Obviously, those prospects could change
significantly after the 2016 elections.
98. Many universities, private and public, contract with the federal government
or accept grants conditioned on compliance with non-discrimination protections.
See E-Verify: Compliance for College and University Federal Contractors, NACUA
NOTES
(Jan.
20,
2010),
http://counsel.cua.edu/employment/publications/nacuanotejanIO.cfm
[hereinafter
E-Verify]; Kevin Theriot, Protecting Catholic Colleges from External Threats to
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contract with the federal government cannot discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation or gender identity but have the benefit
of Title VII's accommodations for religious employers. 99 Some

Their Religious Liberty, STUD. CATH. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 2011, at 4 (discussing
conditions in federal direct grants, and cautioning that "religious educational
institutions must carefully examine the procurement criteria for any particular
research grant in order to determine whether accepting the federal funds will
adversely affect their particular religious mission"). However, merely receiving
grants from the federal government does not trigger the non-discrimination bans in
the executive order. Office of Fed. Contract Compliance Programs, Frequently
Asked
Questions:
EO
13672
Final
Rule,
U.S.
DEP'T
LAB.,
http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/lgbt/lgbt-faqs.html#Q27 (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) ("The
Final Rule does not apply to grant recipients or non-construction recipients of
federal financial assistance.").
As Part II.E(1) notes, federal law bans discrimination based on religion in hiring,
unless specifically exempted. The federal government has provided guidance about
the hiring prerogatives of religious non-profits that receive federal grants. In 2007,
the Department of Justice issued an opinion that the federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Act would permit a religious non-profit that received a $1.5 million
federal grant, World Vision, Inc., to hire on the basis of religion, as Part II.E(2)
describes. See Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to the Award
of a Grant Pursuant to the Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act, 31 Op.
O.L.C. 162, 162 (2007).
99. LGBT employees of federal contractors receive protection against
discrimination as a result of President Obama's executive order protecting LGBT
individuals from discrimination in federal contracting. Exec. Order No. 13672, 79
Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 23, 2014); see Jonathan Capehart, Obama Moves To Protect
LGBT Federal Contractors and Employees, WASH. POST (July 21, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2014/07/21/obama-movesto-protect-lgbt-federal-contractors-and-employees/.
The executive order amends
two prior orders-Executive Order 11,246 and Executive Order 11,478-which bar
federal contractors "from discriminating in employment decisions on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Office of Fed. Contract Compliance
Programs, supra note 98 ("[The] Final Rule, like Executive Order 11246, generally
applies to employers who are contractors or subcontractors with the Federal
government, as well as construction contractors working on federally-assisted
construction projects, with covered contracts in excess of $10,000."). While "there is
no exemption for religious organizations with government contracts," the executive
order left in place existing protections under Title VII for religious employers,
despite President Obama's own campaign promises to eliminate the exemptions.
See Laycock, Neither Side, supra note 14; Sarah Posner, Obama's Faith-Based
Failure,
SALON
(May
4,
2012,
10:46
AM),
http://www.salon.com/2012/05/04/obamas-faith-based-failure/
(quoting
the
President as pledging "if
you get a federal grant, you can't use that grant money to
proselytize to the people you help and you can't discriminate against them-or
against the people you hire-on the basis of their religion"). Recently, House
Republicans narrowly blocked an amendment that would have made the Executive
Order's non-discrimination protections legally binding on federal contractors; at the
last moment, several legislators switched their votes, resulting in chaos in the
House chamber. See Rachael Bade, Ben Weyl & John Bresnahan, House Erupts in
Chaos After
LGBT Vote,
POLITICO
(May
19,
2016,
12:50
PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/05/house-lgbt-amendment-discrimination-fight223366.
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universities accept grants conditioned on compliance with nondiscrimination protections. 100
C. State Law Bans on Discriminationin Higher Education
and Employment
The District of Columbia and fifteen states have enacted laws
to protect LGBT students in higher education.10 1 However, the
scope of these protections vary from state to state. For example,
Connecticut bars discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,

gender, and gender identity in "educational, counseling, and
vocational guidance programs and all apprenticeship and on-the-

job training programs," 10 2 whereas Washington bans only "sexual
orientation" discrimination, but does so in all places of public
10 4
accommodation, 1 03 which includes educational institutions.
Some penalties for violating these discrimination bans are
10 5
and jail time.106
substantial and can include fines

100. See E-Verify, supra note 98; Theriot, supra note 98; Office of Fed. Contract
Compliance Programs, supra note 98.
101. See Wheeler, supra note 24.
102. CONN GEN. STAT. § 46a-75(a) (2015) ("All educational, counseling, and
vocational guidance programs and all apprenticeship and on-the-job training
programs of state agencies, or in which state agencies participate, shall be open to
all qualified persons, without regard to race, color, religious creed, sex, gender
identity or expression, marital status, age, national origin, ancestry, intellectual
disability, mental disability, learning disability or physical disability, including,
but not limited to, blindness.").
103. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030 (2015). Under Washington's law,
[t]he right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color,
national origin, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status,
sexual orientation, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical
disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person
with a disability is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This
right shall include, but not be limited to ...[t]he right to the full
enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or
privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or
amusement.
Id.
104. Id. § 49.60.040 (2015) ("Any place of public resort, accommodation,
assemblage, or amusement' includes, but is not limited to ... any ...

educational

institution, or schools of special instruction ....
").
105. In Massachusetts, a person violating the law can be forced to pay penalties
to the city, starting with a $10,000 maximum penalty for the first violation, a
$25,000 maximum penalty for a second offense in a five-year period, and $50,000
maximum penalty for a third offense in a seven-year period. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
151B, § 5 (2015). In Washington, a florist who turned away a same-sex couple who
needed flowers for their upcoming wedding was fined $1,000. Curtis M. Wong,
Barronelle Stutzman, Washington Florist Who DiscriminatedAgainst Gay Couple,
Ordered To Pay Fine, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 30, 2015, 4:08 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/30/barronelle-stutzmanfined n 6971122.html.
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Like Title IX, state non-discrimination laws exempt religious
10 7
institutions, though some exemptions are broader than others.
Washington's broad exemption carves out all religious educational
institutions from its non-discrimination statute. 108 On the other
hand, Connecticut limits its exemption to employment by religious
schools, as well as to matters of "discipline, faith, internal
organization or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law."10 9
Twenty-two states ban discrimination against LGBT
individuals in hiring and employment.110 All of these states
provide various religious exemptions, although these exemptions
vary in scope. 1
Most commonly, states borrow language from
106. In Connecticut, business owners found to violate discrimination laws may
be found guilty of a Class D misdemeanor, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-81d(b), which
carries penalties including up to thirty days in jail, id. § 53a-26(d)(4); cf. Comm'n
on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Bd. of Educ. of the Town of Cheshire, 855
A.2d 212, 215-17 (Conn. 2004) (determining definitions in CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a58 applied to public accommodation law violations).
107. Wheeler, supra note 24.
108. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 ("[N]or shall anything contained in this
definition apply to any educational facility.., maintained by a bona fide religious
or sectarian institution.").
109. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-81aa ("The provisions of... subsection (a) of
section 46a-75 ...that prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity or
expression shall not apply to a religious corporation, entity, association,
educational institution or society with respect to the employment of individuals to
perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, entity,
association, educational institution or society of its activities, or with respect to
matters of discipline, faith, internal organization or ecclesiastical rule, custom or
law which are established by such corporation, entity, association, educational
institution or society.").
110. Emma Green, Can States Protect LGBT Rights Without Compromising
Religious

Freedom?,

ATLANTIC

(Jan.

6,

2016),

http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/lgbt-discrimination-protectionstates-religion/422730/.
The District of Columbia also bans employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender
expression. D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (2016). The following states do not prohibit
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Green,
supra.

If federal courts ultimately agree that Title VII's sex-discrimination ban
protects individuals from gender identity and sexual orientation discrimination,
state courts and agencies might apply that broader interpretation to comparable
state laws; as a result, states could enforce existing sex discrimination statutes to
protect individuals from sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination in
employment.
111. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-112 (2015); Letter from Dayna K. Shah,
Managing Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, to Sen. Tom
Harkin, Chairman, Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, et al. (Oct. 1,
2009)
[hereinafter
Letter
from
Dayna
K.
Shah],
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Title VII's treatment of religious institutions, 112 which permits

religious organizations to give preference to people of their same
religion in hiring. 11 3 However, a fraction of states, including Iowa

and Minnesota, allow religious employers to hire employees to
meet bona fide occupational qualifications without violating non114
discrimination duties.
D.

Examining Anew Settled Compromises

It is worth briefly noting that the legislative compromises
around faith and sexuality in Title IX and Title VII occurred long
before the recent successes of the LGBT rights movement.
Importantly, these compromises are sure to be revisited in coming
years, both at the state and federal level.
Gay rights advocates have expended considerable resources
in their quest to secure rights for all people to "live authentically,"
free from discrimination.1 1 5 In addition, gay rights advocates

http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/96410.pdf.
112. Cf. infra Part I.E.
113. Ralph D. Mawdsley, Employment, Sexual Orientation, and Religious
Beliefs: Do Religious Educational Institutions Have a Protected Right To
Discriminate in the Selection and Dischargeof Employees?, 2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J.
279, 288; Letter from Dayna K. Shah, supra note 111, at 3.
114. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 216.6(6)(d) (2016) ("Any bona fide religious
institution or its educational facility, association, corporation, or society with
respect to any qualifications based on religion, sexual orientation, or gender
identity when such qualifications are related to a bona fide religious purpose. A
religious qualification for instructional personnel or an administrative officer,
serving in a supervisory capacity of a bona fide religious educational facility or
religious institution, shall be presumed to be a bona fide occupational
qualification."); MINN. STAT. § 363A.20, subd. 2 (2015) ("The provisions of section
363A.08 shall not apply to a religious or fraternal corporation, association, or
society, with respect to qualifications based on religion or sexual orientation, when
religion or sexual orientation shall be a bona fide occupational qualification for
employment."); see also Letter from Dayna K. Shah, supra note 111, at 5-30. Bona
fide occupational qualifications must relate to the "essence" of a job or to "the
central mission of the employer's business." Huisenga v. Opus Corp., 494 N.W.2d
469, 473 (Minn. 1992) (citation omitted). Thus, in this context, a bona fide
occupational qualification might be that the CEO of Catholic Charities needs to be
Catholic.
115. Kelsey Harkness, Meet 7 Big Businesses Behind the Houston Ballot
Measure, DAILY SIGNAL (Nov. 2, 2015), http://dailysignal.com/2015/11/02/meet-7big-businesses-behind-the-houston-ballot-measure/; Matt Simonette, Victory Fund
CEO Talks Organizing,Post MarriageDecision, WINDY CITY TIMES (Oct. 14, 2015),
http://www.windycitymediagroup.com/lgbt/Victory-Fund-CEO-talks-organizingpost-marriage-decision/53132.html;
Steve Weatherbe, Foundations Pouring
Millions into Campaign To EradicateReligious Exemption on Gay "Marriage,'LIFE
SITE NEWS (July 31, 2015), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/foundationspouring-millions-into-campaign-to-eradicate-religious-exemption.
Advancing gay
rights has figured prominently in the 2016 Presidential campaign. See Ramona
Cramer Tucker, No More Mud-Slinging, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 21, 2015, 12:45 PM),
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recognize the importance of continuing their activism. As Tim Gill
of the Gill Foundation has noted, "'[o]ther [civil rights] movements
have ...

won something and then sat back and relaxed,' only to

116
find themselves with their work still undone many years later."
Thus, the movement for LGBT rights has pressed on 11 7 after
securing marriage equality.118
Some assume that a Republican-controlled Congress will
push back against national campaigns to "add the words."1 19 Yet
the nation overwhelmingly
"support[s]
non-discrimination
protections for LGBT Americans."1 20 Furthermore, a recent HRCcommissioned poll found "strong support among Republican voters
'1 21
Sixtyfor the Equality Act's non-discrimination protections."
four percent "of all likely Republican voters support protecting
LGBT people from discrimination."'1 22
Conservatives are
increasingly joining the conversation about why "all Americansincluding gay and transgender Americans-must be protected
equally under the law." 123
In addition, support for non-

http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/faith-matters/2015/10/21/gay-marriagedebate-in-religious-circles-must-move-beyond-mud-slinging.
116. David Callahan, No One Left Behind: Tim Gill and the New Quest for Full
LGBT Equality, INSIDE PHILANTHROPY (Aug. 25, 2015,
11:57 AM),
http://www.insidephilanthropy.com/home/2015/8/25/no-one-left-behind-tim-gill-andthe-new-quest-for-full-lgbt.html.
117. Id.
118. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
119. These campaigns seek to add the words "sexual orientation" and "gender
identity" to existing state human rights laws. E.g., What Is Add the Words?, ADD
WORDS IDAHO, http://www.addthewords.org/#!about/aboutPage (last visited June
20, 2016) (describing the work of Add the Words, Idaho, which seeks to add "sexual
orientation" and "gender identity" to the Idaho Human Rights Act).
120. Brandon Lorenz, Illinois Senator Mark Kirk Becomes First Senate
Republican To Co-Sponsor the Equality Act, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Jan. 19, 2016),
http://www.hrc.org/blog/mark-kirk-becomes-first-senate-republican-to-co-sponsorthe-equality-act; accord Press Release, Human Rights Campaign, New Poll: 59% of
Voters Less Likely To Support Candidates Who Oppose Non-Discrimination
Protections (July 22, 2015), http://www.hrc.org/press/new-poll-59-of-voters-lesslikely-to-support-candidates-who-oppose-non-disc.
121. ROBERT P. JONES ET AL., PUB. RELIGION RESEARCH INST., BEYOND SAMESEX MARRIAGE: ATTITUDES ON LGBT NON-DISCRIMINATION LAWS AND RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTIONS
10
(2016),
http://publicreligion.org/site/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/PRRI-AVA-2015-LGBT-Report.pdf ("There is bipartisan
support for non-discrimination laws for LGBT people, with more than six in ten
Republicans (61%), and more than seven in ten independents (73%) and Democrats
(78%), in favor of such laws."); Lorenz, supra note 120.
122. Lorenz, supra note 120; Human Rights Campaign, supra note 120.
123. FREEDOM
FOR ALL AMS.,
WHY CONSERVATIVES
SUPPORT NONDISCRIMINATION
PROTECTIONS
FOR
LGBT
AMERICANS
1
(2015),
http://www.freedomforallamericans.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/Conservatives.pdf. As gay rights advocates explain, nondiscrimination measures are consistent with conservative values of "individual
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discrimination measures has been building among Republican
legislators.
Following Obergefell v. Hodges,124 moderateRepublican Representative Charlie Dent spoke of the need for
"compromise legislation" that "would prohibit anti-LGBT
employment and housing discrimination" while simultaneously
"ensur[ing] non-profits won't have their tax-exempt status revoked
125
for opposing same-sex marriage."
The Equality Act's sweeping protections received key
bipartisan support from Senator Mark Kirk and Representative
Robert Dold, the Act's first Republicans co-sponsors.1 26 For Matt
McTighe, Executive Director of Freedom for All Americans,
Republican co-sponsorship of the Equality Act has
shown us that non-discrimination isn't just a Democratic issue
or a Republican issue, but it is an American issue. The vast
majority of Republicans, Democrats and independents all
agree that discrimination is not an American value. That's
why we are seeing conservative leaders across the nation
fighting to ensure that every American, regardless of sexual
orientation or gender identity, are protected from
discrimination. 127
According to McTighe, Senator Kirk's and Representative
Dold's support of the Equality Act "is consistent with the majority
of conservatives in the country who already are strong supporters
128
of LGBT non-discrimination laws."
Other Republicans back the First Amendment Defense Act
(FADA), which would prohibit "the federal government from
penalizing individuals or institutions on the basis that they act in
accordance with a religious belief that marriage is a union
between one man and one woman." 129 Thus, FADA would
freedom and working hard to care for your family," 'fairness for all hardworking
Americans," 'respecting ...coworkers and serving customers, and getting the job
done," and enacting laws that "are good for business." Id.
124. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).

125. Chris Johnson, Equality Act Introduced with Great Fanfare, WASH. BLADE
(July 23, 2015, 1:40 PM), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/07/23/equality-actintroduced-with-great-fanfare/. However, Representative Dent has yet to file such
a bill.
See Bill Summary and Status, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES,
http://dent.house.gov/index.cfm?p=SponsoredLegislationSponsored Legislation (last
visited Apr. 11, 2016).
126. Adam Polaski, Senator Mark Kirk Is First Republican Senator To Sponsor
Equality

Act,

FREEDOM

FOR

ALL

AMS.

(Jan.

20,

2016,

11:10

AM),

http://www.freedomforallamericans.org/senator-mark-kirk-is-first-republicansenator-to-sponsor-equality-act/?mc cid=5c 70ed2256&mc eid= 2bd3be8f3e.
127. Id.
128. Id.

129. Mike Lee, Sen. Mike Lee: First Amendment Defense Act Protects Critical
of Freedom,' DESERET NEWS
(June 18,
2015,
12:00
AM),

'Space
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proactively address one concern that arose in the aftermath of
Obergefell: whether a tax-exempt university or other organization
could be stripped of its tax exemption for adhering to a traditional
view of marriage. 130 However, because FADA would not extend
any new rights to the LGBT community, some have argued that it
"enable[s] anti-LGBT discrimination."1 3 1 In a divided Congress,
FADA is "competing for passage with" the Equality Act.132
Recent scraps over budget riders show that public support
may not lead inexorably to definitive federal legislation.1 33 To be
sure, the extent of bipartisan support for federal LGBT protections
will rest heavily on whether and how protections for faith and
sexual orientation are balanced. As the next Part shows, a "walk"
across a typical university campus reveals the limits of existing
law in providing guidance on a range of questions post
Obergefell-subjects that will certainly be included in any
legislative fixes going forward.

II. A "Walk" Across Campus
To grasp how a university's interest in adhering and
witnessing to its faith beliefs intersects with protections for LGBT
students, staff, and faculty, this Part "walks" across a university
campus-beginning at its chapel, traveling through its front gate,
1 34
residence halls, student commons, and staff lounge.
Before making this trek, it is worth noting that the degree to
which faith influences each institution's character and day-to-day
operations varies. Religious universities span a spectrum: Some

http://www. deseretnews.com/article/865630939/First-Amendment-Defense-Actprotects-critical-space-of-freedom.html?pg= all [hereinafter Lee, Sen. Mike Lee]; see
Maggie Gallagher, Why I Support a Viewpoint-Neutral First Amendment Defense
Act,
NAT.
REV.
(Jul.
29,
2016,
3:10
PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/438520/ame-sex-marriage-viewpointneutral-first-amendment-defense-act-makes-sense.
130. See infra Part II.
131. Johnson, supra note 131.
132. Id.
133. For example, in May 2016, House Republicans blocked a measure that
would have banned federal contracts from going to groups that discriminate on
LGBT status. Karoun Demirjian, House Turns into Battleground over LGBT
Rights,
WASH.
POST
(May
19,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/05/19/house-turns-intobattleground-over-lgbt-rights/.
133. Lee, Sen. Mike Lee, supra note 129.
134. An exploration of athletic facilities can be found in Part III, infra.
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train students to minister to the faithful. 135 Others are covenantal
schools that "agree with parents to provide a consistent, Christcentered education" firmly rooted in Scripture and "strive to admit
only Christian families." 136 For example, Harding University
prohibits all kinds of "sexual immorality," such as sharing hotel
rooms with single members of the opposite sex, visiting such
persons' residences, and frequenting dance clubs. 137 Other schools,
though religiously affiliated, are less religiously infused, and have
few or no stringent requirements for faculty and students. Some
might see themselves as religious in name only.
Figure 1
graphically represents the different archetypal institutions, with
the most religiously infused at the core. As this Part will show,
the extent to which a school is religiously infused sometimes
matters to the degree of insulation it receives.

Figure 1. Degrees of Religious Infusion
135. For example, seminaries train religious leaders, such as priests, ministers,
and
rabbis.
Seminary,
OED
ONLINE,
http://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/175684?rskey=afTceN&result=l&isAdvanced=false#eid
(last visited
June 20, 2016).
136. Michael W. Lee, What Is a Christian School?, PERSPECTIVE (Jan. 11, 2006),
http://www.cherokeechristian.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/BadMythwhatisachristianschool.pdf.
137. HARDING UNIV.,
STUDENT HANDBOOK 2015-16, at
11 (2015),
http://www.harding.edu/assets/www/student-life/pdf/student handbook.pdf
("Sexual immorality in any form will result in suspension from the University.
Visiting in the residence of a single member of the opposite gender, even though
others are present, without permission is prohibited. Staying overnight in a motel,
hotel, residence or any such arrangement with a member of the opposite gender
will result in suspension, although explicit sexual immorality may not have been
observed. Students are prohibited from possessing or displaying pornographic
materials of any type .... Students are not allowed to social dance or go to dance
clubs, bars, or other inappropriate places of entertainment.").
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A. The Chapel
A religious university's religious autonomy is at its zenith in
its chapel, so this Article begins there.
In Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, the U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously held that "strictly ecclesiastical"
matters are "the church's alone. '138 In that case, Cheryl Perich
worked as a "called" teacher for Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church, affiliated with the Lutheran Church-Missouri
Synod (LCMS).139 When Perich developed narcolepsy, she
requested and was granted disability leave, and the Church hired
a substitute teacher to take on her duties.1 40 When Perich asked
to return to work earlier than expected, Church leadership
questioned whether she was ready to resume teaching and,
further, whether it could accommodate her narcolepsy. 1 41 Perich
filed a complaint with EEOC, which authorized her to sue under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).142 As a religious
matter, LCMSadherents do not believe in litigation; church
leaders wished to mediate with Perich.1 43 The question before the
Court was whether Perich's ADA suit could proceed or whether
the First Amendment, under a "ministerial exception," insulated
144
the church's decision.
While many would not have classified Perich as a "minister,"
the Court found that her "job duties reflected a role in conveying
1 45
the Church's message and carrying out its mission."
Acknowledging that non-discrimination laws are "undoubtedly
important,"1 6 the Court concluded that a religious organization's
choice about who should deliver its message and beliefs belonged
138. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC., 132 S. Ct.
694, 709 (2012) (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox
Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)).
139. Id. at 700. "Called" teachers, as opposed to "lay" teachers, must satisfy
certain academic requirements, including theological study. Id. at 699. "Once
called, a teacher receives the formal title 'Minister of Religion, Commissioned."' Id.
140. Id. at 700-01.

141. Id.
142. Id. at 701.
143. See id. at 701; see also COMM'N ON THEOLOGY & CHURCH RELATIONS, 1
CORINTHIANS 6:1-11:

AN EXEGETICAL

STUDY

(1991)

(detailing

the Lutheran

Church-Missouri Synod's stance on litigation),
http://www.lcms.org/Document.fdoc?src=lcm&id=415.
144. Hosanna-Tabor EvangelicalLutheran Church & Sch., 132 S. Ct. at 701.
145. Id. at 708.

146. Id. at 710.
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to it alone-making this a decision into which the government
147
may not intrude.
The significant sphere of autonomy given to religion rested in
part on the Court's view of the Establishment Clause as
restricting the government from interfering in ecclesiastical
matters. 148 But the Court was careful to narrowly cabin its
decision: "The case before us is an employment discrimination suit
brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her church's decision
to fire her. Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars
such a suit."149
Like the power to choose its ministers, the question of who
may be married in a particular faith tradition is quintessentially
1 50
religious. Marriage has always been a religious sacrament.
Religious couples who marry are not simply entering ordinary civil
contracts with one another: they believe they are entering into a
covenant with God.1 51 In fact, many couples experience their
marriages as "sojourning together on a religious journey" with
God.152
Recognizing the inherently religious nature of decisions
about who may marry in a particular faith tradition, all states
that voluntarily embraced same-sex marriage exempted clergy and
all but one exempted religious non-profits from any duty to host or
facilitate such marriages.1 53 Similarly, in his majority opinion in
Obergefell, Justice Kennedy

147. Id.

148. Id.; see Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 839, 859-62 (2012).

149. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 132 S. Ct. at 710.
The Court expressly reserved the question of whether contract breaches or tort
suits for injuries would also be barred. Id.
150. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., Marriage: Its Relationship to Religion, Law, and
the State, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS
157, 176-78 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson
eds., 2008) ("For many people ... marriage is a religious institution and wedding
ceremonies are a religious sacrament within American society.").
151. For more on this subject, see MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM COVENANT TO
CONTRACT (2000).

152. Robin Fretwell Wilson, "Getting the Government Out of Marriage" Post
Obergefell: The Ill-Considered Consequences of Transforming the State's
Relationship to Marriage, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at n.222)

(quoting Rachel Lile Colbert, Scale Development of the Religious Marital Factor-26
(Mar. 13, 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Regent University) (on file with
author)).
153. Clergy exemptions appear in CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-22b (2015); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 106 (2016); D.C. CODE § 46-406(c) (2016); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 572-12.1 (2016); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/209 (2016); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§§ 2-201, 2-202 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. § 517.09 (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
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emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious
doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere
conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should
not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious
organizations and persons are given proper protection as they
seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central
to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations
to
154
continue the family structure they have long revered.
In keeping with generally accepted notions of religious
autonomy over religious marriage, religious universities often

restrict who may marry in their chapels. The University of Notre
Dame, for example, provides that to marry in the Basilica, couples
must secure "the permission of the bride's pastor," one of the two
to be married must be a member in good standing of the Catholic
Church, 155 and couples must complete a "marriage preparation
program" prior to the ceremony. 156 Nothing explicitly limits
marriages in Notre Dame's Basilica to couples in opposite-sex
marriages,1 57 but given the Church's present teachings on
marriage as a union of one man and one woman, presumably no
same-sex couple could meet Notre Dame's listed requirements for
marrying there.158

§ 457:37(11) (West 2013); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11(1) (McKinney 2014); 15 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-3-6.1(b) (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5144(b) (2016); WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.04.010(4) (2016). Clergy are also exempted in the states that embraced
marriage equality by public vote, see, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 655(3) (2013), as
well as in states that combined LGBT rights with marriage conscience protections
in a single legislative package, like the Utah Compromise, see Antidiscrimination
and Religious Freedom Amendments, ch. 46, 2015 Utah Laws 214. Exemptions for
religious organizations appear in CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-22b, 46b-35a (2015);
D.C. CODE § 46-406(e) (2016); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-12.1 (2016); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/209 (2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 655 (2013); MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW §§ 2-201, 2-202 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. § 363A.26(3) (2015); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 457:37(111) (West 2013); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-b(1) (McKinney
2014); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-3-6.1(c) (2013); Antidiscrimination and
Religious Freedom Amendments, ch. 46, 2015 Utah Laws 214 ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
9, § 4502(1) (2016); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010(5) (2016).
154. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
155. Marriage at the Basilica, Step 1: Schedule Your Wedding, UNIV. NOTRE
DAME, http://campusministry.nd.edulbasilica-of-the-sacred-heart/marriage-at-thebasilica/step- 1-schedule-your-wedding/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
156. Id.
157. However, couples seeking to reserve the Basilica for a wedding ceremony
are told to have the "[n]ames of the bride and groom" available, id., which suggests
that only opposite-sex marriages may take place there.
158. See Anthony Faiola, Pope Lectures Catholic Elders at Closing of Synod on
Family,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
25,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/vatican-synod-calls-for-a-morewelcoming-catholic-church/2015/10/24/f98c83b6-71b9-1le5-bal4318f8e87a2fcstory.html.
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159
A majority of Americans do not oppose such exemptions.
What is more, "[n]o one seriously believes that clergy will
be... even asked[] to perform marriages that are anathema to
them." 160 But if they are, there is near-universal agreement that
neither a clergy member nor a church could or should be forced to
solemnize a marriage when doing so would violate their religious
convictions.1 61
Religious organizations may, however, open
themselves to litigation and may potentially violate state and
municipal non-discrimination laws if they have permitted nonmembers to rent their facilities in the past but deny access to gay
couples alone. For example, in Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp
Meeting Ass'n, a Methodist-affiliated non-profit group in New
Jersey was found to have violated a state non-discrimination law
when it denied a pair of same-sex couples the use of its boardwalk
and pavilion for their commitment ceremonies.1 62 This was the
first such request that had been denied for anything other than
scheduling reasons.1 63 The group paid substantial fines; lost its

159. See SARAH TRUMBLE & LANAE ERICKSON HATALSKY, THIRD WAY,
AMERICANS AGREE: MARRIAGE FOR GAY COUPLES DOESN'T THREATEN RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY
7
(2013),
http://s3.amazonaws.com/content.thirdway.org/publishing/documents/pdfs/000/000/
157/americans-agree-marriage-for-gay-couples-doesnt-threaten-religiousliberty.pd ?1462825557 ("The only situation in which respondents felt someone
should be allowed to refuse to provide a wedding-related service for a gay couple
was when the provider was a church or clergy member and that service was the
religious solemnization of that marriage-the actual performance of the wedding
ceremony. In that case, 61% of voters felt the clergy member or church should be
able to refuse to perform the ceremony, compared to 28% who felt they should
not.").
160. Marc Stern, Same-Sex Marriageand the Churches, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 1 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R.
Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008).

161. See

John

Corvino,

The

Slippery

Slope

of Religious Exemptions,

JOHNCORVINO (Nov. 22, 2009), http://johncorvino.com/2009/1 1/the-slippery-slope-ofreligious-exemptions/ ("No serious participant argues that the government should
force religions to perform gay weddings (or ordinations or baptisms or other
religious functions) against their will."). But see TRUMBLE & HATALSKY, supra note
159, at 7 (reporting that 28% of respondents believed that clergy members and
churches should not be able to refuse to perform a same-sex wedding ceremony
because of religious beliefs).
162. See Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, CRT 6145-09, 2012 WL
169302, at *2 (N.J. Office of Admin. Law, Jan. 12, 2012) ("The Green Acres
program is designed to preserve open space and the statutory scheme authorizes a
tax exemption for non-profit corporations utilizing property for conservation or
recreational purposes. One condition of the exemption is that the property be 'open
for public use on an equal basis."'); Robin Fretwell Wilson & Anthony Michael

Kreis, Embracing Compromise: Marriage Equality and Religious Liberty in the
PoliticalProcess, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 485, 494 (2014).

163. Judge Rules in Favor of Same-Sex Couple in DiscriminationCase, ACLU
N.J. (Jan. 13, 2012), https://www.aclu-nj.org/news/2012/01/13/judge-rules-in-favor-
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ability to participate in a state program exempting "public lands"
from taxes; and lost its "exemption from ad valorem property taxes
on the pavilion," 164 which was made possible "by the group's own
decision to hinge its tax exemption on continued participation in
5
the public lands program."16
As the next sub-Part explains, a religious university's claims
for religious autonomy also ebb in strength when a university
seeks to open admission to some, but not all, people otherwise
qualified for admission. And while ED has authorized waivers
under Title IX as to admissions, the Obergefell Court gave no
assurances about a university's tax-exempt status if the university
166
excludes LGBT students.
B. The Front Gate (orAdmissions)
Title IX's carve-out for religious institutions is central to
religious schools' prerogative to limit admissions to specific types
of applicants while accepting funding. At Title IX's inception,
Congress specified that it shall "not apply to an educational
institution which is controlled by a religious organization if [its]
application ...

would not be consistent with the religious tenets of

such organization." 167
Although religious universities are
expressly carved out from Title IX's prohibitions, 168 the ED created
an administrative process to grant express "waivers" to religious
universities controlled by religious organizations. 169 Universities
must follow ED regulations in order to rely on Title IX's
170
categorical exemption.

of-same-sex-couple-in-discrimination-case/.
164. Wilson & Kreis, supra note 162, at 494.
165. Id.
The group later regained its tax exemption on the pavilion as a
religious organization. Id.
166. See Laurie Goodstein & Adam Liptak, Schools Fear Gay MarriageRuling
Could
End
Tax
Exemptions,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
24,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/us/schools-fear-impact-of-gay-marriage-rulingon-tax-status.html?_r=0.
167. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235, 373

(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (2014)); see also 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.12(a) (2015) ("[Regulations promulgated under Title IX] do[] not apply to an
educational institution which is controlled by a religious organization to the extent
application of this part would not be consistent with the religious tenets of such
organization."). This categorical exemption differs in important ways from Title
VII's more cabined exemptions. See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
168. Wilson, When Governments Insulate Dissenters from Social Change, supra
note 14 (discussing differences between specific, tailored carve-outs from specific
statutes and generalized protections, like RFRA).
169. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.12(b).
170. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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Schools have sought and received waivers in areas such as
admissions and recruitment, educational programs and activities,
athletics, employment, housing, and financial aid. 171 Since 2013,
more than four dozen schools have requested waivers to portions
of Title IX that might apply to students and staff who are
transgender or in same-sex relationships. 172 Of these, twentythree schools have asked for and received a Title IX exemption for
sexual orientation, and thirty-three schools have asked and
received an exemption for gender identity. 173
Nonetheless, few universities appear to bar admission to
LGBT students. 174 In fact, the vast majority of universities "want
to be viewed as safe and welcoming places to all students, and
they are happy to go the extra mile to ensure that they are" by
"continuously working to improve.., safety concerns, recruitment,
awareness and education both in and outside of the LGBTQ
community." 175
Still, many universities desire to build an
intentional orthodox community of believers.
Some require
students to attend Bible studies or church. 176 To forge this
171. Together, these schools serve more than 73,000 students. WARBELOW &
GREGG, supra note 25. To date, ED has not denied any school a requested waiver.
Augustine-Adams, supra note 71, at 3 (reporting 253 exemptions granted as of
January 6, 2016, with no denials).
172. Id.
173. Mitchell, supra note 5.
174. Some institutions have undergone an evolution in their stance on
inclusivity of LGBT individuals. For example, in 2015, Goshen College, a Christian
liberal arts college in Indiana, and Eastern Mennonite University in Virginia
added "sexual orientation" to their non-discrimination policies. Bob Smietana et
al., Two CCCU Colleges To Allow Same-Sex Married Faculty, CHRISTIANITY TODAY
(July
28,
2015,
3:41
PM),
http://www.christianitytoday.com/gleanings/2015/july/cccu-goshen-college-easternmennonite-university-same-sex-m.html.
Importantly, not all religions oppose
same-sex marriage. See David Masci & Michael Lipka, Where Christian Churches,
Other Religions Stand on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 21, 2015),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/21/where-christian-churches-standon-gay-marriage/ (listing several religious institutions that have embraced samesex marriage, including the Reform and Conservative Jewish movements, the
Unitarian Universalist Association, and the United Church of Christ); see also, e.g.,
Shaila Dewan, True to Episcopal Church's Past, Bishops Split on Gay Weddings,
N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/19/nyregion/newepiscopal-split-priests-role-in-ny-gay-weddings.html (noting that, in New York
City, two out of five Episcopalian dioceses allow same-sex couples to be wed in the
Church).
175. Gabrielle Kratsas, 50 Great LGBTQ-Friendly Colleges, GREAT VALUE CS.,
http://www.greatvaluecolleges.net/50-great-lgbtq-friendly-colleges/ (last visited Feb.
17, 2016).
176. At public non-religious universities, mandating church attendance may
intrude on the student's countervailing First Amendment rights. For example, a
former Delaware State University volleyball player, Natalia Mendieta, lost her
athletic scholarship because she refused to participate in Bible studies or attend
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identity, some universities close their ranks to all kinds of
students-not just LGBT students-whom they believe do not
conform to their religious tenets. For example, Carson-Newman
University, a private Baptist College in Tennessee, drew fire for
an alleged admissions ban on "gay students, unwed mothers,
women [who have] had an abortion and even students who may be
pregnant." 177 Asked to explain the choice to limit admissions in
this way, the university's president responded "[tihis is who we
1 78

are."

As this illustrates, some religious universities are closing
their doors to LGBT students by denying them admission or, later,
by expelling them.1 79 Because of Title IX's categorical exemption,
excluding students who are in same-sex relationships or who
identify as LGBT is permitted if admission would be inconsistent
with the school's faith tenets and the school has received a waiver
from ED. 180 However, if a university seeks to avoid hiring LGBT
employees, it may court Title VII liability.18 1 In any event, both
church, optional activities which her coach had made mandatory. Complaint at 511, Mendieta v. Killingsworth, No. 1:15-cv-00472-GMS (D. Del. June 9, 2015).
Mendieta subsequently sued the coach, Delaware State University, and its athletic
director for violating her First Amendment rights. Id. at 11-21; see John Rawlins,
DSU Student's Lawsuit Claims Scholarship Lost After Refusing To Attend Church,
6 ABC ACTION NEWS (June 19, 2015), http://6abc.com/news/lawsuit-studentsscholarship-lost-after-refusing-to-attend-church/793247/.
177. Lauren Davis, Carson-Newman University Granted Exemption from
Discrimination Laws,
LOCAL8
NEWS
(Dec.
14,
2015,
12:25
PM),
http://www.local8now.com/home/headlines/Carson-Newman-University-grantedexemption-from-discrimination-laws-360521761.html; cf. Letter from Catherine E.
Lhamon, Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of
Educ., to J. Randall O'Brien, President, Carson-Newman Univ. 3 (July 10, 2015)
[hereinafter Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon to J. Randall O'Brien],
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/carson-newmanresponse-07102015.pdf ("The University is exempt from [Title IX] to the extent that
[it] prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of marital status, sex outside of
marriage, sexual orientation, gender identity, pregnancy, or abortion and
compliance would conflict with the controlling organization's religious tenets.").
178. Davis, supra note 177.
179. As Part II.D explains, it is not necessary to exclude categories of students in
order to create and maintain a faith-centered community. For example, under an
equal-opportunity proscription that read, "The University further holds to the
biblical principle that sexual relationships are unacceptable to God outside the
context of marriage," admission would not open to unmarried, pregnant student.
HARDING UNIV., supra note 137, at 11. As Part II.E(4) shows, using pregnancy as a
decisional tool is especially problematic because only biological women can become
pregnant; thus, if such a policy is used to enforce bans on sex outside marriage
without taking measures to enforce those bans against men, the practice may
violate Title VII's ban on sex and pregnancy discrimination. See infra.
180. See Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon to J. Randall O'Brien, supra note
177.
181. See infra Part I.D.
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choices may violate state and municipal sexual orientation non182
discrimination laws in particular parts of the country.
Yet, the more religious universities close in on themselves,
the more contested the government's subsidy will be-whether
through Title IX and other funding or through indirect supports
like tax exemption. Nearly every university in the United States,
public or private, is federally tax exempt.18 3 Thus, a question of
grave importance to religious universities is whether they can
exclude LGBT individuals and retain their tax-exempt status.
While it would once have been unthinkable that a
university's religious tenets regarding marriage and sexuality
would bear on its tax-exempt status, this possibility arose during
oral argument in Obergefell.184 Justice Alito asked Solicitor
General Donald Verrilli whether a university or college that
opposed same-sex marriage would be at risk of meeting the same
fate as Bob Jones University,18 5 referencing the Court's decision
that a university "was not entitled to tax-exempt status if it
opposed interracial marriage or interracial dating."186 General
Verrilli responded frankly: "You know, I-I don't think I can
answer that question without knowing more specifics, but it's
certainly going to be an issue. I-I don't deny that. I don't deny
that, Justice Alito. It is-it is going to be an issue. '18 7 In his
dissent, Chief Justice John Roberts returned to this colloquy.
Chief Justice Roberts noted:
[H]ard questions arise when people of faith exercise religion in
ways that may be seen to conflict with the new right to samesex marriage-when, for example, a religious college provides
married student housing only to opposite-sex married couples,
or a religious adoption agency declines to place children with
same-sex married couples.
Indeed, the Solicitor General
candidly acknowledged that the tax exemptions of some

182. See infra Part II.D.
183. The Internal Revenue Code exempts universities "because of their
educational purposes-purposes that the Federal government has long recognized
as fundamental to fostering the productive and civic capacities of citizens-and/or
the fact that they are State governmental entities." ASS'N OF AM. UNIVS., TAX
EXEMPTION FOR UNIVERSITIES & COLLEGES: INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION
501(C)(3)
AND
SECTION
115,
at
1
(2013),

http://www.aau.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id= 14246.
184. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2015) (No. 14-556) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument],
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/14556q1_7148.pdf.
185. Id.; see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
186. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 184, at 38.
187. Id.
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religious institutions would be in question if they opposed
same-sex marriage.188

Obergefell left many universities that adhere to a traditional
view of marriage wondering how the decision would affect them.18 9
It seems unlikely that an administration would attempt to strip a
university of its tax exemption on these grounds, at least until
"gay rights looks like race does today, where you have a handful of
crackpots still resisting."1 90
Nonetheless, guidance from IRS
Commissioner John Koskinen provided little comfort. He stated
that, while "[tihe IRS has absolutely no plans or intention to take
away the tax exempt status of religious schools, colleges, or
universities that practice discrimination against LGBT people," if
the IRS were to make such a move, "[tihe public would have plenty
of notice and plenty of opportunity to comment, and that's not
going to happen in the next two and a half years."1 91
The major challenge for religious colleges and universities,
then, is how best to adhere to the deeply held convictions of their
faiths without risking their funding and/or tax-exemption and
without violating federal, state, or local law. The most decent
course-in both the immediate future and long term-is to
welcome LGBT students and faculty into the educational
community. A principal aim and benefit of higher education is
that it brings together people who are different.
"Neither
individuals nor society as a whole will function effectively without
mutual respect, knowledge, and comfort in our dealings with
people who are different from us. 1 92 Ideally, one's education
"proactively teach[es one] to tolerate, interact with, and, hopefully,
enjoy people who are different" from oneself.193 When someone
different from us expresses a view that diverges from our own, "it
provokes more thought than when it comes from someone who

188. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
189. Emma Green, How Will the U.S. Supreme Court's Same-Sex-Marriage
Decision

Affect

Religious

Liberty?,

ATLANTIC

(June

26,

2015),

http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/how-will-the-us-supremecourts-same-sex-marriage-decision-affect-religious-liberty/396986/.
190. Goodstein & Liptak, supra note 166 (quoting Professor Douglas Laycock).
191. David Badash, IRS: Religious Colleges Can Still Keep Tax-Exempt Status
While DiscriminatingAgainst Gays, NEW C.R. MOVEMENT (Aug. 3, 2015, 9:38 AM),

http://www.thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/davidbadash/irs-commits to allowing
_religious colleges-keep-tax-exempt-status while discriminating-against-gays.
192. Michael A. Resnick, An American Imperative: Public Education, CTR. FOR
PUB.

EDUC.

(Apr.

27,

2006),

http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/Main-

Menu/Public-education/An-American-imperative-Public-education-.
193. Id.
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looks like us." 1 9 4 To serve these ends, educational institutions
"cannot advocate the value of one racial, ethnic, or [other] group
over another, nor can they engage in practices that would
195
discriminate against any such group."
Accepting LGBT students and faculty into a community does
not mean that a university could not transmit its values around
sexuality and marriage both within the university community and
to the public. Religious universities that hold traditional views of
marriage and sexuality could express those views to the
community and to the world by affirming their religious tenetseven if this means leaving some feeling "no longer welcome at
their own college." 196 As the next Section explains, religious
universities can also work to actively instill a common ethos and
norms around sexuality and marriage by using "equal
opportunity" conduct proscriptions.
C. Student Housing
One place where universities realize the benefits of bringing
together those of different backgrounds is through residential life
and housing, and student housing is a fundamental part of
university life. Much as in the admissions context, universities
defeat their own educational missions and thwart their own
educational goals in denying transgender or same-sex individuals
student housing. Many universities, secular and sectarian, have
LGBT-inclusive housing policies.1 97
Unfortunately, gay and
194. Katherine W. Phillips, How Diversity Makes Us Smarter: Being Around
People Who Are Different from Us Makes Us More Creative, More Diligent, and
Harder-Working,
SCI.
AM.
(Oct.
1,
2014),
http://www. scientificamerican.com/article/how-diversity-makes-us-smarter/; accord
Gurin et al., supra note 40; Larrick et al., supra note 40.
195. Resnick, supra note 192; see also Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ.
of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 705 (2010) (discussing
the benefits of diversity in education).
196. Abby Ohlheiser, Another Christian College Faces Backlash for StudentAthlete

Policy

on

LGBT

Issues,

WASH.

POST,

(May

21,

2015),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/05/21/anotherchristian-college-faces-backlash-for-student-athlete-policy-on-lgbt-issues/ ("Erskine
College, a Christian university in South Carolina, condemned same-sex
relationships as sinful, a year after two members of the school's men's volleyball
team came out as gay. Erskine emphasized that its statement was not a policy
banning LGBT behavior. However, it left many LGBT students there wondering
whether the school's stance meant they were no longer welcome at their own
college.").
197. For example, at the University of Illinois Springfield, "Family
Housing ... is available to enrolled students or visiting scholars who will be
residing with their legal spouse, ... a domestic partner, ... and/or legally
dependent children .... ."
Family Housing at UIS, U. ILL. SPRINGFIELD,

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 34: 385

transgender students report denial of "gender-appropriate
housing," in addition to "outright denial of campus housing." 198

http://www.uis.edu/residencelife/livingatuis/family-housing-at-uis/
(last visited
June 25, 2016).
The policies of other schools are more opaque. In some instances, a school's
married student housing policy simply references "marriage," as opposed to one's
legal or religious marriage, requiring specific inquiry of the school's housing policy.
The University of Notre Dame's website, for example, says it offers "[o]ne-bedroom
apartments ...

to married full-time students without children ....

A

copy of a

marriage certificate is needed as proof of marriage." Office ofHousing: Cripe Street,
UNIV. NOTRE DAME (emphasis added), http://housing.nd.edu/graduate/cripe-street/
(last visited Apr. 11, 2016). Upon further inquiry, Notre Dame officials confirmed
that university housing is open to anyone in a marriage that is legally recognized
in Indiana. E-mail from Karen Kennedy, Dir. of Hous., Univ. of Notre Dame, to
Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of Law, Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law (June 7, 2016,
07:07 CST) (on file with author) ("In order for full-time students and their spouses
to be eligible to live together in University Village, our residential community for
married students and students with children, we require a valid marriage license
recognized by the State of Indiana.").
LeTourneau University's website provides that "[o]n-campus housing is available
for married students and their families .... " Family and Married Student
Apartments, LETOURNEAU UNIV., http://www.letu.edu/_Student-Life/residencelife/living-options/MSHGallery.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2016). Upon inquiry,
LeTourneau's Director of Housing and Operations stated that the school has yet to
receive a request from a same-sex couple for married student housing and did not
wish to speculate what actions it might take if a legally married same-sex couple
were to apply. See Email from Tony Zappasodi, Dir. Of Hous. & Operations,
LeTourneau Univ., to Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of Law, Univ. of Ill. Coll. of
Law (June 2, 2016, 12:51 CDT) (on file with author). Clarity is important because
availability of housing affects the choice to enroll for some students.
198. WARBELOW & GREGG, supra note 25, at 5 ("In the 2011 National
Transgender Discrimination Survey, one-fifth of transgender students reported
that they were denied gender-appropriate housing, and five percent reported
outright denial of campus housing."). This issue likewise applies to regular dorms.
In 2013, a transgender male student at George Fox University, a school affiliated
with the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), requested to be moved to male oncampus housing for the following academic year. Joshua Hunt & Richard P6rezPefia, Housing Dispute Puts Quaker University at Front of Fight Over Transgender
Issues,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
24,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/25/us/transgender-student-fights-for-housingrights-at-george-fox-university.html.
The school offered the student a single
apartment on-campus or the option to live off-campus. Id. In response, the student
filed a complaint with the Department of Education. Id. In March 2014, the
University requested a Title IX exemption regarding transgender housing and
bathrooms. Letter from Robin Baker, President, George Fox Univ., to Catherine E.
Lhamon, Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ.
2
(Mar.
31,
2014),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-relexempt/george-fox-university-request-03312014.pdf. OCR granted the exemption
in May 2014. Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights,
Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Robin Baker, President, George Fox
Univ. 2 (May 23, 2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-relexempt/george-fox-university-response-05232014.pdf. Although the student lived
off-campus for the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 academic years, George Fox has since
changed its policy towards transgender students.
Students Identifying as
Transgender, GEORGE FOX UNIV., http://www.georgefox.edu/transgender/ (last
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To be sure, in some states like Washington, religious
universities are wholly exempt from duties not to discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation in public accommodationsmeaning they do not have a legal duty to be inclusive in
housing. 199 Outright exclusion of gay students, however, suffers
from a basic normative problem: it is wholly unnecessary. By
combining reasonable accommodations with student conduct codes
requiring chastity outside marriage for everyone, a religious
university can transmit its tenets without excluding anyoneengendering respect from the community, as well as from its own
LGBT students. The fact that a student is transgender does not
necessitate exclusion either. Reasonable accommodations can be
made in dormitory bathrooms to effectively balance the privacy
interests of students and their dorm-mates, 20 0 much as occurs with
20 1
athletes in locker rooms.
Married student housing is different. 20 2 Married student
housing implicates the university's own understanding of and
faith witness to the religious sacrament of marriage. 20 3 So, while a
university might limit married student housing to those in
traditional heterosexual relationships, it might also require a
couple to be married in the faith, rather than just civilly, in order
to allow them to reside in married housing. 20 4

By providing

visited June 26, 2016) ("Given the varying circumstances of students identifying as
transgender, addressing their particular needs will be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis, prioritizing the well-being of the individual and community alike. As an
example, care is thus given to ensure that gender-neutral bathrooms are provided
in academic and other facilities when possible.").
199. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.030, 49.60.040 (2015).
200. See infra Part I.D.
201. See infra Part I.D. A requirement that all students refrain from sexually
intimate activities in university housing or on university grounds is an "equal
opportunity" prohibition that would not treat LGBT students differently (assuming
that the university would enforce the prohibition equally as to both homosexual
and heterosexual students). See infra Part I.D.
202. The housing policies of any given university are not always obvious. See
supra note 197 (comparing various housing policies).
As with other policies
covering typical student housing, universities should provide clarity to students
about married student housing because availability of such housing may affect a
student's choice to enroll.
203. See supra Part II.A.
204. If a university thinks of marriage as a matter for the secular state, as some
Lutherans do, JOHN W. KLEINER, HOW DO LUTHERANS VIEW MARRIAGE? 1 (2004),
http://elcic.ca/Same-Sex-Blessings/documents/kleiner.pdf (analyzing the works of
Martin Luther to assist the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Canada "in
considering the matter of the blessing of same-sex relationships"), the university
would treat all legally married couples as alike. On the other hand, if a university
thinks of marriage as a sacrament, the university would likely not recognize all
legally valid marriages, presenting the difficult questions raised here.
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housing, universities can support students who choose to marry in
the school's faith; thus, in a sense, universities can channel
couples into marriage as they envision that union.
As Obergefell recognized, what counts as a religious marriage
is an inherently religious question. 20 5 Religious universities need
space to advance conceptions of marriage consistent with their
faith, through action and speech. Unsurprisingly, many states
that voluntarily embraced same-sex marriage or that have enacted
protections against housing discrimination for LGBT individuals
included specific
statutory
protections
so that religious
universities may restrict access to married student housing to
206
reflect their religious beliefs.

205. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
206. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(111) (West 2013); see also MINN. STAT.
§ 363A.26
(2015) ("Nothing
in this chapter
prohibits any religious
association ...

from ...

in matters relating to sexual orientation, taking any action

with respect to ... housing and real property .. "); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 10-b(2)
(McKinney 2014) ("[N]othing in this article shall limit or diminish the right ... of
any religious or denominational institution or organization, or any organization
operated for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or
controlled by or in connection with a religious organization, to limit employment or
sales or rental of housing accommodations or admission to or give preference to
persons of the same religion or denomination.").
Some state non-discrimination laws make allowances for religious organizations to
restrict housing to "persons of the same religion." E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-9
(2012). The New Mexico Human Rights Act, for example, states that nothing shall
B. bar any religious or denominational institution or organization that is
operated, supervised or controlled by or that is operated in connection with
a religious or denominational organization from limiting admission to or
giving preference to persons of the same religion or denomination or from
making selections of buyers, lessees or tenants as are calculated by the
organization or denomination to promote the religious or denominational
principles for which it is established or maintained, unless membership in
the religious or denominational organization is restricted on account of
race, color, national origin or ancestry;
C. bar any religious or denominational institution or organization that is
operated, supervised or controlled by or that is operated in connection with
a religious or denominational organization from imposing discriminatory
employment or renting practices that are based upon sexual orientation or
gender identity; provided, that the provisions of the Human Rights Act
with respect to sexual orientation and gender identity shall apply to any
other:
(1) for-profit activities of a religious or denominational institution or
religious organization subject to the provisions of Section 511(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended; or
(2) non-profit activities of a religious or denominational institution or
religious organization subject to the provisions of Section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
Id.
When Utah extended its prohibitions on discrimination to include sexual
orientation and gender identity, it continued to exempt religious entities from the
non-discrimination law's scope:
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D. Student Commons and Conduct Codes Shaping Student
Life
"The life blood of religious educational institutions [are] their
doctrinal statements and codes of conduct that set standards for
employee and student life."20 7 Such conduct codes are a valuable
way for a religious university to instill its faith into the scholastic
community, so long as they apply equally.
Baylor University, a Baptist University in Waco, Texas, is an
exemplar of just such an equal-opportunity proscription. In 2012,
Baylor updated its conduct code, which previously included a ban
on "homosexual acts. 208
Under the current policy, Baylor
students are directed to be "guided by the biblical understanding
that human sexuality is a gift from God and that physical sexual
intimacy is to be expressed in the context of marital fidelity. Thus,
it is expected that Baylor students, faculty and staff will engage in
behaviors consistent with this understanding of human
sexuality." 20 9 As Baylor's new code shows, religious universities
can institute policies that maintain a common ethos and transmit
their religious values around sexuality without prohibiting gay
sexuality alone.

This chapter does not apply to a dwelling or a temporary or permanent
residence facility if ... the discrimination is by sex, sexual orientation,
gender identity, or familial status for reasons of personal modesty or
privacy, or in the furtherance of a religious institution's free exercise of
religious rights under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution or the Utah Constitution; and (b) the dwelling or the
temporary or permanent residence facility is: (i) operated by a non-profit
or charitable organization; (ii) owned by, operated by, or under contract
with a religious organization, a religious association, a religious
educational institution, or a religious society; (iii) owned by, operated by,
or under contract with an affiliate of an entity described in Subsection
(2)(b)(ii); or (iv) owned by or operated by a person under contract with an
entity described in Subsection (2)(b)(ii).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-21-3 (West 2015); Antidiscrimination and Religious Freedom
Amendments, ch. 13, 2015 Utah Laws 68; S. B. 296, Reg. Sess. at lines 812-28
(Utah 2015), http://le.utah.gov/-2015/bills/static/sbU296.html.
207. Mawdsley, supra note 113, at 279.
208. Abby Ohlheiser, Why Baylor University's Sexual Conduct Policy No Longer
Calls
Out
"Homosexual Acts,"
WASH.
POST
(July
8,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/07/08/why-bayloruniversitys-sexual-conduct-policy-no-longer-calls-out-homosexual-acts/.
209. Id. ("In a document outlining how the school will apply the new policy,
Baylor says that it will 'be interpreted by the Baptist University in a manner
consistent with the Baptist Faith and Message of 1963,' a reference to a doctrinal
document from the Southern Baptist Convention. That document, among other
things, defines marriage as 'the uniting of one man and one woman in covenant
commitment for a lifetime."').
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Equal-opportunity conduct codes can do the work of
transmitting core values. Consider, for example, the honor code at
Brigham Young University (BYU), which binds students to a
pledge to live a "chaste and virtuous life" and forbids sexual
activity prior to marriage. 210 In accordance with that provision,
BYU, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Church of Jesus Christ of
the Latter Saints (also known as the LDS or Mormon Church),
"suspended star basketball player Brandon Davies for admitting
211
to having premarital sex with his girlfriend."
Contrast this equal-opportunity proscription with a conduct
code that speaks exclusively in terms of gay sexuality, such as one
"prohibit[ing] same-sex dating behaviors." 21 2 Some schools extend
such restrictions to students, staff and faculty. 21 3 These policies
tread very close to excluding outright those LGBT individuals who
do not intend to be celibate. Although codes framed in this way
would be permitted under Title IX, such policies impoverish the

210. BYU's Honor Code requires
[s]tudents [to] abstain from the use of alcohol, tobacco, and illegal
substances and from the intentional misuse or abuse of any substance.
Sexual misconduct; obscene or indecent conduct or expressions; disorderly
or disruptive conduct; participation in gambling activities; involvement
with pornographic, erotic, indecent, or offensive material; and any other
conduct or action inconsistent with the principles of The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints and the Honor Code is not permitted.
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV., CHURCH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM HONOR CODE 2 (2015)
[hereinafter
BYU HONOR CODE], https://policy.byu.edu/content/managed/26
/ChurchEducationalSystemHonorCode.pdf.
211. Jim Buzinski, Gay at BYU: A Former Athlete Tells His Story, OUTSPORTS
(Apr. 3, 2011, 10:35 PM), http://www.outsports.com/2011/4/3/3863458/gay-at-byu-aformer-athlete-tells-his-story.
212. E.g., LETOURNEAU UNIV., LETU STUDENT HANDBOOK 2015-16, at 34 (2015),
http://www.letu.edu/opencms/export/sites/default/_StudentAll of these policies
Life/studenthandbook/LETUStudentHandbook20l5-16.pdf.
have received media scrutiny. See Philip Francis & Mark Longhurst, How LGBT
Students Are Changing Christian Colleges, ATLANTIC (July 23, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/07/gordon-college-the-newfrontier-of-gay-rights/374861/; Aubrey Hoeppner, Private Universities and LGBT: A
Comparative Survey, PEPP. UNIV. GRAPHIC (Jan. 19, 2012), http://pepperdinegraphic.com/private-universities-and-lgbt-a-comparative-survey/; State of the Gay,
Queer Zine, Banned by Harding University, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 4, 2011, 1:54
PM),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/04/state-of-the-gay-n-830846.html

[hereinafter State of the Gay].
213. E.g., OKLA. CHRISTIAN UNIV., UNDERGRADUATE ACADEMIC CATALOG 20142015, at 9, https://www.oc.edu/academics/documents/catalog/Catalog-2014-2015.pdf
("By choosing to be a part of the Oklahoma Christian community, every member of
the student body, staff, faculty, and Board of Trustees affirms his or her
understanding of, respect for, and commitment to abide by the principles and
standards of conduct set forth in this covenant."). For an analysis of the law
surrounding these codes when applied to faculty, see Part I.E, infra. (discussing
Title VII's religious university exemption).

2016]

Squaring Faith and Sexuality

community and deny LGBT individuals access to quality
educational institutions.
And as an exclusionary rule, the
proscription likely would be impermissible as to employees under
Title VII if courts agree that sex discrimination includes sexual
orientation discrimination, and may violate state and local laws
2 14
across the country.

As Baylor's

code

illustrates,

additional prohibitions

on

homosexuality are wholly unnecessary when all students-gay
and straight alike-must be chaste. Commanding chastity before
marriage gives witness to one's faith tenets and demands the same
fidelity of all students. So, for example, when a student is expelled
for having sex with a same-sex partner, no one is being treated

differently so long as the university is prepared to-and actually
does-expel

any

students

who

relationships outside marriage, as BYU

have

sexually

intimate

21 5

did.

Singling out homosexual behavior serves no purpose that is

not already served through a policy requiring chastity.2 16

For

students of faith struggling with their sexuality, codes that
specifically prohibit homosexuality risk pushing the student away
or making the student feel unwelcome, rather than bringing the
student into the faith.21 7 In this respect, a code that proscribes all
sexual activity prior to marriage applies equally to all students,
gay or straight, at least until a student marries. Setting aside
those pursuing graduate degrees, in a world of delayed
marriage,212 a conduct code that reserves sex to marriage does not

214. See, e.g., Macy, EEOC DOC 0120120821, at *1, *16 (E.E.O.C. 2012); U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 47; see also Part I.E, supra.
215. For example, Danielle Powell, a student at a small Bible college in Omaha,
says she was expelled during her final semester for being in a same-sex
relationship, which was a violation of the university's student handbook. Tyler
Kingkade, Danielle Powell, Grace University Student Kicked Out for Being Lesbian,
Must Repay Thousands, HUFFINGTON POST (June 12, 2013, 3:05 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/12/danielle-powell-graceuniversity-n_3428514.html; State of the Gay, supra note 212.
216. If the purpose is to police public displays of affection by gays and not
straights, then it would not be an equal opportunity prohibition, as explained later
in this Part. See infra.
217. Buzinski, supra note 211.
218. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Keeping Women in Business (and Family), in
RETHINKING BUSINESS MANAGEMENT: EXAMINING THE FOUNDATIONS OF BUSINESS
EDUCATION 95 (Samuel Gregg & James R. Stoner, Jr. eds., 2d ed. 2008). Although
religious schools might be more likely to have a lot of married students, marriage
rates are typically low among college students. Compare Y Facts: University
Marriage Status Totals, 1980-2014, BYU http://yfacts.byu.edu/Article?id=188 (last
visited June 20, 2016) (reporting that, in 2008, 25% of BYU undergraduate
students were married), with Stephanie Steinberg, Saying I Do' While Studying at
the
"U,'
CNN
(Aug.
8,
2011,
3:14
PM),
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make it impossible for LGBT students to attend a given university
any more than it makes it impossible for any student who wants to
have sex in college but is not yet ready to marry to do so.
A harder question bedeviling religious universities in the
wake of Obergefell is whether religious universities can proscribe
same-sex marriage, rather than sexuality alone.
Some
2
universities bar admission to applicants in same-sex marriages, 19
220
and others expel students despite the hardship this entails.
Binding students and faculty to a promise that all "physical sexual
intimacy" will be confined to marriage as the university recognizes
it operates as backdoor exclusion of gay married students and
employees. When a straight couple marries, that couple can
satisfy the conduct rule because the school recognizes their
marriage. However, because same-sex marriage would not be
recognized religiously by many faith traditions likely to have such
a conduct code, a legally married gay couple could never come into
compliance. 221
Indeed, in these faith traditions, couples in
unrecognized marriages may violate dual proscriptions: The
http://www.cnn.com/2011/08/04/living/married-college-students/
(reporting that
18% of all undergraduate students in 2008 were married).
219. For example, Harding University's student handbook reads in part that
"Harding University holds to the biblical principle that God instituted marriage as
a relationship between one man and one woman," and that "[s]tudents are
prohibited from being married to any person of the same sex." HARDING UNIV.,
supra note 137, at 11. Likewise, Oklahoma Christian University's student
handbook reads: "We strive to treat our bodies with the honor due the temple of the
Holy Spirit-honoring God's plan that sexual relations be a part of a marriage
between a man and a woman ....

By choosing to be a part of the Oklahoma

Christian community, every member of the student body, staff, faculty, and Board
of Trustees affirms his or her understanding of, respect for, and commitment to
abide by the principles and standards of conduct set forth in this covenant." OKLA.
CHRISTIAN UNIV., supra note 213, at 9. Again, all of these policies have received
media scrutiny. See Francis & Longhurst, supra note 212; Hoeppner, supra note
212; State of the Gay, supra note 212.
220. The hardship to legally married students who are expelled is especially
poignant, even if they had "notice" of the proscription. Christian Minard, an honorroll student at Southwestern Christian University, a religious university in
Oklahoma, says she was expelled after marrying another woman, a violation of the
lifestyle covenant the University asked all students to sign and follow. Dave
Stewart, Student Expelled After Same-Sex Marriage Accepted at Another School,
CNN (July 23, 2014, 7:52 PM) http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/23/us/expelled-lesbianstudent-new-college-oklahoma/; see Justin Tinder, SCU Issues Preliminary
Statement on Student's Dismissal, SW. CHRISTIAN UNIV. (July 14, 2014),
http://swcu.edu/scu-issues-preliminary-statement-on-students-dismissal.
221. It is important to note that not all members of certain denominations agree
as to whether their faith should recognize same-sex marriages. See Mark Woods,
Primates Act Against US Episcopal Church over Homosexuality, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY
(Jan.
14,
2016),
http://www.christiantoday.com/article/primates.meeting. suspends.us.episcopal.chur
ch.over.same.sex.marriage.policy/7661 1.htm.
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couple's intimacy violates a school's proscription on premarital sex
because, in the university's view, the couple never married and, in
addition, entering into a same-sex marriage violates the separate
prohibition on same-sex marriage. 222 In that context, marriage is
a double negative: It does not solve the chastity problem, and it
may incur church discipline for a separate violation.
Conduct codes prohibiting same-sex marriage present a much
more difficult question than an outright ban on LGBT students.
Because marriage is a sacrament-a quintessential religious
question-universities must have the autonomy to decide what
counts as a "marriage" on their grounds. 223 The harder question is
whether that religious conviction can-or should-be used to expel
a member of the community.
Imagine a male student, Scott, who, after enrolling at
"Religious U," discovers that he is sexually attracted to men. Once
on campus, Scott meets and falls in love with Steve. If Religious U
has a sexual-orientation-neutral chastity policy, Scott would be
bound by that policy irrespective of the fact that he is in a
relationship with Steve, another man. Thus, if Scott is intimate
with Steve, Religious U could expel him or otherwise distance
itself from Scott's relationship and reaffirm a central faith tenet.
Religious U should be able to enforce this policy-as long as the
school would expel Scott if he had been intimate with Sue.
Religious U may also inform Scott that he cannot be sexually
intimate on university grounds, including in his dorm, with Steve
or with Sue. Further, if Scott marries Steve, Religious U could
reserve its married student housing for those in opposite-sex
marriages and could prohibit Scott and Steve from sharing a dorm
224
room in non-married housing.

222. Harding University, for example, includes dual prohibitions: "Students are
prohibited from being married to any person of the same sex. The University
further holds to the biblical principle that sexual relationships are unacceptable to
God outside the context of marriage." HARDING UNIV., supra note 137, at 11.
223. See supra Part H.A.
224. More precisely, under the posited hypothetical Religious U can reserve its
married student housing for those in traditional marriages. Scott and Steve are
not in a traditional marriage as defined by Religious U. Therefore, Scott and Steve
may not live in Religious U's married student housing. Further, Scott and Steve
may not live in Religious U's single person dorms together as a way around the
restriction on living in Religious U's married student housing. The result of such a
policy is that Scott and Steve are excluded from campus housing, and Religious U
is able to preserve its traditional view of marriage without being seen as condoning
same-sex marriage. Thus, Scott may continue to reside in single person dorm
alone; so too may Steve continue to reside in single person dorm alone. Scott and
Steve could also choose to move into off-campus housing, where they could live
together without losing access to educational opportunities at Religious U.
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Though many conduct codes dictate both on- and off-campus
behavior, 225 Religious U's conduct code should not reach Scott's
married intimacy with Steve if they move off university
grounds. 226 If conduct codes did reach such conduct, religious
institutions could effectively exclude a category of people-legally
married LGBT couples-through their conduct codes. Religious
U's interest in Scott's off-campus same-sex marital intimacy is at
its lowest ebb. If such conduct took place, Religious U would not
be seen as "endorsing" it since it occurred off campus. Marital
intimacy is deeply private and occurs within a legally recognized
marriage, thus setting it apart from raucous, licentious off-campus
conduct that a university may rightly want to prohibit, such as
public drunkenness. 227 Even if some perceived Religious U as
"endorsing" Scott and Steve's relationship, the school could
adequately distance itself from their marriage by publicly
reaffirming its faith commitments around marriage. However,
claiming a categorical right to exclude in order to signal a faith
commitment goes too far and undervalues Scott's interest vis-a-vis
that of the university.
It appears that, under Title IX, Religious U would be
authorized to exclude or expel Scott if it was acting "consistent [ly]
with the religious tenets" of the school and if Religious U secured
an explicit waiver. 228
Schools' edifice of immunity was even
thicker until OCR recently began interpreting the Title IX ban on
225. GORDON COLL., GORDON COLLEGE STUDENT HANDBOOK 2015-2016 , 6-7
(2015) ("Those acts which are expressly forbidden in Scripture ...will not be

tolerated in the lives of Gordon community members, either on or off campus.").
226. However, some universities require students to live on campus for a
number of years or until they reach a specific age. See, e.g., Residence Life, TRINITY
CHRISTIAN C., http://studentlife.trnty.edu/residence-life.html (last visited June 26,
2016) ("We are committed to a Christ-centered residential experience that
emphasizes the total development of each student. We are committed to an
engaging residential experience and we know that students who reside in campus
living communities are more likely to persist and graduate, therefore all students
who leave home to attend Trinity are expected to live in college owned housing until
the age of 22 or successful completion of their junior year (90 credit hours)."
(emphasis added)). Such schools would need to waive the rule as to Steve after the
couple married so they could move off campus.
227. See, e.g., HARDING UNIV., supra note 137, at 11 (prohibiting students from
visiting dance clubs or engaging in "immoral" behavior); cf. supra note 7 and
accompanying text (noting NFL policies that regulate player behavior).
228. Title IX "shall not apply to an educational institution which is controlled by
a religious organization if the application of this subsection would not be consistent
with the religious tenets of such organization." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3); see also 34
C.F.R. § 106.12(a) (Regulations promulgated under Title IX do "not apply to an
educational institution which is controlled by a religious organization to the extent
application of this part would not be consistent with the religious tenets of such
organization.").
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sex discrimination to include gender identity and sexual
orientation discrimination. 229 If courts follow the EEOC's lead and
find that sex discrimination includes sexual orientation
discrimination, 230 a religious university's conduct rule which
excluded only gay married couples would likely violate Title VII as
applied to student-employees, faculty, and staff. 23 1 EEOC would
surely argue that a rule that no legally married gay person could
232
ever satisfy constitutes discrimination against a protected class.
In this sense, a chastity rule that similarly singles out only those
individuals who are attracted to members of the same sex is no
different than restrictions on pregnancy, which is an illegal basis
for employment decisions under Title VII.233
Restrictions on
pregnancy "are not permitted because they are gender
discriminatory by definition "' 234 even when religiously motivated.
What is more, preventing religious universities from wholly
excluding LGBT students serves the interests of religious
universities themselves-imagine the public relations nightmare
235
that will follow from expelling legally married gay students.
Thus, whether the law presently allows such policies or not, a
school's right to exclude or expel legally married students while
also accepting federal or state funding may prove difficult to
defend over time.
Stories of students who awaken to their
sexuality or who unexpectedly fall in love members of the same
sex after beginning college will resonate with the public, as will
the students' countervailing interests, including the costs they
sunk into their education at that university or their inability to
transfer elsewhere if their records are marred by honor code
236
violations.
229. See supra Part L.A (discussing how OCR's interpretations of Title IX
precluded summary judgment in a suit filed by two former women's basketball
team members against Pepperdine University).
230. See What You Should Know About EEOC and the Enforcement Protections
for
LGBT
Workers,
EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/
enforcement-protections lgbt-workers.cfm.
231. See infra Part ILE; App. A.
232. See id.
233. See e.g., Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
234. Ganzy, 995 F. Supp. at 349 (citing Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F.

Supp. 266, 270 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (stating that a school has violated Title VII if it
terminates a plaintiff for pregnancy alone)).
235. E.g., WARBELOW & GREGG, supra note 25.

236. As noted earlier, the nature of "federal financial assistance" that brings
Title IX into operation-including federal loans that give students the individual
choice where to attend school-makes it unlikely that that federal laws expanding
LGBT protections will strip funding entirely. See supra Part I.D. Removal of Title
IX funding would damage religious educational institutions, but it would hurt
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Both critics and defenders of conduct codes focus on "notice"
237
and its important role in reducing unfair surprise and hardship.
Without more notice, some students or athletes may have chosen
instead to attend a different educational institution that offered
238
them a scholarship or attractive educational package.
Defenders of conduct codes would say that students, by enrolling,
have accepted the prohibitions contained within. In this view, to
the extent that a conduct code prohibiting same-sex marriage is
clear on its face, already married same-sex students violate it
upon entry, making the student to blame for the resulting
hardship of being expelled. Likewise, in this view, students who
marry after enrolling also have notice and accept the
prohibition. 239 But, as noted above, some norms are easier to
discover on the school's website than others, 240 although a
university's reputation in the community may also provide
241
notice.

Nonetheless, notice cannot completely erase unfair results.
Expelling only gay students who marry while enrolled at
Religious U is a deeply troubling result, and such a policy is made
242

students most of all. Far more likely in the near term are state efforts to bar state
higher education grants from bein spent at universities that adhere to certain faith
tenants around sexuality or marriage. See California S.B. 1146. Reg. Sess. (2016).
237. Religious institutions may balk at laws they see as frustrating their ability
to have conduct codes that reflect their religious beliefs because religion is infused
into every aspect of their operation. See Fig. 1 and accompanying notes, supra.
Students and/or their parents might have a negative reaction if the conduct code is
"liberalized" and perhaps may even choose to withdraw. Of course, if such changes
arose due to a federal law, all religious schools would need to comply, and there
would be no competition between them on this basis.
238. WARBELOW & GREGG, supra note 25, at 11-13
239. Presumptive knowledge based on the website and the code of conduct may
not signify actual knowledge. This is in contrast to the employment context, where
employees must sign upon receipt and review of the employer's handbook after
receiving training on the employer's policies, and therefore are far more likely to
have actual knowledge.
See, e.g, Faculty, MILWAUKEE MONTESSORI SCH.,
http://www.milwaukee-montessori.org/Faculty.htm (last visited June 26, 2016)
("Each year, all employees must read the [the employee and operations handbooks],
print the last page, sign and submit the form . . . ").
240. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing housing policies).
241. Cf. Wilson, When Governments Insulate Dissenters from Social Change,
supra note 14, at 749 (noting that, in the abortion context, "[s]ome exemptions seep
into the public consciousness").
242. Some schools explicitly discuss homosexuality in their student handbooks.
For example, Gordon College's student handbook reads: "Those acts which are
expressly forbidden in Scripture, including but not limited to ... homosexual
practice [sic], will not be tolerated in the lives of Gordon community members,
either on or off campus." GORDON COLL., supra note 225, at 5. As before, these
policies have received media scrutiny. E.g., Francis & Longhurst, supra note 212;
Hoeppner, supra note 212; State of the Gay, supra note 212.
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even more unfair when applied to students who may be unaware
or still grappling with their sexualities when entering college. A
university should not use its conduct code as an ever-present
"bubble"-punishing
intimacy between
same-sex
married
students, wherever that intimacy occurs.
At the end of the day, a university's interest in maintaining a
coherent identity should be respected up to the point at which its
policies would operate to exclude an entire class of people, instead
of policing the specific conduct of every member of its community.
It does not matter to this analysis whether Scott and Steve have a
legal right to marry. Of course Scott does, 243 just as he has a legal
right to have sex before marriage 244-or for that matter to drink
alcohol (if he over the drinking age) or to go to a dance club. But if
Religious U does not recognize lawful civil same-sex marriages,
Religious U's prohibition on sex outside marriage cannot be
245
satisfied by its legally married gay students.
Thus, what matters is that Religious U has a policy
prohibiting premarital sex and other behavior that does not
comport with its religious tenets that can be satisfied by gay
students and straight students. 246 When a school's prohibition is
an equal-opportunity rule, it can be applied to everyone, defending
the school against the charge that its policy is nothing more than
naked discrimination on the basis of sex or any other prohibited
characteristic.
E. Staff and Faculty Lounge
When it comes to faculty and staff employment policies, Title
VII's accommodation for religious employers is pivotal to the
degree of latitude religious universities have to shape communities
of like-minded believers through employee conduct codes. Title
VII expressly permits certain religious organizations to hire

243. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
244. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2002).
245. Some student conduct codes also prohibit students from "public advocacy
for the position that sex outside of a biblically-defined marriage is morally
acceptable."

LETOURNEAU UNIV., supra note 212, at 34.

For a discussion of such

bans, see infra Part I.E.
246. Many religious proscriptions are written in these equal-opportunity terms.
See 1 Thessalonians 4:3-6 (English Standard Version) ("For this is the will of God,
your sanctification: that you abstain from sexual immorality; that each one of you
know how to control his own body in holiness and honor, not in the passion of lust
like who do not know God; that no man transgress and wrong his brother in this
matter, because the Lord is an avenger in all these things, as we told you
beforehand and solemnly.").

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 34: 385

"individuals of a particular religion" to fulfill their mission.247
This Part first reviews who qualifies for Title VII's protection and
then examines how far this authorization to hire on a religious
basis carries religious universities.
1.

Entities Covered by Sections 702(a) and 703(e)(2)

Under 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-1(a), also known as Section

702(a),

"religious

corporation[s],

association[s],

educational

institution[s], or societ[ies]" receive protection, while under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2), also known as Section 703(e)(2), "school[s],
college[s], university[ies], or other educational institution[s] or
institution[s] of learning" receive protection. 248 Both exemptions
are
"intended
to
protect
religious
organizations
from
unconstitutional government intrusions into their religious
249
affairs."
To qualify under Section 702(a), religious corporations must
in fact be "religious."' 250
Federal appellate courts have split,
however, on what organizations qualify as "religious." 251 As one
247. Religious universities may hire employees of a particular religion; religious
organizations may do so to "to perform work connected with the carrying on ...of
[their] activities." See infra Part I.E.1.
248. Section 702(a) provides that Title VII "shall not apply to an employer with
respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on
by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2012).
Section 703(e)(2) provides that for religious universities:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college,
university, or other educational institution or institution of learning to
hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such school, college,
university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in
whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by
a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or
society, or if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other
educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward the
propagation of a particular religion.
Id. § 2000e-2(e)(2).
249. See Roger W. Dyer, Jr., Qualifying for the Title VII Religious Organization
Exemption: Federal Circuits Split over Proper Test, 76 Mo. L. REV. 545, 546-47,
554-60 (2010).
250. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a).
251. In drafting Title VII, Congress provided little guidance about how to
determine whether an entity qualifies as a religious organization under Section
702(a). Federal courts of appeal have developed four different tests to determine
whether an organization is religious under Section 702(a): (1) the secularization
test, (2) the sufficiently religious test, (3) the primarily religious test, and (3) the
LeBoon Test. See Dyer, supra note 249, at 546-47, 554-60. Appendix A describes
how facets of an organization-such as whether it was founded by a religious
organization or engages in religious training-can affect whether an organization
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example, the Ninth Circuit asks if an organization has "a religious
purpose, is engaged primarily in carrying out that religious
purpose, holds itself out to the public as an entity for carrying out
that religious purpose, and is not engage[d] primarily or
substantially in the exchange of goods or services for money
beyond nominal amounts." 252 Under this test, a "humanitarian"
organization devoted to eradicating poverty qualified under
Section 702(a), permitting it to prevail on summary judgment
against a claim of religious discrimination. 253 Other circuit courts
of appeal focus on whether an entity produces a secular product
for a profit; states a religious purpose in its organizing documents;
is owned, controlled, or financially supported by a formally
religious entity like a church or synagogue; holds itself out as
sectarian; regularly includes worship in its activities or religious
instruction in any curriculum; and whether only coreligionists are
254
members.
To qualify under the second exemption, Section 703(e)(2),
religious schools must be "in whole or in substantial part, owned,
supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a
particular religious corporation, association, or society," or
alternatively,

have

a

"curriculum ...

directed

toward

the

propagation of a particular religion." 255 Wholly owned religious
educational institutions clearly qualify for protection, but
freestanding institutions must show that they are "religious" or
256
propagate a particular religion.
To see how a religious school might claim protection under
either provision, consider Hall v. Baptist Memorial Health Care
qualifies as religious and therefore whether it legally can make distinctions on the
basis of religion when hiring.
252. See Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 724 (9th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam); see also Marty Lederman, Why the Law Does Not (and Should Not) Allow
Religiously Motivated Contractors to DiscriminateAgainst Their LGBT Employees,
BALKINIZATION (July 31, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/07/why-law-doesnot-and-should-not-allow.html; see also, Dyer, supra note 249, at 546-47 (criticizing
Spencer for "fail[ing] to develop a standard that adequately protects the religious
liberty of all religious organizations").
253. Spencer, 633 F.3d at 741.

254. See App. A; Leboon v. Lancaster Jewish Comty. Ctr. Ass'n, 503 F.3d 217,
226 (3rd Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (2012). Title VII also allows employers, labor
organizations, and others to "employ any individual ... on the basis of his religion,
sex, or national origin in those "certain instances where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise." Id.; see 42 U.S.C. §2000e2(e)(1).

256. Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1037 (W.D.
Tenn. 1998), aff'd, 215 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
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Corp.257
This case involved a nonprofit corporation, Baptist
Memorial Health Care ("Baptist Memorial"), that was established
"for carrying out a health care mission consistent with the
traditional and on-going health care missions ... [consistent with
the] Baptist church[]" and owned and operated a nursing college
("College"). 258 A lesbian employee of the College sued, saying she
was fired for being gay. 259 The court dismissed her employment
discrimination suit on summary judgment, holding that Baptist
Memorial qualified as a religious organization under Section
702(a). 260 The court found that:
[t]he purposes and programs of [Baptist Memorial's College]
are permeated with a conviction to adhere to Christian
principles while providing education in Nursing and Health
Sciences ....
[The] [C]ollege has a clear relationship with the
Baptist church. In light of the overwhelming evidence of the
College's religious activities and nature, the mere fact that the
College only requires one three-hour course in religion is not
sufficient to deprive it of its appropriate
classification as a
26 1
religious educational institution.
Importantly, the plaintiff also never presented evidence of
actual discrimination in response to the motion for summary
judgment. If an entity qualifies as religious, some employment
choices, but not all, are protected. As the next Section explains,
unlike Title IX, Title VII does not give a categorical exemption to
religious employers.
2. Scope of Protected Conduct
Even if a group qualifies under Sections 702 or 703, the
question remains: what conduct is protected under Sections 702
and 703? Section 702 permits religious organizations to make
decisions on the basis of religion itself-to prefer or employ only
"individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected
with the [organization's] activities." 26 2 Section 703 allows religious

257. See id.
258. Id. at 1031.
259. Id. at 1034.
260. Id. at 1040.

261. See id. at 1033. The court did not reach the question of whether the college
would also receive protection as a free-standing religious school under Section 703
(e)(2). Id.; see also id. at 1037 ("Because Defendant is exempt from Title VII
liability under § 2000e-l(a), there is no need for the court to address Defendant's
assertion that it is also exempt from Title VII liability under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2 (e)
(2).S").

262. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a).
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education institutions to "hire and employ employees of a
particular religion. 26 3
Academics and commentators read these protections to
encompass a vastly different scope of authorized conduct. 26 4 Some
read Title VII's exemptions narrowly to allow religious
organizations only to employ persons of the same faith
denomination. 26 5
Cases clearly show, however, that religious
organizations can do more: they sometimes can require employees
to adhere to certain conduct standards informed by the employer's
266
faith.
Hard questions arise about whether employing individuals of
a "particular religion" operates to "excuse discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, or national origin just because that
26 7
discrimination happens to be motivated by religious belief."
While some flatly reject this reading, 26 8 others contend Title VII
authorizes religious organizations "to maintain a conduct standard
that reflects their religions' sincerely held beliefs, which include
deep convictions about human sexuality" and to "make decisions
based on faith" even when those beliefs implicate otherwise
protected classes under Title VJJ.269
263. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(2).
264. Compare Letter from Katherine Franke, Professor of Law, Columbia Law
Sch., et al., to Barack Obama, President of the U.S. (July 14, 2014),
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gendersexuality/executive order letter-finalO.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Katherine
Franke], with Letter from Stanley Carlson-Thies, President, Inst. Religious
Freedom All. et al., to Barack Obama, President of the U.S. (June 25, 2014),
http://www.irfalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/LGBT-EO-letter-toPresident-6-25-2014-w-additional-signatures.pdf [hereinafter Carlson-Thies Letter]
(positing a "Title VII right to have religiously grounded employee belief and
conduct requirements" and contending that the exemptions allow religious
organizations "to maintain a conduct standard that reflects their religions'
sincerely held beliefs, which include deep convictions about human sexuality").
265. Letter from Katherine Franke, supra note 264. In cases where a religious
employer says it was expressing a clear preference for individuals of a particular
faith, and an employee does not allege discrimination on another ground, the
religious employer simply wins on summary judgment. See Corp. of the Presiding
Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987). Summary dismissal serves an important
protective function. If religious universities that hire co-religionists had to defend
their choices even in the face of the thinnest evidence that they acted on an
impermissible ground, then Title VII's protections would be eviscerated. By
contrast, when a religious employer says it was hiring based on faith and an
employee alleges some other protected ground as a basis for discrimination,
Sections 702 and 703 do not operate as categorical exemptions the way Title IX's
protection does. See Part II.E(4) discussed infra.
266. See Part II.E(4).;App. A.
267. Letter from Katherine Franke, supra note 264.
268. Id.
269. Esbeck, supra note 36; see Carlson-Thies Letter, supra note 264.
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As this discussion and Appendix A show, Title VII provides
different insulation to religious employers depending on whether
the employer makes employment decisions on the basis of (a) a
religious status ("We prefer Catholics, not Protestants."); (b) a
religious belief ("We think it is not acceptable to advocate for
abortion."); (c) conduct ("We fired the employee because she had
sex outside of marriage."); or (d) a status other than religion ("We
prefer men, not women; straights, not gays."). To date, no case
directly grapples with protection for the fourth type of decision: a
religious employer applying a policy that "by its very terms"
discriminates on the basis of a protected ground other than
religion 270 to someone other than those who "preach their beliefs
[or] teach their faith." 271 Nonetheless, how courts resolve the first
three archetypal cases helps to locate the outer boundaries of
protection for employment decisions that spill over to illicit
grounds for decision making under Title VII.
3. Religious Status or Belief Cases Alleging Only Religious
Discrimination
Cases alleging discrimination on the basis of religion affirm
that basic thrust of Sections 702 and 703: Religious employers can
hire people who share the same faith. Consider the case that
upheld Title VII's religious employer exemption against an
Establishment Clause challenge, Corp. of the PresidingBishop v.
Amos. 272 In Amos, Arthur Frank Mayson worked as a building
engineer for a nonprofit gymnasium operated by nonprofit groups
affiliated with the Mormon Church.27 3 Mayson failed to qualify for
a "temple recommend" certifying him as a member of the Church.
The Deseret Gymnasium subsequently terminated Mayson.274
Mayson alleged religious discrimination under Title VII.
In upholding Section 702(a)'s exemption for religious
employers against Mayson's Establishment Clause challenge, the
majority explained that when the "government acts with the
proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of
religion .... the exemption [need not] come packaged with benefits
to secular entities."275 Without such protection, "[f]ear of potential

270. Esbeck, supra note 36, at 389.
271. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
694, 710, (2012).
272. 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987).
273. Id. at 330.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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liability might affect the way an organization carried out what it
understood to be its religious mission [,]"chilling religious
27 6
practice.
Importantly, in Amos the Court grappled with, and limited
its holding to, only Title VII's "statutory ban on religious
discrimination,"277 never reaching the question of whether
religious employers may legally discriminate on a grounds other
than religion.
But the decisions construing Section 702 and 703's
protections go further and illustrate that religious employers may
legally prefer employees who also conform to their core religious
tenets.
As Appendix A shows, when the employee sues on the basis of
religious discrimination alone, religious schools handily defeat
challenges to such codes. For instance, in Little v. Wuerl, a
Catholic school did not renew the employment contract of a
Protestant teacher who divorced her first husband and remarried
a second one "without pursuing the 'proper canonical process
available from the Roman Catholic Church."' 278 The school's
employment contract stated:
Teacher recognizes the religious nature of the Catholic School
and agrees that Employer has the right to dismiss a teacher
for serious public immorality, public scandal, or public
rejection of the official teachings, doctrine or laws of the
Roman Catholic Church, thereby terminating any and all
rights that the Teacher may have hereunder, subject,
however, to the personal due
process rights promulgated by
279
the Roman Catholic Church.
The teacher sued under Title VII, alleging only religious
discrimination; she lost on summary judgment.
Squarely
grappling with a "legislative history [that] never directly
addresses the question of whether being 'of a particular religion'
applies to conduct as well as formal affiliation," the court read an
exchange with the exemption's sponsor as "solicitous of religious
organizations' desire to create communities faithful to their
religious principles." 280 Thus, "the permission to employ persons
'of a particular religion' includes permission to employ only

276. Id.
277. Id. at 339.

278. Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 946 (3d Cir. 1991).
279. Id. at 945.
280. Id. at 950.
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persons whose beliefs and conduct are consistent with the
'28 1
employer's religious precepts.
Claims by a theology professor at Samford University,
alleging he was religiously discriminated against after a
theological disagreement with the dean of the divinity school and
by a female professor who sued Marquette for not hiring her as a
professor of theology that alleged only religious discrimination,
282
also resulted in summary judgment for the schools.
The explicit authorization for religious entities to hire on the
basis of religion is a recognition that the government should not
wade into religious questions. Concerns about entangling the
court in religion have supported dismissal of lawsuits alleging
discrimination on grounds other than religion. Foreshadowing the
result in Hosanna-Tabor, for instance, the Fourth Circuit
dismissed race and sex discrimination claims by a pastoral care
worker who "introduce[d] children to the life of the church[,]"
28 3
citing religious entanglement.
281. Id. at 951 (emphasis added).
282. Killenger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 197 (11th Cir. 1997) (granting
summary judgment in the school's favor after it raised Section 702 as a defense);
Maguire v. Marquette Univ., 814 F.2d 1213, 1218 (7th Cir. 1987); see Hall v.
Baptist Memorial Healthcare Corp.,
215 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2000)
("determin[ing] that the College was exempt from the Title VII prohibition against
discrimination based on religion").
Today, one can imagine Killinger's and
Maguire's suits also being barred by the ministerial exemption under HosannaTabor EvangelicalLutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC. 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012).
283. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
1166, 1168 (4th Cir. 1985). Forcing the employer to litigate would "infringe
substantially on the church's free exercise of religion and would constitute
impermissible government entanglement with church authority." Id. at 1165.
Other suits in the era before Hosanna-Tabor also resulted in dismissal. Consider
Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hospital, where an ordained female
chaplain alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII and age discrimination
in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which has no
religious exemption. Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d
360, 361 (8th Cir. 1991). Concluding that the "very process of inquiry" would too
entangle the courts in questions of religious leadership and doctrine, the Eight
Circuit dismissed the suit.
By contrast, a 1993 suit by a lay teacher with religious duties against a
Catholic high school, alleging age discrimination, proceeded to trial because it
presented no "serious risk of offending the Establishment Clause." DeMarco v. Holy
Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir. 1993) ("There may be cases involving lay
employees in which the relationship between employee and employer is so
pervasively religious that it is impossible to engage in an age-discrimination
inquiry without serious risk of offending the Establishment Clause. This is not
such a case."). Analogizing the ADEA suit to Title VII, the court observed that
religious institutions that otherwise qualify as '"employer[s]' are subject to Title VII
provisions relating to discrimination based on race, gender and national
origin ... the legislative history of Title VII makes clear that Congress formulated
the limited exemptions for religious institutions to discrimination based on religion

2016]

Similarly,

Squaring Faith and Sexuality

in

Curray-Cramer v.

Ursiline Academy

of

Wilmington, Delaware Inc., a teacher at a Catholic school alleged
she was fired after signing a pro-choice statement published in the
newspaper. 28 4 She sued for gender discrimination, saying that
male employees were not fired after engaging in anti-war speech
that she said also violated Church doctrine. The court dismissed
her suit. Determining how the Church regards speech about quite
different topics (abortion and war) would require the court to
determine Catholic doctrine. "We conclude that if we were to
consider whether . . . opposing the war in Iraq is as serious a
challenge to Church doctrine as is promoting a woman's right to
abortion, we would infringe upon the First Amendment Religion
clauses." 28 5 Yet, the court distinguished cases in which
truly comparable employees were treated differently following
substantially similar conduct ....
Requiring a religious
employer to explain why it has treated two employees who
have committed essentially the same offense differently poses
no threat to the employer's
ability to create and maintain
286
communities of the faithful.
Importantly, claims of religious entanglement may shield
decisions as to ministers and other key employees from review by
the courts; it is unlikely, however, that every employee at a large
institution will fall within the protective ambit of Hosanna-Tabor.
As the Fifth Circuit explained in a gender discrimination case
against Mississippi College:
The College is not a church. The College's faculty and staff do
not function as ministers.
The faculty members are not
intermediaries between a church and its congregation. They
neither attend to the religious needs of the faithful nor
instruct students in the whole of religious doctrine. That
faculty members are expected to serve as exemplars of

with the understanding that provisions relating to non-religious discrimination
would apply to such institutions." (citations omitted).
In Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish School, a teacher at a
religious school claimed discrimination under the ADEA when she was fired-and
that her salary and age were the reasons for her dismissal. Geary v. Visitation of
the Blessed Virgin Mother Par. Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 327, 330 (3d Cir. 1993). The
school, on the other hand, claimed she violated its conduct code when she married a
divorced man. The Third Circuit found that the teacher presented enough evidence
to defeat the school's motion for summary judgment and proceed to the pretext
inquiry. Id.
Depending on the teachers' duties, courts might reach a different outcome after
Hosanna-Tabor. See App. A for select religious autonomy cases.
284. Curray-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130,
140 (3d Cir. 2006).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 141.
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practicing Christians does not serve to make the terms and
conditions

of

their 28 7employment

matters ... [of]

purely

ecclesiastical concern.
Thus, most colleges and universities cannot take themselves

outside Title VII's prohibitions on discrimination on the basis of
"race, color ....sex, or national origin" by claiming that every
'288
employee is a "minister.
Like the Curray-Cramer court, judges in Little and other
cases raising religious discrimination claims alone have observed
that Section 702(a) "does not exempt religious organizations from
Title VII's provisions barring discrimination on the basis of race,
gender, or national origin. 28 9 As the Fourth Circuit baldly
declared, "nothing in Title VII confers upon religious organizations
a license to make [hiring decisions] on the basis of race, sex, or
290
national origin."
It is true that these observations about the limits of Title
VII's religious employer protections are dicta-the parties did not
need to argue over scope and so the judges did not have the benefit
of extensive briefing on the question. 291 Indeed, because each of
287. EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 489 (5th Cir. 1980).
288. Many universities employ thousands of people. For example, University of
Notre Dame, one of the largest Catholic universities in the United States, had
17,800 employees during the fiscal year ending in June 2013. A university could
not seriously suggest that each of them had religious duties worthy of the
ministerial exemption and thereby avoid application of the employment laws. See
Tax
Documents,
CITIZEN
AUDIT,
https://www.citizenaudit.org/organization/350868 188/UNIVERSITY%20OF%20NO
TRE%20DAME%20DU%20LAC/ (last visited July 15, 2016).. Every employee at a
small seminary might qualify, however, depending on assigned duties.
289. Kennedy v. St. Joseph's Ministries, Inc., 657 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2011); Little
v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 946 (3rd Cir. 1991) ("Title VII has been interpreted to bar race
and sex discrimination by religious organizations towards their non-minister
employees.").
290. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
1166 (4th Cir. 1985).
291. Some contend that "[Title VII] exempts [the religious employer]" when
discrimination on a protected ground is "motivated by religious belief or practice,"
relying on two interpretative arguments. Esbeck, supra note 36, at 385. First,
cases have construed the exemptions for religious organizations to "encompass[] all
employment decisions with respect to religious discrimination," including
retaliation claims. Kennedy v. St. Joseph's Ministries, Inc., 657 F.3d 189 (4th Cir.
2011). In Kennedy, a nursing assistant claimed she was retaliated against for
violations of a religious hospital's dress code and sued alleging religious
discrimination. Construing "employment" broadly to reach all employment actions,
the court found Section 702(a) barred the employee's retaliation suit. Id.
Professor Esbeck argues that "the logic of Kennedy necessarily applies to
claims for discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, or national origin."
Esbeck, supra note 36, at 380. Yet, in Kennedy, religious discrimination alone was
alleged. Further, the Kennedy court itself explained that religious employers may
not discriminate on other protected grounds-a bar presumably not lifted by
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these
cases
involved
"claim [s] of
[only]
religious
discrimination ... [they] say[] nothing about whether Title VII
permits religiously-motivated discrimination on any other
grounds." 292 As the next Section shows, courts have read title
VII's protections not to insulate from scrutiny religious employer's
employment decisions when the decisions implicate another
293
protected ground.

religious belief. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
Second, Esbeck says "the plain language of 702(a) ...[and] of 703(e)(2) ...
resolve this apparent ambiguity [regarding whether the exemption covers
discrimination based on a protected ground other than religion] in favor of the
employer." Esbeck, supra note 36, at 393. Esbeck leverages specific words in each
provision: Section 702(a) begins, "This subchapter shall not apply .'..."
while
Section 703 begins, "Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter ....
"
Yet, both provisions also contain limiting terms. Section 702(a) authorizes
decisions "with respect to ...the employment of individuals of a particularreligion
to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
[or] educational institution." 42 USC 2000e-l(a) (emphasis added). Emphasizing
the words "with respect to," courts in dicta have flatly concluded: "The exemptions
do not simply exempt religious organizations from Title VII. On the contrary, they
show[ ] that although Congress permitted religious organizations to discriminate in
favor of members of their faith, religious employers are not immune from liability
for discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, or for retaliatory actions
against employees who exercise their rights under the statute." Vigars v. Valley
Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (citing EEOC
v.Pac. Press Pub. Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272,1276 (9th Cir. 1982).
Likewise, Section 703's assurance that "itshall not be an unlawful employment
practice" encompasses the "hir[ing] and employ[ment of] employees of a particular
religion ....
" Here, courts have said "of a particular religion" exempts religious
organizations from religious discrimination and no more: "Title VII does not confer
upon religious organizations a license to make [hiring decisions] on the basis of
race, sex, or national origin. Because discrimination based on pregnancy is a clear
form of discrimination based on sex, religious schools cannot discriminate based on
pregnancy." Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 1999).
The key difficulty with reading either provision as a categorical exemption is that if
Congress had meant to exempt religious employers entirely, it could have simply
stated "[t]his subchapter shall not apply to the employment of individuals of a
particular religion, regardless of any protected ground under this subtitle ....
"
Title VII contains a categorical exemption for small employers. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(b) (2012).
292. Rose Saxe, The Truth About Religious Employers and Civil Rights Law,
GEO. UNIV. (July 28, 2014), http:/Iberkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/thetruth-about-religious-employers-and-civil-rights-laws.
293. Some assert that the ample latitude given to religious employers in Little
and similar cases should govern when employees allege discrimination on a basis
other than religion because "that is a distinction without a difference." Esbeck,
supra note 36, at 383. As Appendix A shows, cases alleging only religious
discrimination fall squarely within the exemption, insulating religious employers,
while cases implicating other protected grounds-which test the exemptions'
limits-are not nearly so protective. In the latter cases, judges have said that the
distinction makes all the difference.
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4. Conduct Cases Alleging Discrimination of Grounds
Other Than Religion
The burning question is not whether religious employers can
make decisions guided by their faith tenets but whether they will
be protected even when decisions spill over to a protected class,
like pregnant women who are protected explicitly from
discrimination by Title VII.294 As this Section and Appendix A
show, Title VII provides far less insulation in cases where the
plaintiff says he or she was discriminated against on a basis other
than religion.
In divining the outer limits of Section 702 and 703's
protections for religious employers, suits brought by women for
pregnancy discrimination are illuminating. In these cases, the
employee alleges that she was fired because of her pregnancy and
the employer "maintain[s] that [it] acted not on the [prohibited]
basis, but in accord with [its] religion," 295 specifically, a religious
296
ban on premarital sex.
Outside of suits alleging straight religious discrimination,
dueling claims about why an employee was fired go to trial, where
a battle of facts will determine whether "the real motive was
prejudice" 297 or the employer's religious policy. In such "pretext"
cases, religious employers do not win on summary judgment;
rather, cases are often "prolonged, expensive and entangling, with
expensive pretrial discovery and a highly publicized public trial"
298 because, as Professor Esbeck notes, "that is the balance
between liberty and equality that Congress has struck [in] Title
VII."299

294. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
295. Esbeck, supra note 36, at 385.

296. Many religious universities ban sex outside of marriage in the host of moral
commands that they ask employees to adhere to. See Frost, supra note 3, at 6-7
(collecting school policies banning premarital sex, adultery, bestiality, prostitution,
cohabitation prior to marriage, transgenderism, and other "sexual immorality"
along with many other sexual morality based commands).
297. Esbeck, supra note 36, at 388.

298. Id. In the early stages of a "pretext" case, the employer often asks for
summary judgment, citing its religious precepts as the reason for acting. To get
summary judgment and proceed to trial, a plaintiff may not "rely on bald
allegations of discrimination," but must show that there is evidence of
discrimination on the protected ground. Id. As explained below, the employee may
prevail even after the religious employer asserts its affirmative defense that it
acted on a religious tenet.
299. Esbeck, supra note 36, at 383.
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After submitting evidence of its religious defense, religious
employers do not necessarily prevail on the merits either. 300 The
employee can show unlawful discrimination through two routes,
by demonstrating that: (1) an employer's stated reason for
dismissing the employee (e.g., her premarital sex) was mere
"pretext" for actually firing her on the protected ground (e.g.,
pregnancy or her sex); or (2) the employer applied its religious
rule unequally only to certain employees, like women, based on a
protected ground, like gender. 30 1 In neither instance does the
religious employer prevail, even if it shows its stated policy
reflects a religious belief.
Consider, for example, Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne South
Bend.30 2 A language arts teacher at a religious school owned by
the Diocese of Fort Wayne South Bend alleged that she was fired
due to her pregnancy after using in-vitro fertilization ("IVF"); the
school countered that it dismissed her because of its religious
opposition to IVF. 30 3 The district court allowed the case to go
forward despite both Title VII exemptions. 30 4 Even if the school's
IVF policy reflected a good faith religious belief and was not a
pretext for discrimination, "a jury wouldn't be compelled to accept
[the Diocese's] avowed gender-neutrality."' 30 5 Although the Diocese
presented evidence that it applied the policy in a gender-neutral
way, it was not entitled to summary judgment because "a jury that
resolved every factual dispute, and drew every reasonable
inference[] in Mrs. Herx's favor could infer that Mrs. Herx's
contract would have been renewed had she been male and
everything else remained the same." 306 As the court explained,
"Title VII doesn't give religious organizations freedom to make
discriminatory decisions on the basis of race, sex, or national
origin." 30 7 At trial, the jury found in Herx's favor and awarded her
$1.9 million for sex discrimination, which was reduced on
remittitur to slightly more than $300,000 dollars, the statutory
cap on damages. 308 As Herx makes clear, religious proscriptions by

300. Id. at 386-93.

301. Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 1999).
302. Herx v. Diocese of Ft. Wayne-S. Bend, Inc. 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (N.D. Ind.
2014), dismissed on other grounds, 772 F.3d 1085 (7th Cir. 2014).
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

1171-72.
1183.
1178.
1179.
1175.

308. Herx v. Diocese of Ft. Wayne-S. Bend, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-122 RCM, 2015 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 3047, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 12, 2015).
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themselves do not insulate religious employers from liability when
making adverse decisions if the decision goes beyond membership
in the faith or spills over to a protected ground.
Other cases are equally unforgiving when a religiously
motivated employment decision implicates a protected ground
other than religion-running the gamut from pregnancy
discrimination claims brought by teachers who became pregnant
after using IVF 30 9 or as result of premarital sex,310 which brought
their violations of the school's conduct codes to the school's
attention to cases alleging race and gender discrimination.3 1 1 As

309. See App. A.
310. See App. A. In Cline v. CatholicDiocese of Toledo, a religious school did not
renew an unmarried teacher's contract after she became pregnant in violation of
the school's conduct code barring premarital sex. 206 F.3d 651, 657 (6th Cir. 1999).
She sued under Title VII, which bans pregnancy discrimination. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (2012) ("The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but
are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy."). The school countered
that its conduct code reflects its religious values. Cline, 206 F.3d at 651-52.
The district court dismissed the teacher's claim on summary judgment, finding
that she failed to make her prima facie case. Id. at 655,658. Reversing, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit permitted the teacher's case to
proceed to trial. As the Sixth Circuit put it, "[t]he central question in this
case ... is whether St. Paul's nonrenewal of Cline's contract constituted
discrimination based on her pregnancy as opposed to a gender-neutral enforcement
of the school's premarital sex policy. While the former violates Title VII, the latter
does not." Id. at 658 (emphasis added). Summary judgment for the school was not
appropriate because, while "Title VII
exempts religious organizations for
'discrimination based on religion,' it does not exempt them 'with respect to all
discrimination ... Title VII still applies ...

to a religious institution charged with

sex discrimination."' Id. (citing Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d
410, 413 (6th Cir. 1996)).
The Sixth Circuit explained that, at trial, Cline could show illegal
discrimination in a number of ways. "First, she can show intentional discrimination
directly by showing 'that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer' than the reason the employer proffered." Id. Cline could "indirectly show
Ipretext' by showing "that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence." Id. Further, "Cline also may show that St. Paul enforced its premarital
sex policy in a discriminatory manner-against only pregnant women, or against
only women." Id. Importantly, the school could not "use the mere observation or
knowledge of pregnancy as its sole method of detecting violations of its premarital
sex policy" without violating Title VII. Id. The case later settled. See Stipulation of
Dismissal by All Parties, Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, No. 3:197-cv-07472
(N.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 2000) (No. 70) (showing that the case was dismissed by both
parties on December 27, 2000-likely with terms of settlement).
311. In EEOC v. Mississippi College, a female professor at a Baptist university
alleged she was not hired for a specific position because of her gender. 626 F.2d
477, 486 (5th Cir. 1980). The university sought summary judgment, claiming that
they selected another person because the professor was not a Baptist, clearly
permissible religious discrimination.
The court summarized the university's
position this way: "The College argues first that once it showed (1) an established
policy of preferring Baptists in its hiring decisions, (2) that the individual hired for
the position was Baptist, and (3) that the charging party was not a Baptist, § 702
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one court explained in allowing a pregnancy discrimination case to
go to trial:
"[t]he
exemptions do not simply exempt religious
organizations from Title VII. On the contrary, they 'show[]
that although Congress permitted religious organizations to
discriminate in favor of members of their faith, religious
employers are not immune from liability for discrimination
based on race, sex, national origin, or for retaliatory actions
against 312
employees who exercise their rights under the
statute."'

Court after court has made the same observation in suits
313
brought under other protected grounds.
Courts have also concluded that the unequal application of
facially neutral rules to a subset of all employees who are
protected from discrimination under Title VII may result in
liability, notwithstanding a proffered religious explanation. In
Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, California,a librarian at
a religious elementary school was fired after she "informed the
administration she was pregnant."31 4
She sued, alleging
pregnancy discrimination. The court allowed the suit to go to
trial, notwithstanding the fact that the school's policy was
grounded in a religious belief: "[W]omen would be subject to
termination for something that men would not be, and that is sex

prevented the EEOC from investigating further the charge of discrimination."
As the court explained, this argument fails if the "College applied its policy of
preferring Baptists over non-Baptists in granting the faculty positions,... then §
702 exempts that decision from the application of Title VII and would preclude any
investigation by the EEOC to determine whether the College used the preference
policy as a guise to hide some other form of discrimination." Id. However, if the
evidence showed "only that the College's preference policy could have been applied,
but in fact it was not considered by the College in determining which applicant to
hire, § 702 does not bar the EEOC's investigation of Summers' individual sex
discrimination claim." Id. One way to read Mississippi College is that the plaintiff
cannot continue past summary judgment if she does not show enough evidence to
suggest that something other than religious discrimination contributed to the
challenged employment action.
312. Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, 805 F. Supp. 802, 807 (N.D. Cal.
1992).
313. See, e.g., Herx v. Diocese of Ft. Wayne-S. Bend Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168,
1175 (N.D. Ind. 2014), dismissed on other grounds, 772 F.3d 1085 (7th Cir. 2014)
("Title VII doesn't give religious organizations freedom to make discriminatory
decisions on the basis of race, sex, or national origin."); Geary v. Visitation of the
Blessed Virgin Mary Par. Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 331 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Religious
institutions are not exempt from Title VII's prohibitions of discrimination on the
basis of race, color, sex and national origin."); Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d at 477 ( "The
employment relationship between Mississippi College and its faculty and staff is
one intended by Congress to be regulated by Title VII.").
314. Vigars v. Valley Christan Ctr. Of Dublin, 805 F. Supp. 802, 807 (N.D. Cal.
1992).
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discrimination, regardless of the justification put forth for the
31 5
disparity."
To be sure, employees have failed to produce sufficient
evidence that an illicit ground actually motivated the employee's
dismissal. For instance, where a religious employer shows that it
applied a ban on premarital sex to everyone, religious employers
have prevailed. 316
As this discussion and Appendix A show, in cases asserting
that a religiously motivated conduct rules spills over to a protected
ground other than religion, courts simply reject the idea that
Sections 702 and 703 confer broad immunity. Congress allowed
religious employers wide latitude to hire employees who can carry
out their faith tenets-but tempered this latitude, these courts
say, by not allowing discrimination on any other protected ground.
As the next Section explains, an even harder set of cases arises
when a religious rule that directly maps onto a protected ground,
such as refusing to hire women because religiously they are bound
to be in the home.
5. When Religious Policies Directly Implicate a Protected
Ground
The hardest questions arise when a religious view concerns a
protected class-for instance, the view that "women properly
belong in the home" and so should not be hired.3 1 7 One can
imagine any number of religious convictions overlapping protected
classes: Suppose a seminary that employs women forbids
315. Id.
316. In Boyd v. HardingAcad. of Memphis, Inc., a preschool teacher claimed she
was dismissed because of her pregnancy. 88 F.3d 410, 414-15 (6th Cir. 1996). Her
employer, a religious college, countered that it dismissed her for having sex outside
marriage in violation of its policies. At a bench trial, the college showed that "at
least six married women who became pregnant while working [there] remained
employed there during and after their pregnancies." Id. The college's president
also testified that the college fired every employee that it learned had engaged in
sex outside of marriage, male and female alike. Id. The district court found
against the teacher. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that district court
judge
was correct in holding that defendant articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason by stating that it fired plaintiff Boyd not because
she was pregnant, but for engaging in sex outside of marriage, and that
plaintiff Boyd did not meet her burden to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that this articulated reason was actually a pretext for illegal
discrimination.
Id. at 412.
In short, pregnancy did not account for Boyd's firing and neither did selective
application of the college's conduct code to women.
317. Esbeck, supra note 36, at 394.
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pregnancy, a protected ground under Title VII. Or suppose a
church loosely allied with the White Supremacist movement
refuses to hire anyone others than Aryans.318 Or suppose after
Obergefell that a religious university forbids its employees from
marrying a person of the same sex-not a protected ground per se
but one that restricts only gay employees (who would be protected
if a court construes sex under Title VII to include sex stereotypes
1 9
or sexual orientation)3
Such cases test the limits of Section 702 and 703's protections
differently than proscriptions on premarital sex discussed above
because here the Title VII protected ground and a religious
employer's ban are one and the same.
Intuitively, it seems
implausible that Congress intended-when it gave authority
under Sections 702 and 703 to hire with religion in mind -to
condone the kinds of exclusionary choices that led to Title VII's
enactment; the whole point of Title VII was to ensure that, among
other purposes, women and Blacks would not be excluded from
opportunity based on irrelevant characteristics. 320 To understand
Sections 702 and 703 as authorizing religious employers not hire
to the very categories of people protected by Title VII from
discrimination would allow the exemption to swallow the rule.
While some argue that the plain text of Sections 702 and 703
support that prerogative when premised on a faith tenet, both
provisions textually limit their application to decisions "with
respect to... the employment of individuals of a particular

religion" or the "hir[ing] and employ[ment of] employees of a
particularreligion ... .".321 The key difficulty with reading either

318. E.g.,
About
Our
Church,
CREATIVITY
ALLIANCE,
http://creativityalliance.com/about-our-church/
(last visited July 16, 2016)
("CREATIVITY is a LEGALLY RECOGNISED Professional, Non-Violent,
Progressive Pro-White Religion for White people, by White people. We object to
amongst other things, Christianity, multiculturalism and Marxism. Creators do
not believe in gods or devils, an after-life, heaven or hell. WE BELIEVE in
maintaining a balance with nature while keeping a Sound mind, in a Sound Body,
in a Sound Society, in a Sound Environment. Our church is called the Church
of Creativity."); KINSMAN REDEEMER MINISTRIES, http://kinsmanredeemer.com/
(last visited July 16, 2016) ("Kinsman Redeemer Ministries is a calling to White
people to gather together and worship the one true God; to rightly divide and
discern God's Word; to proclaim the righteousness of the Laws of God and His
judgements; to live the truth, the way and the life according to God's will.").
319. See Part II.E(4), supra. Some contend that the religious exemptions should
"override and avoid the potential conflict" between the conduct code and Title VII.
Esbeck, supra note 36, at 391. As noted above, neither common sense nor a close
textual reading supports that conclusion.
320. See Ricci v. Destefano, 557 U.S. 557, 580 (2009).
321. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
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provision as a categorical exemption is that if Congress had meant
to exempt religious employers entirely, it could have simply stated
"[this subchapter shall not apply to the employment of individuals
of a particular religion, regardless of any protected ground under
this subtitle ....

"

322

Title VII contains a categorical exemption for

small employers.
The few cases in which women have sued religious employers
under Title VII over unequal pay, and won, are not terribly
illuminating. In EEOC v. Pacific Press Publication Ass'n, for
example, the plaintiff recovered over $26,000 plus interest against
her employer, a religious publishing house that she proved paid
her less because of her gender. 323 Yet, the organization did not
justify its decisions in religious terms. 324 Despite this fact, later
courts cite Pacific Press for the proposition that "Church
organizations have been held liable under Title VII for benefit and
employment decisions which they contended were based upon
religious grounds but which also discriminated against women
325
based upon sex."
As Appendix A amply demonstrates, even if the exemptions
are available as a defense, the religious employer will not prevail
on summary judgment and may well lose at trial. Many settle out
to avoid publicity or the risk of a worse outcome at trial.
6. Striving for Conduct Codes that Do Not Operate to
Exclude LGBT People
Faith institutions transmit their values through university
employees, including professors, coaches, and staff-as many
schools affirm publicly. 326 Putting aside faculty who have tenure
and receive considerable protection for espousing ideas under the
umbrella of academic freedom, in the absence of a contract, the

322. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b) (2012).

323. In fact, "the Church proclaim[ed] that it does not believe in discriminating
against women or minority groups, and that its policy is to pay wages without
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, age, or national origin." EEOC v.
Pac. Press Pub. Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1282 (9th Cir. 1982).
324. Id. at 1279.

325. Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, 805 F. Supp. 802, 806 (N.D. Cal.
1992)
326. For example, Regent University's Academic and Faculty Handbook states:
"Regent's Christian community is represented by all of Regent's trustees, officers,
employees[,] and student or volunteer leaders, each of whom serves Regent's
mission and is an integral part of the community ..
" REGENT UNIV., FACULTY &

ACADEMIC
POLICY
HANDBOOK
9
http://www.regent.edu/academics/academic-affairs/faculty-handbook.cfm
(emphasis added).

(2016),
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background rule in the employment context is that employers can
fire employees "for any reason or no reason." 327 So, when a
religious university's values do not align with the employee's,
ordinary at-will employment means that the university can let the
employee go without repercussion-unless that firing is based on a
328
protected characteristic.
As Chris Kluwe's account of why he was released from the
Minnesota Vikings illustrates, a clash of values is not unique to
religious universities. 329 But the religious identity of a university
does amplify its concerns about endorsing an employee's conduct.
For instance, a Baptist school in Tennessee, Belmont University,
allegedly fired its head women's soccer coach, Lisa Howe, after she
told her team that she and her lesbian partner were having a
baby. 330 Coach Howe said she asked Belmont if she could share
the news with her team since rumors were swirling; when
Belmont nixed the idea, Coach Howe told her team anyway. 331

327. See Gregory M. Saltzman, Dismissals, Layoffs, and Tenure Denials in
Colleges and Universities, in THE NEA 2008 ALMANAC OF HIGHER EDUCATION 51,
52, 57-61, http://www.nea.org/assets/img/PubAlmanac/ALM 08 05.pdf ("Under
[employment-at-will], an employer or an employee may terminate an employment
relationship at any time for any reason or for no reason ....The broad exceptions
[to the general at will rule] cover four employee groups: (1) employees with
individual contracts restricting dismissal; (2) employees covered by collective
bargaining agreements permitting discipline only for just cause; (3) public
employees covered by civil service or K-12 teacher tenure laws; and (4) residents of

Montana, protected by that state's Wrongful Discharge from Employment
Act .. ").
328. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012) (defining "because of sex" or "on the
basis of sex" for purposes of Title VII to include pregnancy, childbirth, and related
conditions).
329. See Colleen Flaherty, Cal State Northridge Professor Says He's Being
Targeted for His Conservative Social Views, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 24, 2015, 3:00
AM),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/11/24/cal-state-northridgeprofessor-says-hes-being-targeted-his-conservative-social-views.
330. Lisa Howe, Former Belmont Coach, Allegedly Fired for Being Gay,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Dec.
06,
2010,
12:48
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/06/lisa-howe-former-belmont-

n 792526.html. LGBT coaches at other universities have successfully sued for
discrimination. See Pat Griffin, Helen Carroll & Cyd Ziegler, LGBTQ Sports
History
Timeline,
CAMPUS
PRIDE
(Oct.
24,
https://www.campuspride.org/resources/lgbt-sports-history-timeline/

2012),
("2009-

Women's basketball coach Lori Sulpizio, who is lesbian, wins a lawsuit against
Mesa Community College for being fired without just cause."). But there is still a
chilling effect on LGBT individuals in sports. See Zeigler, supra note 5 ("This story
comes on the heels of my lengthy feature last week in which I talked to five gay
college basketball coaches-in Divisions I & II-all of whom feel they have to stay
in the closet for their own futures in the NCAA. One of those coaches had to sign
an anti-gay 'lifestyle contract' to stay at his school, just as faculty and coaches have

to do at this athlete's university and many others like it.").
331. Mike Organ, Belmont Disputes Gay Coach Was Fired, KNOXVILLE NEWS
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Coach Howe and Belmont parted ways-Belmont says Coach
Howe resigned on her own; her players said "athletics department
officials [gave Coach Howe] the choice to resign or be
terminated ....332
How should we think about Coach Howe's departure if it was
precipitated by disclosing her family's impending child-or for
disclosing her sexuality?
Practical concerns can explain a university's preference for
employee discretion. Some universities may fear that an openly
gay coach will hurt their recruiting chances. As one women's
basketball coach with a forty-year tenure explained, parents often
fear "that if their son or daughter is around a gay person, it is
going to make them gay, like it's a contagious disease." 333 Clearly,
even if "homophobia remains as much a problem today as it was
decades ago" in women's sports, 334 refusing to hire or retain a
person because of such stereotypes is wrong-and may well be
illegal if local, state, or federal law bans discrimination based on

SENTINEL (Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/state/belmont-disputesgay-coach-was-fired-ep-407045781-358280991.html.
332. Id. Like Kluwe's departure from the Vikings, resignations and even firings
almost always raise factual questions about why the employment relationship
ended. For example, after ESPN reported that the University of Iowa's athletic
director "forced out" five female coaches in two years, Kate Fagan, What the Heck Is
Going on with the Iowa Athletic Department?, ESPN (Nov. 5, 2014),
http://espn.go.com/espnw/news-commentary/article/I1773583/what-the-heck-goingiowa-athletic-department), Iowa Civil Rights Commission investigator Benjamin
Flickenger queried whether the firings were based on "gender or anti-gay
discrimination." Ryan J. Foley, Investigator Sees Possibility of Bias in Iowa
Firing, ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Jan
21,
2016,
3:36
PM),
Coach's
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/6c6b429bac8c49acb66fb8882e ld38bb/investigatorsees-possibility-bias-iowa-coachs-firing. As noted above, factual questions can arise
when anyone with a protected characteristic is fired. Thus, when a female coach is
fired, she may have been terminated for poor performance or because of gender,
sexual orientation, race, and/or other any other personal characteristic. If the
employer proffers a nondiscriminatory reason or legal prerogative to act of an
otherwise protected basis, factfinders will assess whether an illegal basis for acting
actually accounted for the adverse decisions. See supra Part II.E(4).
333. Michelle Kaufman, Prejudice Against Gays and Lesbians Hurts Women's
College
Basketball, MIAMI
HERALD
(Nov.
22,
2014,
8:55
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/sports/college/article4071422.html.
334. Id.; accord Luke Cyphers & Kate Fagan, Unhealthy Climate, ESPN (Jan.
26,
2011),
http://espn.go.com/womens-college-basketball/news
/story?page=Magl5unhealthyclimate ("Fears of 'converting' straight girls into
lesbians have long bedeviled women's sports. The high-profile case of Pam
Parsons, who in 1982 resigned as coach of South Carolina amid accusations that
she had a sexual relationship with a player, made those fears public."). Both
religious and nonreligious universities may be concerned about losing recruits, or
students in general, if faculty, coaches, or athletic staff are open about their LGBT
status. As a result, universities may pressure coaches to be closeted, which may be
illegal or constitute a hostile workplace. See supra Part I.B.
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sexual orientation, as Part I and Part JJ.D explained, and carveouts do not apply.

33 5

As for Title IX, recruiting students more effectively would not
seem to be explainable as a religious value. But transmitting
values consistent with the University's values almost certainly is.
Some institutions bind employees to their Articles of Faith, which
forbid the "teaching or support of [any] position inconsistent" with
336
the university's-including support for same-sex relationships.
The question then becomes whether the existence of Coach Howe's
new family, which was connected to the university system only
through the coach's employment, acted to support same-sex
relationships. Unsurprisingly, Coach Howe was not married to
her partner when her child was born 337 because gay marriage was
338
not then allowed in most of the United States.
As Part II.E(3) shows, a conduct code that binds employees to
promises to confine sexual relationships to the university's
definition of biblical marriage would operate as back-door means
of excluding gay married employees. It may also violate the laws of
many states and localities, as well as federal law if Title VII is
interpreted by courts to ban sexual orientation discrimination and

335. Where state employment laws ban discrimination on a protected basis, the
state-law carve-outs received by some religious employers may immunize them. In
Iowa, for example, it is illegal for both public and private employers to discriminate
on the basis of sexual orientation and/or gender identity. IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.6
(West 2009). But religious institutions and their educational facilities are exempt
from those bans "with respect to any qualifications for employment based on
religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity when such qualifications are related
to a bona fide religious purpose." Id. § 216.6(6)(d). Schools without religious
affiliations must show that termination occurred for reasons other than the
protected characteristic. Thus, when a former women's field hockey coach sued the
University of Iowa alleging "gender or anti-gay discrimination played a role in her
firing," and the University maintained she was terminated because of player
complaints, a factual claim arose. Foley, supra note 332.
336. BIOLA UNIV., BIOLA UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK § 1.2 (2014),
http://offices.biola.edu/hr/ehandbook/static/media/pdf/1.2.pdf.
Biola University, a
Christian college in southern California, requires
[e]very employee of the University [to] agree and support [its] Articles of
Faith and ... to subscribe annually to the Articles of Faith. Any employee
ceasing to believe the above Articles of Faith shall by that fact cease to be
an employee of the University. No teaching or support of a position
inconsistent with these Articles of Faith will be tolerated on the part of
any employee of the University.
Id.
337. Adam Tamburin, Former Belmont Coach Lisa Howe Has Historic Wedding
Day,
TENNESSEAN
(June
26,
2015,
6:42
PM),
http://www.tennesseean.com/story/news/2015/06/26/lisa-howe-same-sex-marriageformer-belmont-coach/29362957/.
338. See Same-Sex Marriage, State by State, PEW RES. CTR. (June 26, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/06/26/same-sex-marriage-state-by-state/.
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if the Sections 702 and 703's protections are not read as
categorical exemptions. 339
Such a strict conduct code would
deprive the university of diversity, reduce the pool of highlyqualified faculty members and staff from which the school can
hire, and diminish the institution's educational enterprise.
Ideally, religious universities will examine their own
suppositions about the value of having diverse faculty members
and staff, as some religious universities have done. For example,
Eastern Mennonite University and Goshen College "have added
'sexual orientation' to their non-discrimination policies, opening
the door for the schools to hire staff and faculty who are in samesex marriages." 340 After the "uproar" at Belmont University after
Coach Howe's departure, Belmont's board voted to officially bar
"discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation." 341 Belmont
"added a new preamble... stating that Belmont is a Christian
university and that the university strives to uphold Christian
standards of morality, ethics and conduct." 342 For many like
Coach Howe, Belmont's approach signals not only "values of
inclusion, human dignity, and respect," but it affirms "that being
343
gay and being Christian are not mutually exclusive."
Religious universities that welcome LGBT employees and
staff may worry that the decision to employ LGBT individuals will
signal the University's acceptance of same-sex marriages if the
employee later enters into a same-sex marriage and is open about
that. 34 4 Yet questions of endorsement are not new to religious

339. See supra Part II.E(3). Restrictions on only sex inside marriage also make
it difficult for single employees to work for the university, whether gay or straight.
The difference is that straight employees can marry to sanctify a sexual
relationship in the university's eyes, while a gay employee can never meet the
university's rule unless celibate.
340. Smietana et al., supra note 174.
341. Scott Jaschik, Change of Heart at Belmont, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 27,
2011,
3:00
AM),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/
2011/01/27/belmont bars discrimination based on sexual orientation.
342. Id. (quotation ommited).
343. Id. (quoting Howe's statement about Belmont's policy change). Of course,
as Howe cautioned, University leaders must take steps to ensure that "acceptance
of LGBT students and staff is not just a written policy but is also reflected in
practice, attitude, and behavior." Id.
344. Some churches and religious organizations have terminated employees they
may have known to be gay after the employee entered a legal marriage, which the
employer saw as an affirmation of marriages that the organization could not
recognize. See Lauren Gambino, Firedfor Being Gay: Church Pantry Worker Sues
Kansas
City
Diocese,
GUARDIAN
(July
17,
2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/I7/lawsuit-kansas-city-catholicdiocese-gay-marriage (noting "a growing list of gay employees fired in recent years
by Catholic institutions for marrying, announcing plans to wed, or in some way

2016]

Squaring Faith and Sexuality

educational institutions. For instance, questions of endorsement
animated Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law
Center v. Georgetown University, the pioneering decision that
ensured equal access to facilities for a student group that
advocated a different moral vision than the university did on gay
right. 345 Georgetown University vigorously opposed providing
equal access, arguing it would create the appearance that
Georgetown endorsed the student group-"an endorsement [that]
would be inappropriate for a Catholic University." 346

The group

sought not only the tangible benefits that Georgetown afforded to
3 47
other groups but "official recognition" from Georgetown, too.
Construing the District of Columbia's Human Rights Act, which
prohibited all educational institutions from discriminating on the
basis of sexual orientation, 348 the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia vindicated the interests of both
sides.349 The group ultimately received all of the tangible benefits
provided to other student groups, but Georgetown retained the
ability to decide which organizations to "endorse[]" through official
"University Recognition." 350 The decision illustrates that treating
LGBT students and employees in the same manner as other
groups does not require a faith institution to endorse positions
antithetical to their faith.

making public their sexual orientation").
345. Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536
A.2d 1, 5 (D.C. 1987).
346. Id. at 11-12 (citation omitted).
347. Id. at 12, 13-14 (citations omitted).
348. D.C. CODE § 1-2520 (1987). D.C. Code § 1-2520 prohibits discrimination
based on sexual orientation. However, under D.C. Code § 2-1402.41, also known as
the "Armstrong Amendment," educational institutions affiliated with a religious
organization were permitted "to deny, restrict, abridge, or condition-(A) the use of
any fund, service, facility, or benefit; or (B) the granting of any endorsement,
approval, or recognition, to any person or persons that are organized for, or
engaged in, promoting, encouraging, or condoning any homosexual act, lifestyle,
orientation, or belief." D.C. Code § 2-1402.41, repealed, 2015. In 2015, the D.C
Council passed the Human Rights Amendment Act of 2014. 62 D.C. Reg. 1540
(Feb. 6, 2015). This amendment effectively repealed the Armstrong Amendment,
subjecting religious educational institutions to the same prohibition on
discrimination based on sexual orientation as other entities. Id.; see also Mike
DiBonis, Conservative and Catholic Groups Urge Members of Congress to Overturn
D.C. Bills, THE WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2015) ("[T]he Human Rights Amendment Act
of 2014, repeals a longstanding, congressionally imposed measure exempting
religious educational institutions from the city's gay non-discrimination law.").
349. Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., 536 A.2d at 5.
350. Id. at 38. These tangible benefits included "office space, supplies and
equipment, a telephone, computer label and mailing services, student advertising
privileges, financial counseling, and the opportunity to apply for lecture fund
privileges and for other funding." Id. at 47 (Pryor, J., concurring).
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As in Georgetown University, the interests of LGBT
individuals in being able to openly live out their sexual orientation
or gender identity does not erase a university's countervailing
interest in distancing itself from the moral and sexual choices of
its employees. In Coach Howe's case, had Belmont discovered that
she and her legally married wife were beginning a family, it could
have avoided endorsing the union by simply stating that Belmont
values Coach Howe as an employee and believes that her private
choices off school grounds within a legally married relationship
are hers alone. Ideally, the Belmont University would also wish
Coach Howe and her family well. But the university could just as
well have chosen to stridently condemn Coach Howe's choice to
have a child outside (its view of) a Biblical marriage, 351 which may
have made Coach Howe, LGBT students, and students struggling
with their sexualities feel unwelcome. As Professor Laycock has
pointed out, however, same-sex couples cannot escape "the pointed
reminder that some fellow citizens vehemently disapprove of what
they are doing. But same-sex couples know that anyway, and the
American commitment to freedom of speech ensures that they will
be reminded of it from time to time." 352
Whether openly
condemning the relationship or respectfully disavowing it,
religious universities must be able to distance themselves from a
marriage or family structure that conflict with their faithwhether that right is grounded in freedom, free speech, or
353
expressive association.

351. There are competing views among denominations whether such marriages
are indeed Biblical. Justin Lee, Homosexuality & Christianity, GAY CHRISTIAN
NETWORK, https://www.gaychristian.net/justins-view.php (last visited July 16,
2016). Some faith communities are leave the question up to individual faith
leaders. See, e.g., Dewan, supra note 174 (noting that, in New York City, two out of
five Episcopalian dioceses allow same-sex couples to be wed by priests in the
church).
352. Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 189, 198 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello,
Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008).
Faced with the possibility of moral condemnation from their employer, some
employees may feel the need to stay closeted. See Cyd Zeigler, Southern Christian
College Bullies Another Gay Athlete into Silence, SB NATION (Apr. 22, 2015, 9:07
AM),
http://www.outsports.com/2015/4/22/8459617/christian-college-gay-athletelgbt-silence (discussing interviews with "five gay college basketball coaches - in
Divisions I & II - all of whom feel they have to stay in the closet for their own
futures in the NCAA" but not clarifying whether state or local law protected those
coaches from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). In localities that
protect LGBT people from overt discrimination based on their sexuality, employees
have legal recourse if treated differently, which for some should mute, if not erase
the need to hide one's sexuality.
353. For a thoughtful treatment of associational claims, see John D. Inazu, The

2016]

Squaring Faith and Sexuality

III. The Locker Room and the Question of Student-Athletes
Discrimination against LGBT student-athletes is real 354:
"One in four LGBTQ student athletes said they were pressured to
be silent about their sexual identity among teammates"-at
religious and non-religious universities alike. 3 55 Arguably, no
story captures the difficulties faced by student-athletes more
poignantly than that of three-time all-American Brittney
Griner. 356 Often regarded as the "world's most famous female
basketball player," 357 in April 2013, Griner described coming out to
Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 Tul. L. Rev. 565 (2010). Questions of when a
university's expression of moral sentiments slips over into an illegal hostile
workplace are difficult and deserve attention but are beyond the scope of this
Article. See Frost, supra note 2.
354. The 2009 Student-Athlete Climate Study (SACS), done by Campus Pride in
2012, examined data on campus climate and the climate in athletic departments
and teams gathered from 8,481 student-athletes enrolled in United States
representing all intercollegiate divisions and all NCAA National Athletic
Association sports. SUSAN RANKIN & DANIEL MERSON, CAMPUS PRIDE, 2012
LGBTQ NATIONAL COLLEGE ATHLETE REPORT 5, https://www.campuspride.org/wpcontent/uploads/CampusPride-Athlete-Report-Exec-Summary.pdf. It found that
LGBTQ student-athletes generally experienced a more negative climate
than their heterosexual peers, which adversely influenced their athletic
identities and reports of academic success ....
They reported being
deliberately ignored or excluded (51%) more so than their heterosexual
counterparts (41%). They also reported being the target of derogatory
remarks via electronic means almost twice as frequently (21% vs. 12%),
[and] being pressured to be silent about their identity over four times as
much (25% vs. 6%) ....
Id. at 6-7.
ESPN Magazine's seven-month look at women's basketball recruitment found that
55% of women's college basketball recruits indicated that recruiters asked about
sexual orientation. Cyphers & Fagan, supra note 334. Some coaches "talk about
'family values,' then put a definition on what families look like," which "becomes
code for 'We reflect a straight program."' Id. (quoting Heather Barber, a sports
psychology professor at the University of New Hampshire).
355. Campus Pride's 2012 LGBQT National College Athlete Report's Key
Findings Revealed, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar.
18,
2013,
3:31 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/18/lgbtq-college-report-campus-priden 2902427.html.
The NCAA, which oversees 1,281 institutions' athletic
programs, only "recently has started to focus on LGBT inclusion." Id. But as
Karen Morrison, the NCAA's director of inclusion, admitted, "[the NCAA] has no
power to enforce sanctions over homophobic behavior" by institutions. Barbara
Frankel, Why Are Gay College Athletes in the Closet?, DIVERSITYINC (Apr. 17, 2013),
http://www. diversityinc.com/diversity-and-inclusion/why-are-gay-college-athletesin-the-closet/ (advising "[t]hose who believe they have been discriminated against
can go through their university administrative process or take legal action.").
356. WNBA
Prospect
Profile:
Brittney
Griner-Baylor,
WNBA,
http://www.wnba.com/archive/wnba/draft/2013/profiles/prospect-griner-brittney.ht
ml (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
357. Scott Gleeson, Brittney Griner Book: Baylor's Stance on Homosexuality
Caused
'Pain,'
USA
TODAY
(Feb.
27,
2014,
1:51
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/wnba/2014/02/26/brittney-griner-talkshomosexuality-baylor-animosity-in-tell-all-book/5840791/
[hereinafter
Gleeson,
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her parents as a lesbian during an interview in her last year
playing for Baylor University. 358 The media treated her revelation
with "nonchalance." 359 At the time, Baylor's policy prohibited
"homosexual acts," 36 0 which Griner's disclosure would not have
violated. But had Griner played for a school that but also bans
"promotion of sexually immoral behavior," 36 1 that disclosure may
have landed her in hot water. Griner says Baylor's head coach
urged "players not to be open publicly about their sexuality
3
because it would hurt recruiting and look bad for the program. 62
In her book, In My Skin, Griner encapsulated her experience
during her last year as a student-athlete at as "one big
struggle"36 3:
Even though I was open about being gay, I couldn't be open on
Baylor's time, which is why I have a lot of mixed emotions
about my four years there .... Playing for a program and on a
campus that denies a large part of my identity was a tough
3 64
situation to navigate.

Brittney Griner Book].
358. Scott Gleeson, Draft Day: WNBA'S Griner Ready to Evoke Change, Test
NBA
Waters,
USA
TODAY
(Apr.
18,
2013,
8:35
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/wnba/mercury/2013/04/16/draft-day-wnbasbrittney-griner-ready-to-evoke-change-take-on-nba/208702 1/ [hereinafter Gleeson,
Draft Day]; accord Sam Borden, A Female Star Comes Out as Gay, and the Sports
World
Shrugs,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
19,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/sports/ncaabasketball/brittney-griner-comesout-and-sports-world-shrugs.html?r= 0.
359. Borden, supra note 358.
360. Gleeson, Brittney Griner Book, supra note 357357; Abby Ohlheiser, Why
Baylor University's Sexual Conduct Policy No Longer Calls Out 'Homosexual Acts,'
WASH. POST (July 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-offaith/wp/20 15/07/08/why-baylor-universitys-sexual-conduct-policy-no-longer-callsout-homosexual-acts/.
361. See, e.g., Andy Birkey, Eight Minnesota Colleges Discriminate Against
LGBT
Students,
Staff,
and
Faculty, COLUMN
(July
15,
2015),
http://thecolu.mn/16845/eight-minnesota-colleges-discriminate-against-gbtstudents-staff-and-faculty.
362. Griner: No Talking Sexuality at Baylor, ESPN (May 27, 2013),
http://espn.go.com/wnba/story/-/id/9289080/brittney-griner-says-baylor-coach-kimmulkey-told-players-keep-quiet-sexuality.
363. Anna Aagenes, Come Out Like A Girl: Why Athletes Like Brittney Griner
Deserve Our Applause and Our Attention, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/anna-aagenes/brittney-griner-comingout b 3130781.html (citing BRITTNEY GRINER, IN MY SKIN: MY LIFE ON AND OFF
THE BASKETBALL COURT (2015)). See BRITTNEY GRINER, IN MY SKIN: MY LIFE ON
AND OFF THE BASKETBALL COURT (2015).
364. Antonya English et. al, Openly Gay Athletes Challenge NCAA's Culture of
Silence,
TAMPA
BAY
TIMES
(Mar.
27,
2015),
http://www.tampabay.com/sports/basketball/college/openly-gay-athletes-challengeculture-of-silence-in-ncaa-womens-basketball/2223168 (citing BRITTNEY GRINER, IN
MY SKIN: MY LIFE ON AND OFF THE BASKETBALL COURT (2015)).
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As this Part explains, when student-athletes follow a vision
of the good life that conflicts with the university's public witness to
its faith, two distinct quandaries arise for institutions of higher
learning: Has the institution facilitated or endorsed a studentathlete's conduct, and what countervailing interests do other
students have?
The last question arises most clearly with
transgender athletes, where reasonable access to locker rooms and
other facilities is essential if students are to have a meaningful
opportunity to play.
A. Avoiding Endorsement of a Student Athlete's Conduct
By their nature, athletics involve universities deep in the
lives of student athletes: Universities house athletes, provide
facilities for changing, and provide accommodations while
travelling away. When the relationship between the coach and
athlete is a positive one, coaches sometimes act as confidants and
mentors, giving the coach more knowledge of a player's private
affairs than other university employees would have with ordinary
students. Even when the relationship is not positive, coaches have
a greater lens into the athlete's life by virtue of the sheer number
36 5
of hours spent together.
Given the slim hope of real privacy, it is not surprising that
universities often learn intimate details of student-athletes' lives.
To the extent that those details remain private, student-athletes'
conduct raise the same questions as that of other, non-athlete
students discussed in Part I.E(5) above. It is only when the
student-athlete's conduct becomes public that the separate
question arises about whether the university endorses the
athlete's conduct.
Student-athletes undoubtedly are part and parcel of the
university's public face.
Indeed, a student-athlete at any
university can engage in public behavior inconsistent with the
university's "brand."
Consider conduct wholly apart from a
366
illicit drug use, 36 7
person's sexuality, like alcohol consumption,

365. Ben Strauss & Steve Eder, College Players Granted Right to Form Union,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
26,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/27/sports/ncaafootballlnational-labor-relationsboard-rules-northwestern-players-are-employees-and-can-unionize.html? r=0
(observing that some players spend fifty hours a week in practice or competition,
lending support to an NLRB ruling allowing college football players to unionize
based in part on that fact).
366. Gregory Smith, Student Partying Prompts Rhode Island College to Put
Sports Programs on Hold for 3 112 Days, PROVIDENCE J. (Sept. 26, 2014),
http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20140926/NEWS/309269992;
20
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or even sexual assault. 368 In each of these instances, few would
question whether a university can be tarnished by association
with behavior it does not condone. In fact, universities routinely
suspend or expel athletes for such behavior. 36 9 Of course, being
LGBT should not be equated with these acts.
For a set of religious universities, when a student engages in
any sex before marriage, whether gay or straight, it implicates the
university's witness to its own fundamental religious tenets. Some
universities express this sentiment in their student-athlete
handbook: "Because student-athletes are representatives of [the
University] , both on and off campus, expectations and standards
in some areas are placed at a higher level than the general student
body. Accepting and being accountable to these standards is part
' 370
of the responsibility of being a student-athlete."
The amount of control that universities exercise over their
student-athletes raises a separate consideration: facilitation.
Religious universities have a specific interest in not facilitating
sexual relationships that violate their religious tenets. Consider
again facts far removed from issues surrounding LGBT status: a
religious university can insist that students playing mixed doubles
tennis not slip into each other's rooms while travelling for away
games-and it can take steps to police this behavior.
Of course, an athlete's special relationship to the university
places immense pressure on students like Griner. As Baylor's
Centralia College Athletes Suspended for Drinking Party, KSL (Feb. 4, 2015),
www.KSL.com/?nid= 157&sid=33350356.
367. Alcohol, Drug and Other Prohibited Substances Policy, BATES COLL.,
http://athletics.bates.edu/alcohol-drug-and-other-prohibited-substances-policy
(last
visited Apr. 10, 2016).
368. Stanford University continues to defend how seriously it takes rape at the
university after Brock Turner's sexual assault conviction resulted in a mere six
months in jail, sparking a national furor. See Tyler Kingkade, Students Want
Stanford to Apologize for Brock Turner's Sexual Assault, HUFFINGTON POST (June
8,
2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/stanford-brock-turnerapology-us 57589064e4b0ced23ca6f901. Student conduct that reflects poorly on an

institution is not limited to student athletes. For example, applications to the
University of Virginia dropped after the later-discredited Rolling Stone story about
a gang rape at a fraternity on University grounds.
See Chris Staiti, UVA
Applications Drop in Wake of Discredited Gang Rape Story, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 15,

2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-15/uva-applications-dropin-wake-of-nowdiscredited-gangrape-story.
369. E.g., 20 Centralia College Athletes Suspended for Drinking Party, supra
note 366; March 28, 2006: Duke Lacrosse Team Suspended Following Sexual
Assault Allegations,

HISTORY,

http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/duke-

lacrosse-team-suspended-following-sexual-assault-allegations/print.
Apr. 13, 2016); Smith, supra note 366366.
370. LETOURNEAU UNIV., STUDENT-ATHLETE
(2015).

HANDBOOK

(last accessed

2015-2016,

at

19
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later policy revision illustrates, universities can avow a
commitment to chastity with equal-opportunity rules that all
students, gay and straight, must abide (and may struggle to
conform to). Notwithstanding the overarching intuition that a
person's sexuality is private and irrelevant, if a student-athlete's
conduct violates an equal-opportunity prohibition and it comes to
light, the university may feel little choice but to sanction the
player-which will strike some as unfair since student-athletes
371
are under a public microscope.
So what would happen if Griner played for Baylor today, with
its equal-opportunity prohibition on sex outside marriage? Griner
could be expelled if she admits to having sex outside of marriage,
just as a straight athlete would be. 372 The difficulty arises if
Griner legally married her partner and that marriage came to
light. As noted above, if Baylor does not recognize her legal
marriage, Griner can never comply with Baylor's ban after
marrying. If Griner is treated as an employee, expelling Griner
for violating the conduct code may well violate the law, as
explained above, although it would be allowed under Title IX if the
University secured a waiver. 373 But as with an endorsement of an
employee's relationship, an equal-opportunity conduct rule would
not strip a university of its ability to distance itself from Griner's
choice, while witnessing to its own views in a mutually respectful
way.

374

In the end, it remains possible for universities to distance
themselves from endorsing the conduct of their student-athletes
without banning gay or transgender athletes. As the next Section
explains, a university need not deny gay or transgender athletes
access to locker rooms and other facilities in order to infuse its
tenets throughout the community.

371. E.g., GRINER, supra note 363 363; see, e.g., Noah Garcia, Speaking Out:
Student-Athletes Weigh in on LGBT Acceptance in Athletics,STANFORD DAILY (May
27, 2015), http://www.stanforddaily.com/2015/05/27/speaking-out-student-athletesweigh-in-on-igbt-acceptance-in-athletics/
(discussing the discrepancy between
LGBT acceptance on campus and LGBT acceptance within athletics).
372. See BAYLOR UNIV., BAYLOR UNIVERSITY STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK
2009-2010,
at 8,
http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/bay/genrel/auto-pdf/0910compl-studenthandbook.pdf ("A student that engages in misconduct is subject to
disciplinary action ranging from a warning to expulsion."). See supra note 211 and
accompanying text.
373. See supra Part I.D.
374. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
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B. Providing a Meaningful Opportunity to Play Means
ProvidingReasonable Accommodations
Plainly, the discussion of openly gay and transgender
athletes invariably turns to "[tihe gay-shower scenario," whether
the athlete plays professionally or in college.3 7 5 When Jason
Collins, a former NBA player, came out as gay, Bryan Fischer, a
political talk show host, stated:
I will guarantee you ... if the ownership of whatever team is
thinking about bringing him back, or thinking about trading
for him, and they go to the players on that team and they say
"How do you feel about an out active homosexual being in the
same locker room, sharing the same shower facilities with
you?" they'll say "no way. I don't want that. I do 376
not want
some guy, a teammate, eyeballing me in the shower."
To be sure, many, if not most, players seem to have no antigay animus-contending that gay and straight players alike
should be "look[ed] at like a brother," and not be "treat[ed] ...any
different[ly]" and that "things are changing" and "change is
inevitable." 377 Still, even gay allies acknowledge that "the locker
room [is] different." 378 "The locker room may not be ready for
that .... [S]ome guys walk around completely naked all the time,
and they might not want to do that anymore." 379 As players come
out with greater frequency, how to fully include LGBT players will
only take on greater significance. 38 0
But fears focused on
competing claims in the locker room are overblown.
Consider first the bathroom issue, now the fodder of
commentators and talk show hosts after North Carolina's law
(H.B. 2) wiping aside a Charlotte ordinance that provided access

375. Fischer on Jason Collins: NBA Teammates Won't Want "Active Homosexual"
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/30/jason-collins-bryanfischer n 3185766.html.

To Be "Eyeballing" Them in the Locker Room,
376. Id.

377. Will Brinson, Terrell Thomas Not Sure NFL Locker Room Ready for Gay
Player, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 12, 2014, 9:33 AM), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-onfootballI24439998/terrell-thomas-not-sure-nfl-locker-room-ready-for-gay-player.
378. Id.
379. Id.

380. As more gay athletes chose to openly honor their relationships, one would
expect signs of affection not to garner the kinds of headlines that followed Abby
Wambach sharing a kiss with her wife Sarah Huffman after the United States beat
Japan 5-2 and won the FIFA Women's World Cup in Vancouver, Canada. The
moment graced front pages across the world. Cavan Sieczkowski, This Photo of
Abby Wambach Kissing Her Wife Sarah Huffman After World Cup Win Is What
Loves
Looks
Like,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(July.
6,
2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/abby-wambach-kisses-wife-worldcup_559a90d6e4b0c706985a4039.
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381
to restroom facilities for gay and transgender individuals.
Passed in a one-day special session, H.B. 2 requires that
transgender people use the bathroom facility matching their
gender at birth,; it sparked a political maelstrom. North Carolina
now faces the loss of about "$4.7 billion in federal education
funding under Title IX alone," if a federal lawsuit challenging the
law succeeds, 38 2 on top of lost jobs, conference venues, travel bans,
38 3
and widespread boycott.

Contrast that controversy with the duty Utah created in
state law to accommodate transgender employees. In March 2015,
Utah, the single most conservative state in the last presidential
election, enacted its landmark Utah Compromise, extending
protections against discrimination to the LGBT community in
housing and hiring. 38 4

Recognizing that transgender employees

381. Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, H.B. 2, Gen. Assemb., 2d Extra
Sess. (N.C. 2016). Months before H.B. 2's enactment, voters repealed Houston's
non-discrimination ordinance, which was depicted as allowing "men ... [to] use
women's bathrooms." Justin Wm. Moyer, Why Houston's Gay Rights Ordinance
Failed: Fear of Men in Women's Bathrooms, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/11/03/why-houstonsgay-rights-ordinance-failed-bathrooms/; City Council, Houston, Tex., Houston
Equal
Rights
Ordinance,
Ordinance
No.
2014(May
14,
2014),
https://archive.org/stream/equal-rights-ordinance/equal-rights-ordinance-djvu.txt
("It is the policy of the city that the city will not discriminate on the basis of any
protected characteristic in authorizing or making available the use of city facilities
or in the delivery of city programs, services or activities.").
382. Editorial: Federal Government Should Block Funds to States That Pass
Discriminatory
Laws,
CONN.
L.
TRIB.
(June
8,
2016),
m.ctlawtribune.com/#/article/1202759609976/8/Editorial; Complaint, United States
v. North Carolina, No. 1:16-cv-00425 (M.D. N.C. May 9, 2016) [hereinafter DOJ
Complaint],
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2827915/NCDOJComplaint.pdf. The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) contends in a
series of letters to North Carolina that the law violates Title IX, which prohibits
sex discrimination and therefore sex stereotyping discrimination. See Editorial:
Federal Government Should Block Funds to States That Pass DiscriminatoryLaws,
supra. DOJ also alleges violations of Title VII, relying on Price Waterhouse's
theory of sex-stereotyping. Letter from Vanita Gupta, Deputy Assistant Attorney
Gen., to Margaret Spellings,
President Univ. N.C. (May 4, 2016),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2823820/Dept-of-Justice-to-UNCIllegal-to-discriminate.txt ("Federal courts and administrative agencies have
applied Title VII to discrimination against transgender individuals based on sex,
including gender identity."). DOJ further contends that "[d]enying transgender
individuals access to a restroom consistent with gender identity discriminates on
the basis of sex." Id.
383. South Dakota's Governor vetoed a similar measure aimed at students.
Laura Wagner & Bill Chappell, South Dakota Governor Vetoes Bill Stipulating
Transgender Students' Bathroom Use, NPR (March 1, 2016, 2:08 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/01/468732723/south-dakota-stransgender-bathroom-bill-hits-deadline-for-governor.
384. See Antidiscrimination and Religious Freedom Amendments, ch. 13, 2015
Utah Laws 68; ch. 46, 2015 Utah Laws 214; S.B. 296, Reg. Sess. (Utah 2015) ;
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must have access to bathroom facilities during the day and that all
employees deserve respect and dignity, Utah enacted a commonsense
measure:
Employers
must
"afford
reasonable
accommodations based on gender identity to all employees" if they
"designate sex-specific facilities, including restrooms, shower
facilities, and dressing facilities." 38 5
Realizing that other
employees have interests, too, as the employer itself does, Utah
provided assurances that employers could institute reasonable
dress and grooming standards. 386 The Utah Senate and House of
Representatives recognized the public's unease with transgender
individuals, people with whom many Americans and Utahns have
never interacted-and concluded that concerns about privacy
could be solved with nothing more than a $50 lock on a bathroom
door. 38 7 How would that work?

Imagine first a situation where Sam is in the process of
transitioning from Sally. 38 8 Transitioning to another gender is
time limited-Sam's outward appearance morphs until his
Robin Fretwell Wilson, After Indiana: Harmonizing Gay Rights and Religious
Freedom,
LIBR.
LAW
&
LIBERTY
(Apr.
21,
2015),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/O4/21/after-indiana-harmonizing-gay-rightsand-religious-freedom/.
385. UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 34A-5-109 (West 2015); Antidiscrimination and
Religious Freedom Amendments, ch. 13, 2015 Utah Laws 68; S.B. 296, Reg. Sess.,
at lines 676-79 (Utah 2015).
386. UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 34A-5-109 (West 2015); Antidiscrimination and
Religious Freedom Amendments, ch. 13, 2015 Utah Laws 68; ch. 46, 2015 Utah
Laws 214; S.B. 296, Reg. Sess., at lines 676-79 (Utah 2015) ("This chapter may not
be interpreted to prohibit an employer from adopting reasonable dress and
grooming standards not prohibited by other provisions of federal or state law,
provided that the employer's dress and grooming standards afford reasonable
accommodations based on gender identity to all employees ....
");S.B. 296, Reg.
Sess., at lines 676-79 (Utah 2015) ("This chapter may not be interpreted to prohibit
an employer from adopting reasonable rules and policies that designate sex-specific
facilities, including restrooms, shower facilities, and dressing facilities, provided
that the employer's rules and policies adopted under this section afford reasonable
accommodations based on gender identity to all employees.").
387. See Utah
Senate Floor Debate, S.B. 296, Reg. Sess. (Utah 2015),
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip-id= 18760&meta-id=548
216.
388. The NCAA defines a "transgender" person as "an individual whose gender
identity does not match their assigned birth gender. Being transgender does not
imply any specific sexual orientation (attraction to people of a specific gender.)
Therefore, transgender people may additionally identify as straight, gay, lesbian,
or bisexual." PAT GRIFFIN & HELEN CARROLL, NCAA OFFICE OF INCLUSION, NCAA
INCLUSION
OF
TRANSGENDER
STUDENT-ATHLETES
22
(2011),
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Transgender-Handbook_2011_Final.pdf.
A
transgender man or a FTM (Female-to-Male) person is someone who was assigned
to the female gender at birth but has a male gender identity. Id. at 23. A
transgender woman or a MTF (Male-to-Female) person is someone who was
assigned to the male gender at birth but has a female gender identity. Id.
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physical manifestation looks like any other man's. 38 9 Before Sam's
outward characteristics change, imagine he begins using the men's
restroom in the office. If Sam uses a stall with a lock on the door
in the men's facilities, his privacy interests are adequately
protected. The privacy of other men using the restroom, however,
may be encroached upon if they use a urinal, rather than a stall.
Here, the solution is easy-male employees can simply use stalls.
Alternatively, employers have the discretion to give Sam and
Sam's male coworkers additional privacy through another
reasonable accommodation.
For instance, employers could
institute a process where employees hang a "do not disturb" sign
on the multi-stall restroom while using it-effectively converting it
into a single use facility while in use. This approach avoids the
cost of renovating or constructing whole new facilities. Should this
scheme create a backlog or lengthy waits, employers are free to
institute other reasonable accommodations. Of course, once Sam's
change in outward appearance is complete, he will present like
any other man using the restroom and the need for
accommodations will subside.
Now imagine instead that Sally is in the process of
transitioning from Sam and wishes to use the restroom that
reflects her desired gender. This was the issue that motivated
North Carolina's ill-conceived law. 390 Sally's outward appearance
may not match her desired gender for a year or more. 391 Female
co-workers may worry about their own privacy. Ironically, multiuse women's restrooms have stalls with locks, giving more privacy
than most men's rooms do. If Sally's female coworkers are
concerned that Sally is in the restroom at the same time, an
employer can accommodate these privacy and dignity concerns by
allowing all employees to hang a "do not disturb" sign while using
392
the facilities, ensuring maximum privacy.

389. See Joint Statement, supra note 97, at 2 (defining "transition").
390. Moyer, supra note 381.
391. See Transgendercare Medical Feminizing Program, TRANSGENDER CARE,

http://www.transgendercare.com/medical/resources/tmfprogram/tmfprogram-6.as
p (last accessed July 16, 2016).
392. Some may see allowing employees to hang a "Do Not Disturb" sign on an
employer's multi-person restroom as stigmatizing for a transgender worker. The
employer's duty to reasonably accommodate the transgender person comes with the
discretion to adopt reasonable facility rules, which could, but need not consider the
privacy concerns of others. Ideally, the employer would take steps to sensitize it
employees to be welcoming of others. For workers slow to embrace that vision, a
"do not disturb" sign may give some peace of mind until the newness of having a
transgender coworker wears off. Further, with rising levels of acceptance of
transpeople, cresting 70% among millennials, any stigma is likely to attach to the
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There may be those, however, who do not accept Sally's
transition and who are uncomfortable sharing facilities with her
well after her transition is complete. Employers can use "do not
disturb" signs, locks on the main bathroom door, or any other
reasonable accommodation to manage interactions between
coworkers that may be fraught with emotion because one co393
worker will simply not accept the other's true identity.
Contrast this dignified approach with "birth certificate"
394
policies adopted in North Carolina and considered elsewhere.
These policies require that persons to use facilities consistent with
their "anatomy as identified at birth."395 Transgender individuals
are forced to use facilities that they themselves feel uncomfortable
and misplaced in. 396
Under these measures, a transgender
person's self-identity is suffocated.
No point is served in barring a person from living out
something so significant to their true gender when "reasonable
accommodations" can preserve the dignity and privacy of all.
Operationalized,
these policies
are
self-defeating-forcing
transgender women, who physically present as men, to use the
women's bathrooms, with far more chances for friction and dis397
ease.

coworker who is concerned for her privacy, not to the transgender employee.
ROBERT JONES & DANIEL COX, PUB. RELIGION RESEARCH INST., How RACE AND
RELIGION SHAPE MILLENNIAL ATTITUDES ON SEXUALITY AND REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH 42 (2015), http://publicreligion.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/O3/PRRI-

Millennials-Web-FINAL.pdf (reporting that over 70% of millennials "support legal
protections against discrimination in jobs, public accommodations, and housing for
gay and lesbian people ... and for transgender people"); HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,
EQUALITY
RISING:
2015
GLOBAL
EQUALITY
REPORT
7
(2015),

http://www.hrc.org/resources/equality-rising ("Between 2011 and 2015, the number
of Americans who viewed transgender people favorably rose steeply from 26
percent to 44 percent.").
393. See Joanne Greenfield, Coming Out: The Process of Forming a Positive
Identity, in THE FENWAY GUIDE TO LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER
HEALTH 45 (Harvey J. Makadon et al. eds., 2008).

394. See Dominic Holden, South Dakota Becomes First State to Pass AntiTransgender Student Restroom Bill, BUZZFFEED (Feb. 16, 2016, 3:22 PM),
http://www.buzzfeed.com/dominicholden/south-dakota-becomes-first-state-to-passanti-transgender-st#.fcvlMNA2N.
395. Holden, supra note 394.

396. Zack Ford, Opponents of LGBT Protections are Clueless about Transgender
Men,

THINKPROGRESS

(Oct.

23,

2015),

http://thinkprogress.org/

lgbt/20 15/10/23/37 15054/houston-hero-transgender-men/
("Most
importantly,
transgender women are not predators; they are individuals who, like everybody
else, simply want to pee in peace.").
397. See Phil Ciciora, Why Laws Restricting Bathroom Access to Transgender
Peope
Wont
Work,
UNIV.
ILL.
(May
26,
2016,
11:30
AM),
https://news.illinois.edu/blog/view/6367/366409.
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Like the bathroom issue, access to locker rooms poses similar
challenges in college athletics. Athletic facilities are generally the
most active area for Title IX waiver requests-evidencing that
they are the situs of competing privacy interests. 398 ED's recent
settlement with a Chicago school district over a transgender
student's access to the locker room shows that it is possible to
facilitate access to the locker room and changing facilities without
ostracizing transgender students or sacrificing the privacy of
others.399

District 211, Illinois's largest high school district, initially
barred a transgender girl from the girls' locker room facilities at
the high school, 40 0 violating the "student's rights under Title
IX."401
Administrators had offered the transgender student a
changing area adjacent to the girl's locker room, but the student
thought that it would "draw[] more attention," single her out, and
be a hassle because a "staff member [would have] to unlock it for
her." 40 2 By changing elsewhere, the student also missed out on the
"informal camaraderie with her teammates that sometimes occurs
in the girls' athletics locker room ...

prior to practice," much as it

40 3
does in the locker room before physical education class.
Federal officials gave District 211 "30 days to reach an
agreement or risk having its federal education funding suspended
or terminated" and face litigation. 40 4 District 211's school board

398. WARBELOW & GREGG, supra note 25, at 11; see GRIFFIN & CARROLL, supra
note 388.
399. GRIFFIN & CARROLL, supra note 388 398, at 10; see Duaa Eldeib, District

211 Keeps Deal on Transgender Student After Heated Debate, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 8,
2015,
9:58
AM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/cttransgender-student-district-211-settlement-update-met-20151207-story.html.
400. Erin Buzuvis, Banning Transgender Girl from Girls' Locker Room Violates
Title

IX,

OCR

Says,

TITLE

IX

BLOG

(Nov.

3,

2015),

http://title-

ix.blogspot.com/2015/1I/banning-transgender-girl-from-girls.html?m= 1 [hereinafter
Banning Transgender Girl].
401. Duaa Eldeib, Mother of Transgender Student at Center of National Debate
Speaks Out, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
suburbs/schaumburg-hoffman-estates/news/ct-transgender-student-mom-district211-met-20151112-story.html.
402. Banning Transgender Girl, supra note 400.

403. Id.
404. Duaa Eldeib, District211 Keeps Deal on Transgender Student After Heated
Debate, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/
breaking/ct-transgender-student-district-21 1-settlement-update-met-20151207-

story.html. Officials acknowledged that if the District did not reach an agreement,
it "risk[ed] lawsuits and the loss of millions of dollars in federal funding." Michael
E. Miller, Feds Say Illinois School District Broke Law by Banning Transgender
Students

from

Girls'

Locker

Room,

WASH.

POST

(Nov.

3,

2015),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/11/03/feds-sayillinois -school-district-broke-law-by-banning-trans- student-fro m- girls-locker-room/.
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subsequently voted 5-2 to give the student access to the girls'
locker room, 40 5 which took the form of "a curtained-off area in
which to change and shower." 406 This accommodation "stopped
short of complying with the federal directive to offer full access to
the girls' locker room." 40

7

Nonetheless, District 211 officials felt

"they must weigh the rights of their transgender students with the

privacy rights of the remaining 12,000-plus students," resulting in
the decision to offer a curtained-off area. 408 The student not only
"agreed to use the private areas of the locker room to change and
shower,"409 but preferred the arrangement. 410
Coming to an
arrangement that suited the transgender student and her
teammates is a happy ending-although the resolution of
conflicting interests may not always be so easily solved. 411 Several
parents of other children who attend District 211's schools have
since countersued, claiming that the other students "experience

humiliation, anxiety, intimidation, fear, apprehension, stress,
degradation, and loss of dignity" because the transgender student
41 2
uses the same facility.

405. Eldeib, supra note 404.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. TITLE IX BLOG, supra note 400.
411. Individuals have been vocal on both sides of the issue of transgender
students using locker room facilities. "[A] large majority of speakers ... said they
were against a settlement that would allow the student, who was born a male but
identifies as female, to use the girls' locker room." Eldeib, supra note 404. Parents
are uncomfortable, likely in part because they just do not know a lot about
transgender students. Jeff Miller, for example, argued that his daughter was
"scared and uncomfortable when she learned a transgender student could gain
access to the girls' locker room." Id. Miller stated that "[p]eople have the right in
this country to live their lives the way they see fit ... [but w]hen it starts
infringing on other people's rights, that's when it becomes a problem." Id. Another
"high school senior cited her personal modesty and religious beliefs in not wanting
the transgender student to be allowed in the locker room[,]" and refused to speak
publicly because she was ''absolutely terrified of what other people would think of
[her], [and] if they would call [her] intolerant."' Id.
By contrast, John Knight of the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois
stated that while "he was pleased to see the board approve the settlement for [the
student]," it is a ''terrible mistake' not to extend locker room access to other
students." Id. ED's Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Catherine Lhamon,
believes that ''[t]he agreement strikes a balance between respecting individual
privacy while ensuring that all students receive the opportunity to participate
equally in school programs and activities."' Id.
412. Eric Peterson, District 211 Sued Over Tansgender Student's Locker Room
Access, DAILY HERALD (May 4, 2016, 6:01 PM), http://www.dailyherald.com/
article/20160504/news/160509515/.
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To be sure, accommodations respectful of all raise
challenging questions. For example, what happens if the student
no longer finds the accommodation acceptable? Though the key
for scholastic institutions is to attempt to provide "reasonable
accommodations," in the locker room this goal can prove to be
difficult in practice. The curtain arrangement used by District 211
ensures the privacy of the young woman behind the curtain, but
not that of the young women dressing and undressing in front of
open lockers. One possibility to ensure the privacy and modesty of
others is to add curtained areas for all students, which would
involve some cost. Another is to have the transgender student
change first and then allow the rest of team or class to change
after, to the extent that privacy matters to them. Many students
likely will not care; the transgender student sacrifices no
camaraderie with those who do not mind changing at the same
time. For those who do care, privacy will be preserved, even if
they are seen as intolerant for making that choice. Because the
physical transition to another gender is often time limited, over
413
time the need for a curtain or other accommodations falls away.
In crafting reasonable measures surrounding transgender
students and student-athletes, the importance of definitionsespecially of gender identity-cannot be overstated. A definition
that limits one's gender identity to the gender listed on one's birth
certificate, like that enacted recently in North Carolina, 4 14 limits a
student's access only to facilities matching his or her gender at
birth and never accommodates the gender-reassigned individual,
whether during the transition process or after.
Such "birth
certificate" policies effectively dodge the hard, but soluble,
question of how to give transgender students access on the same
basis as other students, while being respectful of the privacy
interests of all. 41 5 By contrast, Utah recognized the need for
employer certainty when accommodating employees, and
defaulted to a medical definition drawn from the American
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manualwhich can be shown by medical history, treatment, or "other
evidence that the gender identity is sincerely held, part of a

413. Even after Sam transitions completely to Sally, one can imagine some
students, knowing that Sally transitioned, will never accept Sally as a woman and
will assert a countervailing privacy interest. In this instance, the school must be
trusted to continue to provide a reasonable accommodation.
414. Holden, supra note 394.
415. See supra Part II.E(6).
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person's core identity, and not being asserted for an improper
purpose."4

16

Other definitions place a premium on certain milestones,
such as beginning hormone therapy. 417 For example, the NCAA
defines "transgender" as "[a]n individual whose gender identity
does not match the sex assigned at birth."'4 18

In

discussing how

"this physical transition is a complicated, multistep process that
may take years," the NCAA specifically references "cross-gender
hormone therapy and a variety of surgical procedures." 41 9 If the
NCAA's definition requires completed hormonal therapy or
surgery to trigger a duty that the member-university provide
"access to various sport facilities, including locker rooms as well
as
restroom facilities [that are gender appropriate] "' 420 then it
operates to delay the student's social transition to the new gender,
overlooking the transgender student's interest in living out their
true

identity

during

the

transition

process

itself.4 21

For

a

transgender woman, the transition from male to female
culminates after one to two years, during which that athlete would
have no access to the woman's locker room.

42 2

416. Antidiscrimination and Religious Freedom Amendments, ch. 13, 2015 Utah
Laws 68 ("Gender identity' has the meaning provided in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DSM-5). A person's gender identity can be shown by providing
evidence, including, but not limited to, medical history, care or treatment of the
gender identity, consistent and uniform assertion of the gender identity, or other
evidence that the gender identity is sincerely held, part of a person's core identity,
and not being asserted for an improper purpose."). The DSM-5 replaced the older
term "Gender Identity Disorders" with the new term, gender dysphoria, which lists
multiple criteria determining when someone has a "strong and persistent crossgender identification." See Camille Beredjick, DSM-V to Rename Gender Identity
Disorder
"Gender
Dysphoria"
ADVOCATE
(July
23,
2012),
http://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/2012/07/23/dsm-replaces-genderidentity-disorder-gender-dysphoria.
417. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, CHAMPIONS OF RESPECT: INCLUSION OF
LGTBQ STUDENT-ATHLETES AND STAFF IN NCAA PROGRAMS 72 (2012),
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Pages /2Bfrom /2BChampions /2Bof%/2BR
espect%2B-%2BLGBTQ%2BTerminology.pdf.
418. Id.
The definition also explains: "This individual usually desires to
physically alter his or her body surgically and/or hormonally." Id.
419. GRIFFIN & CARROLL, supra note 388, at 23.

420. Andro Barnett, NCAA Faces Challenges in Accommodating LGBT Athletes,
COLL. SPORTS J., http://www.college-sports-journal.com/index.php/ncaa-division-isports/707-ncaa-faces-challenges-in-accomodating-lgbt-athletes
(last visited Dec.
23, 2015).
421. See Buzuvius, supra note 43, at
. ("[P]articipation policies based on
hormone usage unnecessarily complicate what is already a complex and
challenging decision about whether and when undergo hormone treatment.").
422. OLIVIA ASHBEE & JOSHUA MIRA GOLDBERG, TRANS CARE PROJECT,
HORMONES:
A
GUIDE
FOR
MTFS
8
(2006),
https://apps.carleton.edu/campus/gsc/assets/hormonesMTF.pdf.
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The pressure for a definite standard, whether based on
hormonal therapy or other evidence, is at its peak with younger
students and high school adolescents, where some worry that a
student will express a fleeting desire for another gender,
ultimately changing their mind. 423 In that instance, policymakers

could utilize the DSM-5's criteria, which require that symptoms of
a "marked incongruence between one's experienced/expressed
gender and primary and/or secondary sex characteristics" last at
least six months and be manifested by at least six specified
criteria.424

It may be that there is no definition without problems.
Whatever definition legislatures and accrediting bodies like the
NCAA choose, they should charge institutions with making
reasonable accommodations that give transgender athletes access
to needed facilities while protecting everyone's privacy and
dignity. 425 As the locker room cases make clear, however, through

423. GENDER

DYSPHORIA,

AM.

PSYCHIATRIC

PUB.

(2013),

http://www.dsm5.org/documents/gender 20dysphoria o20fact o20sheet.pdf. In the
primary and secondary school context, legislators may worry that students will
express an interest in transitioning gender, only to abandon it later. Here, the
criteria in American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
provides clarity. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
(5th ed. 2013).
In Adolescents and Adults Gender Dysphoria must last at least six months
and be manifested by at least two of the following specified criteria: (1) "A
marked incongruence between one's experienced/expressed gender and
primary and/or secondary sex characteristics (or in young adolescents, the
anticipated secondary sex characteristics)[;] (2) A strong desire to be rid of
one's primary and/or secondary sex characteristics because of a marked
incongruence with one's experienced/expressed gender (or in young
adolescents, a desire to prevent the development of the anticipated
secondary sex characteristics)[;] (3) A strong desire for the primary and/or
secondary sex characteristics of the other gender[;] (4) A strong desire to
be of the other gender (or some alternative gender different from one's
assigned gender)[;] (5) A strong desire to be treated as the other gender
(or some alternative gender different from one's assigned gender)[;] (6) A
strong conviction that one has the typical feelings and reactions of the
other gender (or some alternative gender different from one's assigned
gender)."
Id. In children, at least six of the specified criteria must be manifested; tying the
gender identity
to
a
marked
difference
between the
individual's
expressed/experienced gender and the gender others would assign him or her
known as gender dysphoria. Id. Under DSM-5, that marked difference has to
continue for at least six months. Id.
424. Id.
425. The NCAA has also attempted to include transgender student-athletes in a
recent update which "ensures that transgendered student-athletes have respectful,
legal and fair access to various college sport teams in accordance to current legal as
well as medical knowledge." Barnett, supra note 420. The policy attempts to
provide a suitable space for transgender student-athletes by facilitating "access to
various sport facilities, including locker rooms as well as restroom facilities [that

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 34: 385

thoughtful, reasonable accommodations, protecting the interests
426
and privacy rights of all parties is possible.
Conclusion
After Obergefell, hundreds of religious colleges and
universities face a new challenge: how to square faith teachings
and roles as educators with respect for LGBT students at a time
when an increasing portion of the public sees application of
religious tenets about marriage or sexuality as mere
discrimination against LGBT students. Before Obergefell opened
access to marriage for lesbian and gay couples, conduct codes that
required all sexuality to be confined to marriage facially applied
the same norm to all students-straight or gay. 427
Before
Obergefell, civil law understandings of marriage aligned with the
faith traditions of religious universities, avoiding questions about
who should live in married student housing or whether everyone
should abstain from sex outside marriage.
Once those
understandings diverged after Obergefell, thorny questions arise
about how religious educational institutions can maintain their
integrity and continue to witness to their faith traditions.
The natural impulse for many institutions will be to cordon
off all homosexuality or to exclude LGBT students and employees
entirely-something religious institutions can do while receiving
Title IX money, but increasingly may not be able to do under state
law or do as to employees under federal law.
Religious institutions of higher education should not want to
discriminate against individuals because of who they are-even if
the law presently permits them to do so. Religious universities
can and do adhere to faith beliefs on quintessentially religious
questions, like what counts as a marriage, and may fashion
university policies around married student housing and other
matters to mirror those beliefs.
But when the right to work or study at the university is tied
to conduct codes that LGBT individuals can never conform to,
religious universities tread on shaky ground legally. Conduct
codes should operate as a backdoor device for emptying religious
campuses of diversity. By taking steps inimical to the institutions'
established educational missions, religious universities will
are gender appropriate]" Id.
426. Eldeib, supra note 404.
427. Sexual

Conduct,

BAYLOR

UNIV.

(May

http://www.baylor.edu/content/services/document.php?id=39247
distinction is made between hetero- and homosexual marriage).

15,

2015),

(noting that

no
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477

become more insular and see their influence-and perhaps their
ability to draw on public resources-wane.

Appendix A: The Limits of Title VII's Protections for
Religious Organizations

Case

Policy

Discrimnation
Alleged

Defenses

Outcome

Killiner v.
Samford
Univ., 113
F.3d
196(11th
Cir. 1997)

Religious
beliefs of the
dean

Religious

702(a) &
703(e)(2)

Employer
wins

Little v.
Wuerl, 929
F.2d 945
(3rd Cir.
1991)
Hall v.
Baptist
Mem'l
Health Care
Corp., 215
F.3d 618
(6th Cir.
2000)
Kennedy v.
St. Joseph's
Ministries,

Catholic
canonical
marriage

Religious

703(e)(2)

Employer
wins

No
promotion of
Homosexual
ity

Religious

702(a) &
703(e)(2)

Employer
wins

Religious
clothing

Religiousretaliation

702(a)

Employer
wins

Inc., 657
F.3d 189
(4th Cir.
2011)
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Selected Cases Involving Protected Ground and Religvious Defense
Defenses
Outcome
Case
Policy
Dis-crimination
Alleged
Cline v.

Catholic
Diocese of
Toledo, 206
F.3d 651
(6th Cir.
2000)

No premarital sex

Pregnancy;
gender

__

None listed

_

Goes to trial
to
determine
basis of
discriminati
on ("pretext"
or not) & if
rule applied
equally. If
unequally
applied,
plaintiff
may
recover,
even if valid
religious
reason. The
case
eventually
settled

Law and Inequality

Boyd v.
Harding
Acad. of
Memphis,
Inc., 88 F.3d
410 (6th
Cir. 1996)

No premarital sex

Pregnancy;
gender

[Vol. 34: 385

702(a);
Plaintiff
failed to
produce
evidence

Goes to trial
to
determine
basis of
discriminati
on
("pretext" or
not) & if
rule applied
equally. If
unequally
applied,
plaintiff
may
recover,
even if valid
religious
reason
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No in-vitro
fertilization

Herx v.
Diocese of
Ft. WayneS. Bend
Inc., 48 F.
Supp. 3d
1168 (N.D.
Ind. 2014)

Pregnancy;
gender

Goes to trial
to
determine
basis of
discriminati

702(a) &
703(e)(2)

on

("pretext" or
not) & if
rule applied
equally. If
unequally
applied,
plaintiff
may
recover,
even if valid
religious
reason.
Plaintiff
was

4

i.

EEOC v.
Miss. Coll.,
626 F.2d
477(5th Cir.
1980)

Preference
for Baptists

i

i

Gender

702(a)

awarded
damages
Summary
judgment
for
employer,
unless
plaintiff can
show policy
preferring
baptists
was not
used, which
then
permits her
to show
employer
acted on an
impermissib
le basis
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Selected Cases Jrwolving Protected Ground and Religious Defe i ,

Case

Policy

Vigars v.
Valley
Christian
Ctr. of
Dublin, 805
F. Supp. 802
(N.D. Cal.
1992)

No adultery

CurrayCramer v.
Ursuline
Acad. of
Wilmington,
Delaware,
Inc., 450
F.3d 130 (3d

No proabortion
speech; no
anti-war
speech

Cir. 2006)

Dis-crimination
Alleged
Pregnancy;
gender

Defenses

Outcome

702(a) &
703(e)(2)

Gender

Entangleme
nt

Goes to trial
to determine
basis of
discriminati
on ("pretext"
or not) & if
rule applied
equally. If
unequally
applied,
plaintiff
may recover,
even if valid
religious
reason
Employer
wins; to
decide
questions of
catholic
doctrine
violates
establishme
nt clause
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Case

Policy

EEOC v.
Pac. Press
Pub. Ass'n,
676 F.2d
1272(9th
Cir. 1982)

Women paid
less than
similarlysituated
men

EEOC v.
Fremont
Christian
Sch., 781
F.2d 1362
(9th Cir.
1986)

Married
women do
not receive
health
insurance
that married
men do

Gender

No religious
defense
offered

Hypothetical

Cannot be
pregnant
No same-sex
marriage

Pregnancy

702(a)
& 703(e)(2)
702(a) &
703(e)(2)

Hypothetical

Discrimination
Alleged
Gender

Gender; sexual
orientation (if
accepted by
courts or enacted
into law)

Defenses

Outcome

No religious
defense
offered

Employee
wins, cannot
have a
policy which
treats men
and women
unequally
Employee
wins, cannot
have a
policy which
treats men
and women
unequally
Employee
likely wins
Employee
likely wins
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Case
Scharon v.
St. Luke's
Episcopal
Presbyterian
Hosps., 929
F.2d 360
(8th Cir.
1991)
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Additional Church Autonomy Cases
Policy
Discrimination
Defenses
Alleged
N/a
Age & gender
Entangleme
nt; plaintiff
was an
ordained
chaplain

Outcome
Suit
dismissed
on summary
judgment
for employer

Rayburn v.
Gen.
Conference
of SeventhDay
Adventists,
772 F.2d
1164 (4th
Cir. 1985)

N/a

Sex & gender

Entangleme
nt; plaintiff
was an
associate in
pastoral care

Suit
dismissed
on summary
judgment
for employer

DeMarco v.
Holy Cross
High Sch., 4
F.3d 166 (2d
Cir. 1993)

N/a

Age

Suit goes
forward-no
risk of
entangleme
nt

HosannaTabor
Evangelical
Lutheran
Church &
Sch. v.
EEOC, 132
S. Ct. 694
(2012)

N/a

Disability (ADA)

Entangleme
nt; plaintiff
was a lay
teacher with
religious
duties
Entangleme
nt; plaintiff
was a
"called"
teacher with
religious
duties

Suit
dismissed
on summary
judgment
for employer

Appendix B
Four Competing Tests for Whether an Organizationis Sufficiently
Religious to Qualify Under Section 702(a)
Federal courts of appeal have developed four different tests to
determine whether an organization qualifies as a religious
organization under Section 702(a) : (1) the secularization test, (2)
the sufficiently religious test, (3) the primarily religious test, and
(4) the LeBoon test.428 These tests yield different outcomes because
they are responsive to different factors.
The secularization test focuses on whether an organization
is "is, quite literally, [religious] only in name[,]" making it secular
and therefore prohibited from religious discrimination. 429 In Fike,
the court considered whether the defendant, United Methodist
Children's Home, constistuted a religious organization under Title
VII. The court observed that "[w]hile the original mission of the
United Methodist Children's Home may have been to provide a
Christian home for orphans and other children," the facts now
"show that as far as the direction given the day-to-day life for the
children at the Home is concerned, it is practically devoid of
religious content or training, as such. 43 °
The sufficiently religious test is illustrated by Killinger v.
Samford University, where the Eleventh Circuit focused
exclusively
on
the
organization's
observable
religious
characteristics. 431 The court found the university to be a religious
educational institution because
(1) it was founded as a theological institution by the Baptist
Convention and is a member of the Association of Baptist
Colleges and Schools, (2) its trustees were required to be
Baptists, (3) the university received approximately seven
percent of its funding from the Baptist Convention, (4) its
faculty who taught religion courses were required to subscribe
to the Baptist Statement of Faith and Message,
and (5) the
432
school's charter declared a religious purpose.

In contrast to Fike, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Eleventh
Circuit in Killinger held that "[e]ven if Samford has recently
428. See Dyer, supra note 249, at 554-60.

429. Fike v. United Methodist Children's Home of Va., Inc., 547 F.2d 286, 290
(E.D. Va. 1982), affd, 709 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1983).
430. Id. at 290.

431. Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196 (11th Cir. 1967).
432. Dyer, supra note 249, at 556 (citing Killinger, 113 F.3d at 199).
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distanced itself somewhat from the Alabama Baptist Convention,
it certainly has not given up its affiliation with Christianity and
with a predominant point of view within the Christian
perspective." 433 Both the U.S. Court of Appeals for Eighth Circuit
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit used a similar
"sufficiently religious" analysis to uphold the ability of religious
universities legally to employ individuals on the basis of
434
religion.
The primarily religious test arguably represents the
narrowest interpretation of religious institution under Title VII.
Under this test, the court inquires "whether the 'general picture' of
the institution is primarily religious or secular." 4 35 In adopting
this test, the Ninth Circuit, the only appeals court to adopt this
test, reasoned that "Congress's conception of the scope of section
702 was not a broad one" and that all "assumed that only those
institutions with extremely close ties to organized religions would
be covered. Churches, and entities similar to churches, were the
paradigm." 436 Although each case must turn on its own facts, in
Townley the defendant "was primarily secular because (1) it was
for-profit, (2) produced a secular product, (3) had no ties to
organized religion, and (4) did not state a religious mission in its
437
articles of incorporation."
Finally, the Third Circuit adopted its own test in LeBoon v.
Lancaster Jewish Community Cen. Ass'n, which combines factors
other circuits use to determine whether an organization qualifies
for the religious employer exemption under Section 702(a). 438 The
LeBoon test considers nine factors, including:
(1) whether the entity operates for a profit, (2) whether it
produces a secular product, (3) whether the entity's articles of
incorporation or other pertinent documents state a religious
purpose, (4) whether it is owned, affiliated with[,] or
financially supported by a formally religious entity such as a
church or synagogue, (5) whether a formally religious entity
participates in the management, for instance by having

433. Killinger v. Samford Univ., 917 F. Supp. at 773, 777 (N.D. Ala. 1996), aff'd,
113 F.3d 196 (11th Cir. 1997).
434. See EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 478-79 (5th Cir. 1980); Wirth v.
Coll. of the Ozarks, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1187 (W.D. Mo. 1998), affd, 208 F.3d 219
(8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); see also Dyer, supra note 249, at 556.
435. EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg., Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 n.14 (9th Cir. 1988)
(citation omitted).
436. Id. at 618.
437. Id. at 619.
438. Leboon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass'n, 503 F.3d 217, 226-27 (3rd
Cir. 2007).
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representatives on the board of trustees, (6) whether the
entity holds itself out to the public as secular or sectarian, (7)
whether the entity regularly includes prayer or other forms of
worship in its activities, (8) whether it includes religious
instruction in its curriculum, to the extent it is an educational
institution, and (9) whether its membership is made up by
coreligionists.439
The court noted that whether an organization is religious

"cannot be based on its conformity to some preconceived notion of
what a religious organization should do," but instead "must be
measured with reference to the particular religion identified by
the organization. Thus not all factors will be relevant in all cases,

440
and the weight given each factor may vary from case to case."
The Sixth Circuit uses a similar standard that considers slightly
441
different factors.

439. Id. at 226 (citations omitted).
440. Id. at 226-27.
441. See supra Part II.E.1 (discussing Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp.,
215 F.3d 618, 625-25 (6th Cir. 2000)).

